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
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
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1. H. 1857
A TREATISE

ON THE

ORIGIN

OF

EXPIATORY SACRIFICE.

BY

GEORGE STANLEY FABER, B.D.

RECTOR OF LONG-NEWTON.

Antiqua res est prænunciativa immolatio sanguinis, futuram
passionem mediatoris ab initio generis humani testificans:
hanc enim primus Abel obtulisse in sacris literis invenitur—
Sacrificium ergo, non solum cum justè imperat verus Deus,
sed etiam cum superbè exigit falsus deus, satis ostendit cui
debeatur. August. cont. Faust. Manich. lib. xxii. cap. 17. Oper.
vol. vi. p. 145. Colon. Agrip. 1616.



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TO
THE MOST REVEREND
WILLIAM MAGEE, D.D.
ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN,

*The Author of Discourses and Dissertations on the Scriptural
Doctrines of Atonement and Sacrifice,*

THIS TREATISE,

THE OBJECT OF WHICH IS TO ESTABLISH, ON SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, THE
PRIMITIVE DIVINE INSTITUTION OF

EXPIATORY SACRIFICE,

IS FITLY AND RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED

BY

HIS GRACE'S MOST OBEDIENT HUMBLE SERVANT,

GEORGE STANLEY FABER.

P R E F A C E.

A WORK has recently been published by Mr. Davison, under the title of *An Inquiry into the Origin and Intent of Primitive Sacrifice*.

I. In this work, the author teaches us, that *the peculiar rite of Expiatory Sacrifice* was, *for the first time*, divinely instituted at the promulgation of the Law by Moses: and he contends, that *anterior* to such promulgation of the Law, the practice of devoting sacrifice, *under the precise notion of thereby making an atonement*, was, to the early religionists, altogether unknown; for, in truth, we have neither any evidence extant nor any one positive example, by which we can distinctly prove, that, in the primitive worship, the rite of sacrifice was thought to possess an expiatory or particular virtue.

Hence he maintains, that the various sacrifices, offered up during the period of the Patriarchal Dispensation, were not, in their nature and intent, of that class of sacrifices, which are denominated *expiatory* or *particular*: and hence he consistently maintains also, that,

as the outward sign of an atonement had not been divinely instituted during the primitive or antemosaic ages; so neither had the doctrine, represented by that outward sign, been as yet divinely revealed.

On these principles, he denies, that primeval sacrifice, as offered up by Abel and Noah and Job, was of divine institution. For, since the respective oblations of these holy men were *not* piacular, there is no difficulty in conceiving them to have been of mere human origination and appointment: nor is there any need to introduce the Deity, for the purpose of loosing a knot, which admits of a perfectly easy independent solution.

Accordingly, as we have no *occasion* to maintain the divine institution of primitive sacrifice: so neither, from any testimony of Scripture, have we the least *warrant* for maintaining such an opinion.

II. Had Mr. Davison's work treated only of some curious literary speculation, which led not to any theological result of material consequence; however I might possibly have differed from him, I should not have felt it in any wise necessary to controvert his hypothesis.

But such, I apprehend, is by no means the case. His hypothesis respects not some mere indifferent question. Even to say nothing of its denying all knowledge of *the doctrine of an atonement* to the patriarchal worshippers, it respects a matter of most deep and most grave importance; a matter, which vitally touches *the entire*

system of typical prophecy through the medium of sacrifice.

In saying *the ENTIRE system of typical prophecy*, I speak not unadvisedly : on the contrary, I speak with full deliberation and conviction.

By the mouth of an inspired prophet, and (as Kimchi well remarks) in perfect accordance with the very peculiar phraseology of the Mosaic Law, God himself declares, that he did *not* command or institute the rite of sacrifice under the Levitical Dispensation : and Mr. Davison assures us, that he did *not* command or institute that rite under the preceding Dispensation of Patriarchism.

Such being the case, if the rite of sacrifice were NOT instituted of God either under the Patriarchal Dispensation or under the Levitical Dispensation, that rite, from first to last, must henceforth altogether cease to be esteemed *a DIVINE institution* : and thus the inevitable result from Mr. Davison's hypothesis, according to his own very just remark, will be, that *The rite of sacrifice, whether under the Patriarchal Dispensation or under the Levitical, " however it might express the piety " of the worshipper, cannot be reckoned among the " typical signatures of Christianity*."*

III. In his whole view of the present topic, I conceive Mr. Davison to be mistaken : yet certainly, unless

* See below, sect. iii. chap. 3. § I.

I had seemed to feel my ground tolerably firm under my feet, I should most conscientiously have remained silent; for, as we all know, a weak defence is more mischievous than even a powerful attack.

I could have wished indeed, that a much better man than myself, Archbishop Magee, would have taken up the subject: but this is a matter rather to be warmly desired than reasonably expected. Happily for the Church in *one* respect, however unfortunate in *another* respect, the situation of his Grace well nigh precludes the possibility of his entering into a somewhat nice and perplexed controversy: for the anxious occupation of *any* episcopate, pre-eminently the occupation of the *Irish* episcopate, is by no means favourable to that uninterrupted thought and undivided study, without the command of which it were perhaps scarcely prudent for any man to embark in a difficult theological discussion.

As for myself, since, in a private station, I have doubtless been able to reckon upon a measure of time and uninterruptedness which is denied to an Archbishop of Dublin; should competent judges pronounce my *Treatise on the Origin of Expiatory Sacrifice* to be a failure, let the blame rest, where alone it *ought* to rest, not on the cause, but on the author.

LONG-NEWTON RECTORY,

Jan. 28th, 1826.

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Those persons, who maintain the primeval divine institution of
piacular sacrifice, consider the scriptural history of the
offerings of Cain and Abel as speaking decidedly in their
favour. But to this opinion Mr. Davison objects, on the
score that the history, being really *neutral*, cannot be legi-
timately adduced in the way of *argument*. For he contends,
that the Hebrew word *Chattath*, which primarily denotes *sin*,
may denote, in its secondary sense, *a punishment for sin* as
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- (3.) Case of homologetic sacrifice, p. 178.
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4. That sacrifice, when not ordained of God, is no better than an act of mere superstitious will-worship, appears further from the circumstance, that no person *now* ever thinks of sacrificing, because no person *now* imagines that he can please God by the act of sacrifice. But, if sacrifice be *now* superstition, because it is not *now* commanded of God; it must equally have been superstition during the patriarchal ages, if, during those ages, it were a mere human institution, p. 180.
5. The answer, that sacrifice is now abrogated, because Christ, the end of sacrifice, has come, is wholly insufficient: for, in the first place, such an answer would account only for the cessation of expiatory sacrifice; and, in the second place, it travels quite wide of the hypothesis upon which the whole of the present discussion avowedly reposes, for, in the very nature of things, no *uncommanded* sacrifice, if such were the sacrifice of the patriarchal ages, can have been a prophetic type of the sacrifice of Christ. Hence, if *uncommanded* sacrifice were pleasing to God during the patriarchal ages, no reason can be assigned why it should not be equally pleasing to God in the present day: and the question will then still recur, Why do not *we* sacrifice, as well as the early patriarchs? p. 181.
6. The sum, therefore, of the matter is, that sacrifice of whatsoever description, if not commanded of God, can only have been an act of that precise gratuitous

superstition, which the Apostle censures under the name of *Will-worship*, and which evidently is represented as displeasing to God, p. 182.

- IV. Hence, finally the moral argument from the position, that a *superstitious observance, uncommanded of God, cannot be acceptable or well-pleasing to God*, when stated fully and correctly, demonstrates the divine origin of primitive sacrifice, and is itself altogether unaffected by the alleged confutation of Mr. Davison, p. 183.

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NOTICES OF OBJECTIONS TO THE OPINION, THAT EXPIATORY SACRIFICE WAS DIVINELY INSTITUTED AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PATRIARCHAL DISPENSATION, p. 185.

CHAPTER I.

Respecting the objection founded upon the alleged circumstance, that there is no express mention of the Primeval Divine Institution of Expiatory Sacrifice, p. 185.

Mr. Davison objects, that there is no express mention of the primeval divine institution of expiatory sacrifice, p. 185.

I. On the neutrality of the scriptural history of Cain and Abel, Mr. Davison says more than will be conceded, p. 188.

II. A truth may be conveyed in other modes, than that of a regular scholastic enunciation, p. 188.

1. Instance from the Socinian objection respecting the two-fold nature of Christ, p. 188.

2. Instance from the Socinian objection respecting the doctrine of the Trinity, p. 189.

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III. The brief reply to the objection is, that God **COMMANDS** Cain to devote a sin-offering, p. 191.

CHAPTER II.

Respecting the objection founded upon the alleged circumstance, that, while the Primitive Divine Institution of Expiatory Sacrifice is no where expressly mentioned, the Primitive Divine Institution of the Sabbath is carefully and specifically recorded, p. 192.

Mr. Davison objects, that, while the primeval divine institution of expiatory sacrifice is no where mentioned, the primeval divine institution of the sabbath is expressly recorded, p. 192.

- I. The objection is founded upon a palpable error : for the primeval divine institution of the sabbath, though it may be gathered *by induction*, is yet no where expressly recorded throughout the entire book of Genesis, p. 194.
- II. This matter is so obvious, that Justin and the earlier Fathers maintain, that the sabbath was first divinely instituted under Moses ; and that, as it was not a primitive institution, so the patriarchs did not observe it, p. 199.
- III. With them agree the more ancient Rabbins of the Jewish church, p. 203.

CHAPTER III.

Respecting the Objection founded upon the alleged circumstance, that there is no express mention of the atoning Virtue of Sacrifice under the Patriarchal Dispensation, p. 211.

Mr. Davison objects, that there is no express mention of the atoning virtue of sacrifice under the Patriarchal Dispensation, p. 211.

- I. To the present objection an answer has already been given by the adduction of direct scriptural testimony, that Cain was commanded of God to bring A SIN-OFFERING, p. 211.
- II. It may peradventure be said, that the term *sin-offering* does not necessarily involve the idea of *atonement by vicarious suffering*. Such a possible objection shall be answered by anticipation, p. 213.
 1. The word *Chattath*, as defined by Moses himself, INVARIABLY denotes a *sin-offering of atonement*, p. 213.

2. Moses, to whom the word was specially familiar, employs this precise word to describe the sacrifice which Cain was commanded to devote, p. 215.

CHAPTER IV.

Respecting the moral Objection to the rendering, A Sin-offering coucheth at the Door, p. 217.

Mr. Davison objects, that the rendering, *A sin-offering coucheth at the door*, is morally discordant with the general spirit of scripture, p. 217.

- I. His objection is wholly built upon an unproved and an unproveable assumption, that Cain, anterior to his sacrifice, had been a grievous moral offender, p. 218.
- II. He has totally misconceived the general drift and purpose of the whole history, p. 219.

CHAPTER V.

Respecting the Objection founded upon a supposed Retrogradation of the Levitical Dispensation, as viewed in reference to the Patriarchal Dispensation, p. 222.

Mr. Davison objects, that the maintenance of the *primitive divine institution of expiatory sacrifice* involves a retrogradation of the Levitical Dispensation, as viewed in reference to the Patriarchal Dispensation, p. 222.

- I. Piacular sacrifice, under each of the two earlier Dispensations, was the same in dignity and purpose. Hence, where there is no inequality, there can be no retrogradation, p. 225.
- II. But Mr. Davison argues, that, under the Law, expiation was made only for ceremonial offences; while, under Patriarchism, if expiation were made for any thing, it must have been made for moral offences. Hence, on such an hypothesis, the retrogradation still continues; p. 227.
 1. Mr. Davison departs from his own principle, p. 227.
 2. The principle itself is false: for Mr. Davison has con-

founded together two matters, which ought to have been carefully separated, p. 228.

3. Mr. Davison's inconclusive reasoning from the language of David and Paul, p. 230.

4. St. Paul expressly teaches us, that, so far as typical sacrifice *could* make expiation, the sacrifices under the Law made expiation for moral, no less than for ceremonial, offences, p. 235.

5. The same doctrine is maintained by the Jews, p. 238.

CHAPTER VI.

Respecting the Objection founded on the Declaration, that the System of the Gospel is a Mystery, which was hidden of old time, but which now is made manifest, p. 241.

Mr. Davison objects, that the system, which he opposes, is inconsistent with the declaration, that the Dispensation of the Gospel is a mystery, which was hidden of old time, but which now is made manifest, p. 241.

I. The true question respects, not the patriarchal *extent* of the knowledge of an atonement, but the patriarchal *existence* of the doctrine, p. 243.

II. Remarks on *written*, as opposed to *unwritten*, communications, p. 245.

CHAPTER VII.

Respecting the Objection, that the Idea of an Animal Couching at the Door of Cain is inconsistent with the recorded profession of Cain, p. 250.

Mr. Davison objects, that the idea of a *sin-offering couching at the door of the agriculturist Cain* is inconsistent with his recorded profession, p. 250.

I. Mr. Davison assumes, what he ought to have proved, that the door was really the door of Cain, p. 252.

II. We have an equal right to say, that it was the door of a consecrated tent or tabernacle. Each is a mere conjecture: and to found an *express* objection upon an unproved conjecture is criticism, p. 255.

CHAPTER VIII.

Respecting the Objection founded on the alleged Novelty of the Opinion, that Piacular Sacrifice was, from the first, divinely instituted under the Patriarchal Dispensation, p. 257.

Mr. Davison objects, that *the hypothesis of the primitive divine institution of sacrifice is a mere modern figment first struck out in the age of Puritanism*, and that *the early Fathers universally taught its primitive human institution*. In each member of his objection, Mr. Davison is mistaken, p. 257.

I. Mr. Davison builds his large assertion respecting the early Fathers on no more than **FOUR** adduced witnesses, p. 262.

1. Remarks on the citations and references of Spencer and Outram, on which Mr. Davison professes to build his much too large assertion, p. 264.

2. A conjecture, that *sacrifice was introduced into the Law from the Paganism of Egypt*, is no proof, that *the conjecturer maintained the PRIMITIVE human institution of sacrifice*, p. 267.

3. Out of fifteen or sixteen of the Fathers, that have been examined by the author of the present Treatise, about one half never enter upon the subject of sacrifice: and, as for the other half, though they certainly enter upon the subject; yet, with three exceptions, they are *totally silent* as to the primitive origin of sacrifice, whether it was human or divine, p. 271.

II. Mr. Davison's assertion, that *the hypothesis of the primitive divine institution of sacrifice is not older than the age of Puritanism*, is distinctly contradicted by the three exceptions, which have already been noticed, p. 275.

1. Among the Latin Fathers, Augustine, in the fourth century, maintained the primitive divine institution and the prophetic typical import of the patriarchal sacrifices beginning with the first-recorded sacrifice of Abel, p. 276.

(1.) Proof from the necessity of his language, p. 280.

(2.) Proof from his own explicit declaration, p. 281.

2. Among the Greek Fathers, Athanasius, also in the

fourth century, maintained the same doctrine as that which was held and taught by Augustine, p. 283.

(1.) Proof from the general drift of his argument, p. 284.

(2.) Proof from the peculiarity of his language, p. 286.

3. Among the Greek Fathers, Eusebius of Cesarèa, still in the fourth century, no less strenuously maintained the very same doctrine relative to the origin of sacrifice, p. 288.

III. Conclusion, p. 295.

A

TREATISE

ON THE

ORIGIN OF EXPIATORY SACRIFICE.



SECTION I.

PRELIMINARY MATTER.

CHAPTER I.

*Respecting the Character of a Religion suitable to
a fallen Creature.*

IF, to certain of his intellectual creatures, God be pleased to reveal a system of religion; that system *must* be a system ADAPTED to their necessities: for, otherwise, God will have acted vainly.

I. Now, that *The religion, which is SUITABLE to the condition of a sinless creature, is UNSUITABLE to the condition of a lapsed and therefore sinful creature*, must, I think, be acknowledged by every person who fairly considers the bearing of the question.

1. A sinless creature, not having offended his Creator, has no need to court reconciliation with him: neither has he any anxiety in regard to the vital point, *Whether a reconciliation be possible.*

2. But a fallen and therefore a sinful creature, having, by the hypothesis, offended his Creator, has need to court reconciliation with him: he is uncertain, without a revelation to that special purpose, whether reconciliation be possible: and, on the supposition of its impossibility, he must assuredly, so far as he himself and his own interests are concerned, feel the utter uselessness of *any* religious service; for, to a fallen creature, a religion, without a well-grounded hope of reconciliation, is a religion of utter despair; and a religion of utter despair is, in effect, no religion.

3. Hence it follows, that the religion, SUITABLE to the condition of a sinful creature, differs from the religion SUITABLE to the condition of a sinless creature, in the specific point of *its comprehending a revelation which shall set forth the possibility of a reconciliation with God*. Hence also, from the mere necessity of the matter, we may safely pronounce, that the religion, which holds NOT forth to a sinful creature *the possibility of a reconciliation with God*, is a religion totally UNSUITED to his case. And hence, finally, we may venture to assert, that *such* a religion is a religion, which, in the very nature of things, an all-wise God *could not* have communicated to him.

II. In laying down these positions, it will of

course be understood, that I speak exclusively of a religion SUITABLE to a fallen creature.

A religion, UNSUITABLE to a fallen creature, may doubtless *exist* in the world: because, as we may conceive it to have been possible, that God, in his wrath, might have *altogether* withheld from his apostate creatures a revelation of his purposes; so such a religion may have been *independently* struck out by erring man, through ignorance unconscious of his true condition.

But, in the very nature of things, no religion can be SUITABLE to the condition of a fallen creature, unless it holds forth *the possibility of a reconciliation with God*: and, consequently, since God never acts in vain, we may safely assert, that he would never reveal an UNSUITABLE religion.

The final result, therefore, is, that, *If God ever revealed a religion to a race of apostate creatures, that religion must, of very necessity, have taught the possibility of a reconciliation with God.*

CHAPTER II.

Respecting the Principle of Reconciliation avowedly set forth in the Religion, which God has actually communicated to Man, under the Aspect of a Religion suitable to a fallen Creature.

It will probably not be controverted, that the doctrine of a *possible reconciliation with God* is so essentially necessary to a religion *SUITABLE* to the condition of a fallen creature, that, in the very nature of things, no such religion can exist without it.

I. But the *possibility* of a reconciliation with God is one thing: and the *principle*, on which that reconciliation is to be effected, is quite another thing.

In regard to matter of fact, we know on abundantly sufficient evidence, that God has been pleased, through the joint medium of three successive Dispensations, to communicate a religion to man, professedly under the aspect of a *religion SUITABLE to the condition of a fallen creature.*

Hence, as might be anticipated from the very nature of things, this divinely-communicated

religion, however, during the lapse of various periods, it might be variously modified, never fails to hold forth the *possibility* of a reconciliation with God.

But, in holding forth the *possibility* of a reconciliation with God, the question arises, whether it also distinctly propounds the *principle* on which that reconciliation is to be effected.

II. For the purpose of answering this question, we must obviously advert to the declarations and statements of the divinely-communicated religion itself.

1. If, then, we first direct our attention to that consummating Dispensation which bears the name of *Christian* or *Evangelical*, we shall find, that not only is *the principle of reconciliation* fully developed, but also that *the reduction of the principle to effectual practice* is openly and unreservedly exhibited.

The *principle* of reconciliation is developed in THE DOCTRINE OF AN ATONEMENT: the *reduction of the principle to effectual practice* is exhibited in THE DEATH OF CHRIST UPON THE CROSS IN OUR STEAD AND ON OUR BEHALF AND FOR OUR BENEFIT.

Now, between these two matters, there is an obvious and important difference.

The *latter* could only be fully understood,

when it had actually occurred: the *former*, if revealed, might, as a consolatory article of faith, be sufficiently understood, long before the actual occurrence of the latter.

2. Such is the information, as to the reconciliatory principle, which we derive from the *latest* and *most perfect* modification of the religion communicated by God to sinful man.

If we next direct our inquiries retrogressively to that *earlier* form of it which we commonly style the *Levitical Dispensation*, we shall again find, that not only is the *principle of reconciliation* developed, but also that the *reduction of the principle to practice* is distinctly exhibited.

Under the Law, as under the Gospel, the *principle* of reconciliation is developed in THE DOCTRINE OF AN ATONEMENT: and, under the Law, in close correspondence with the Gospel, the *reduction of the principle to practice* is exhibited in THE VIOLENT DEATH OF VARIOUS APPOINTED ANIMAL VICTIMS.

After what precise manner, indeed, that *principle* was ultimately to be carried into *really beneficial effect*, could have been known to the Israelites under the Law, only with a great degree of indefiniteness. By the successive declarations of the prophets, an increasing light, no doubt,

was gradually thrown upon the subject: but, after all, the knowledge even of the most acute and the most inquisitive must largely have partaken of the indistinctness which ever characterizes unaccomplished predictions. Still, however, the ancient people of God had the *principle*. They had learned, not only the *possibility* of a reconciliation, but likewise the *principle* on which that reconciliation was to be effected. THEY WERE ACQUAINTED WITH THE DOCTRINE OF AN ATONEMENT.

III. Such being the case, so far as our inquiries have hitherto been carried, both the *possibility* and the *principle* of a reconciliation with God have been set forth in two successive forms of a religion, divinely-communicated and professedly adapted to the condition of a sinful creature.

CHAPTER III.

Respecting the Connection of the revealed Principle of Reconciliation with the outward Rite of piacular Sacrifice.

BUT neither the Christian Dispensation nor the Levitical Dispensation *commenced* with the fall

of man. That event occurred many ages *before* the promulgation even of the earliest of these two Dispensations. Man, therefore, yet *anterior* to the delivery of the law by Moses, required *a religion suitable to the condition of a sinful creature*: and this religion, if under the well-ascertained character of a divine revelation it any where exist, we shall find in the Dispensation usually denominated *Patriarchal*.

That *the doctrine of AN ATONEMENT, as developing the only true principle of man's reconciliation with God, was known to those who lived under the Patriarchal Dispensation*, I stop not at present to show by any arguments either direct or inductive. I shall rather prepare the way for future discussion, by making some remarks on the connection of the revealed principle of reconciliation with the outward act of *piacular sacrifice*.

The communication of God's will and purposes to fallen man distributes itself into three successive Dispensations: the Patriarchal, the Levitical, and the Christian.

That a close connection subsists between the three; so that they jointly constitute one and the same divine system of theology, exhibited indeed under three progressive forms or modifications, but holding forth uniformly to our

apostate race *the hope of a reconciliation with God through the promised instrumentality of a certain woman-born Deliverer*: no person, I think, who reads the entire volume of Holy Scripture with even ordinary attention, can reasonably hesitate to admit.

The existence, therefore, of such a *connection* will obviously prepare us to expect, in some leading particulars at least, a marked *affinity*.

I. Now the most cursory reader of the Bible can scarcely have failed to observe, simply as a naked matter of fact, that every of the three Dispensations is characterized by the very extraordinary rite of animal sacrifice: *animal sacrifice*, I mean, as contradistinguished from *vegetable oblation*. Each, with whatever object, recognises the sacrificial devotement, by a violent death, of that which possesses animal life.

Under the Evangelical Dispensation, the man Jesus Christ, mysteriously uniting the humanity to the divinity, is *himself* the sacrifice: under the Levitical Dispensation, and under the Patriarchal Dispensation, the sacrifice consists of various bestial victims.

Here then, in a point altogether arbitrary, we have, so far as the bare outward fact is concerned, an *affinity* strongly marked and readily

discerned. Whether the affinity extends beyond *the bare outward fact to the moral inward purpose*, has not, in the present stage of our inquiry, been as yet determined. *The outward fact* is indisputable: *the inward purpose*, in the three several cases of the three connected Dispensations, *abstractedly* may, or may not, be identical; for *identity of outward fact* does not of necessity involve *an identity of inward purpose*.

II. According to the general analogy of all God's works, the three connected Dispensations are clearly progressive.

Hence, if we desire a key to the whole system, we must obviously seek it in that *concluding* Dispensation which *consummates* and *perfects* its two allied predecessors.

Now, under this consummating Dispensation, *the outward fact is the sacrifice of an animated human victim*: and the object, which we wish to ascertain, is *the inward purpose or intention* of that sacrifice.

On such a point, we are by no means left in a state of vague uncertainty and bootless conjecture. We are assured, in language too plain to be misapprehended save by a predetermined manufacturer of systems, that *the inward purpose* of the sacrifice of Christ was strictly *piacular* or

expiatory. He died on the altar of the cross, in order that he might atone for our sins, and in order that he might thus effect our reconciliation with his justly-offended Father: he became strictly what the Hebrews denominate *a sin-offering of atonements* *.

Such, if there be any certainty in language, was *the inward purpose of the outward fact* of our Saviour Christ's sacrificial devotement †.

III. We have now obtained what we may not unreasonably presume to be the key of the whole system. Presumption, however, is not assurance. Hence, although *piacularity be the inward purpose* of animal sacrifice under the Christian Dispensation, we have no right forthwith to determine positively, that it must *therefore be the inward purpose* of animal sacrifice under each of the two preceding Dispensations: still less are we warranted in asserting *a studied and intentional connection, between the various animal sacrifices under Patriarchism and the Law on the one hand, and the one animal sacrifice under the Gospel on the other hand*. Before judgment is pronounced, evidence must be examined.

* Exod. xxx. 10.

† Rom. v. 6—11. Ephes. v. 2.

1. Let us begin with examining the evidence attendant upon the Levitical Dispensation.

(1.) Here the question is, Whether, from any sufficient authority, we can learn something fixed and definite, as to *the inward purpose* of animal sacrifice under the Law of Moses.

Now, on this point, the language, both of the Levitical Dispensation itself, and of its successor the Christian Dispensation, is full and explicit.

The language of the Levitical Dispensation itself pronounces, that *the blood of the animal victim is shed upon the altar, in order to make an atonement for the souls of the offending Israelites**.

And, analogously, the language of the Christian Dispensation pronounces, that *the high-priest of Israel went alone once every year into the second tabernacle with blood, which he offered for himself and for the errors of the people†*.

From such testimonies it is evident, that *the inward purpose* of animal sacrifice, under the Levitical Dispensation, was *piacular*. Whence we learn, that its *inward purpose*, both under the Levitical Dispensation and under the Christian Dispensation, is strictly *identical*. In each case, the victim is devoted *piacularly*: that is to say,

* Levit. xvii. 11.

† Heb. ix. 7.

in each case, the victim is devoted *under the precise aspect of making an atonement*.

(2.) The *outward fact* and the *inward purpose* of animal sacrifice, both under the Christian Dispensation and under the Levitical Dispensation, being thus strictly *identical*; we are naturally led to make yet another inquiry.

Here then the question is, Whether this *identity of outward fact and of inward purpose*, so far as the case of animal sacrifice under the Christian Dispensation and the Levitical Dispensation is concerned, be a *mere identity*: or whether it involves also the additional idea of a *studied and intentional connection*.

The present question is fully answered in the Scriptures of the New Covenant. From them we learn, that there is not only *an identity of outward fact and of inward purpose*: but likewise that there is a *studied and intentional connection, between the various piacular animal sacrifices under the Law, and the one piacular animal sacrifice under the Gospel*. The piacular sacrifices under the Law, we are assured, had in themselves no moral efficacy of making an atonement: they were potent, simply as prophetic types, or images, or pictures, or shadowy representations of that one piacular sacrifice under the Gospel, which really possessed a

moral efficacy of atoning for sin; they taught and exhibited that atonement, which they themselves intrinsically were unable to accomplish*.

2. We have now ascertained both *the actual existence* and *the inward purpose* and *the intentional connection* of animal sacrifice, as subsisting under the successive Levitical and Christian Dispensations; but, with respect to the Patriarchal Dispensation, we have hitherto ascertained nothing more than *the actual existence* of animal sacrifice.

(1.) *Whether the inward purpose of the patriarchal animal sacrifice were, or were not, the same, as the inward purpose of the levitical and the evangelical animal sacrifice; and Whether any intentional connection subsisted between the several animal sacrifices of all the three Dispensations, as there confessedly subsists between those of the two latter Dispensations:* these important points have not, as yet, been determined.

At present, therefore, we can only venture to say, that the presumption, which arises from harmony and analogy, strongly inclines us to favour the affirmative side of the question. For, since the three successive Dispensations are compo-

* John i. 29. 1 Corinth. v. 7. Heb. vii. 19—28. viii. 1—6. ix. 6—28. x. 1—14. Rev. v. 6. xiii. 8. See Outram, de Sacrif. lib. i. c. 18. § I, II.

nent parts of one great and consistent whole, and since in the matter of animal sacrifice there is a clear consent and connection between two out of the three Dispensations ; it seems more probable, as it is certainly more accordant with analogy, that all the three should be characterized by a similar consent and connection.

(2.) Should this presumption ultimately ripen into a well-established fact, the consequence is abundantly manifest.

As the real piacular sacrifice of Christ under the Gospel, and as the shadowy piacular sacrifices of animal victims under the Law, were alike ordained of God : so, if the animal sacrifices under Patriarchism were shadowy piacular sacrifices of the same nature as those under the Law ; they must of necessity have been also ordained of God, and could not have been an unauthorized ordinance of mere human invention.

For, though man himself, without any revelation from heaven, might perhaps have discovered the rite of *eucharistic* or of *homologetic* or of *deprecatory* sacrifice ; it is difficult to comprehend, by what rational mental process he could have discovered the totally dissimilar rite of *piacular* sacrifice : and, even if he *had* discovered it, still we may safely pronounce, that no *intentional* connec-

tion could possibly have existed between animal sacrifice under Patriarchism and animal sacrifice under Christianity, unless God himself had alike instituted each sacrifice; because an *intentional* connection involves, of plain necessity, a *prophetic* reference*.

* Mr. Davison has justly pointed out the glaring defect in that system, by which Bishop Warburton would account for the alleged primeval *human* institution of EVERY kind of sacrifice.

Through a not inconceivable train of thought, man, seeking to clothe his ideas with expressive actions, might peradventure independently arrive at the practice of *eucharistic* and *homologetic* and *simply deprecatory* oblation: but, when, through any essayed line of argument, we attempt to follow him to the practice of *expiatory* sacrifice, we immediately find our course altogether impeded.

Bishop Warburton's scheme, as Mr. Davison well states the matter, "describes aptly and naturally, how the devoted victim might be made to express the *guilt* and *self-condemnation* of the suppliant: how it could indicate or convey or conduce to the *atonement* required, it is unable to explain. The dramatic worshipper becomes mute: the *luciferous principle*, as the author calls it, that of representation by action, the guiding torch of his theory, goes out. So it will always be. For human principles can no more account for "expiation of sin, than human resources could provide it." Inquiry into the Origin of Primitive Sacrifice, p. 37.

I have much gratification in adducing this remark of Mr. Davison, because I myself had *already* made *precisely* the *same* remark on Bishop Warburton's system *two years anterior* to the publication of Mr. Davison's work. See my Treatise on the Genius and Object of the Patriarchal, the Levitical, and the Christian Dispensations, book i. chap. 5. § III. 2. vol. i. p. 214—223. Such an undesigned coincidence is a strong proof, that the estimate of Bishop War-

(3.) I have only to add, that, if God were the original institutor of piacular sacrifice under Patriarchism, the very circumstance of its *piacularity* will alone, without further proof, evince *its intentional connection with the consummating piacular sacrifice under Christianity*. For, even to say nothing of the analogy afforded by the condition of piacular sacrifice under the Law, the whole reasoning of the great Apostle would imperatively drive us to such a conclusion.

From him we learn, that piacular bestial sacrifice is utterly worthless and inefficient, except so far as it shadows out the alone efficacious piacular human sacrifice under the Gospel. From its typical character it derives its sole value. Abstractedly from that character, it is a moral nothing. Hence, if God really instituted the rite of piacular sacrifice under Patriarchism, he must, of very necessity, according to the argument of St. Paul, have instituted it, not independently, but with an intentional shadowy reference to the one availing piacular sacrifice under the Gospel.

burton's system, made alike by Mr. Davison and myself, is accurate and well-founded.

CHAPTER IV.

A Statement of the leading Objections to the Opinion, that the Rite of Piacular Sacrifice was originally instituted by God himself under the Patriarchal Dispensation.

AN ingeniously-plausible work, respecting the origin and intent of primitive sacrifice, has been recently given to the world by Mr. Davison*.

In a small compass, the very estimable author seems to have condensed all that can be said on that side of the question which he himself has been finally led to espouse. Hence I deem it wholly superfluous to employ any other work as my text-book. If Mr. Davison has failed of convincing me that *primitive sacrifice under the Patriarchal Dispensation was of mere human origin*, I utterly despair of seeing my supposed error effectually corrected by a writer of inferior attainments.

I. The main hinge of the matter, in the pre-

* An Inquiry into the Origin and Intent of Primitive Sacrifice. By John Davison, B.D., late fellow of Oriel College, Oxford.

sent stage of the discussion, turns upon the specific character of the sacrifice offered.

1. To speak abstractedly and without entering at large into the question under all its bearings, an *eucharistic sacrifice* may or may not, in the first instance, have been of divine appointment: for, on a rapid inspection of the subject, it might seem uncertain, whether man *spontaneously* offered to God gifts expressive of his gratitude, or whether God *commanded* him to make that rite a constituent part of his outward adoration.

2. On the same principle, as a symbol of man's contrition and self-condemnation, or as indicating a *confession* that he justly deserves the punishment of death at the hands of his offended Creator, a living victim may, or may not, in the first instance, have been devoted by the special appointment of God: for, provided there be no sufficient grounds for maintaining a contrary opinion, perhaps it is not absolutely impossible, that the practice may have occurred to man himself without any direct revelation from heaven.

3. With a much higher, or (to speak more properly) with a *full* degree of assurance, we may safely assert, that, for the simple purpose of *deprecating* God's wrath, the crude notion of

devoting a placatory sacrifice *MUST, independently of any divine command, have occurred, in the first instance, to some conscious and panic-stricken offender*: for, though such an unhallowed mode of appeasing the Deity cannot, consistently with his well-known attributes, have ever been *enjoined by the Deity himself*; yet the mistaken idea, that *punishment may be averted or bought off by a voluntary fine or gift or bribe offered to God on the part of the culprit*, presents itself to the human mind without any effort or difficulty*.

4. But the matter assumes a very different aspect, when the case of *expiatory sacrifice* comes to be considered. Man, peradventure, may express his gratitude to God by uncommanded gifts; or he may, conceivably, set forth his contrition and self-condemnation by the uncommanded symbolical slaughter of an animal; or he may plausibly, because analogically to his dealings with his fellow men, seek to deprecate the wrath of heaven by an uncommanded fine or bribe: but to propound and build upon the idea, essentially inherent in, and expressly con-

* Accordingly, a very large proportion of pagan sacrifices was avowedly offered up under this precise idea. See Homer, *Iliad*. lib. ix. ver. 492-497. Ovid, *Art. Amat.* lib. iii. ver. 651-656. Pers. *Satir.* ii. ver. 29, 30. But see below, sect. ii. chap. 3. § II. 3. (1.)

veyed by, a *piacular sacrifice*, can only, in the absence of a divine revelation to that purpose, be an act, of which (as Mr. Davison well remarks*) no consistent and satisfactory account can be given, either from the light of nature or from the principles of reason. Hence, if I mistake not, it is impossible to conceive, how the wild presumption of an *uncommanded* piacular sacrifice can have been any other than an utter abomination to God: and hence, unless my view of the question be altogether inaccurate, it will follow, that, if, anterior to the law of Moses, God ever *accepted* a manifestly piacular sacrifice, both the rite of piacular sacrifice and its attendant palmary idea of an atonement must have been *ordained* and *revealed* by himself†.

* Inquiry, p. 27.

† In making these concessions, relative to the *possibility* under certain particular aspects, of the mere human invention of ANIMAL SACRIFICE, it has been my wish to give every argumentative advantage to the theory of Mr. Davison. But, after all that has been said by Bishop Warburton and himself, we may not unreasonably doubt, whether, *independently* of a divine command, and *as contradistinguished* from mere vegetable oblation, ANIMAL SACRIFICE, which involves the practice of slaughtering and burning an innocent and sensitive victim, could *ever*, under *any* aspect, have been adopted as a rite likely to gain the favour of the Deity.

I. On this point, we ourselves, accustomed as we are from our infancy to the perusal of scripture, are perhaps not altogether competent judges. Would we learn how so

II. To its fullest extent, this principle is evidently admitted by Mr. Davison: for, in truth,

singular an institution *must* strike the minds of thinking men who had not been prepossessed by our own course of early education, we should do well to hear the remarks of those, who, independently of the light afforded by revelation, philosophically contemplated the bare rite of ANIMAL SACRIFICE as it existed under paganism.

1. Now it is a remarkable fact, that persons, thus circumstanced, have not unfrequently expressed their astonishment how and upon what rational principles so strange an institution as that of ANIMAL SACRIFICE could ever have originated: for, as to the notion of its being *pleasing* to the Deity, such a matter struck them as being a manifest impossibility.

(1.) Thus we are told, that Pythagoras and Plato, so far from being able to account for the origin of ANIMAL SACRIFICE on any plausibly-rational grounds, expressed their amazement how the dismal, though universal, custom of defiling all places with the blood of brute beasts could ever, in the first instance, have been excogitated. Jamb. de Vit. Pythag. p. 106-118.

(2.) Thus also Porphyry introduces an ancient Greek poet, who roundly declares the utter moral impossibility of ANIMAL SACRIFICE being grateful to the gods, notwithstanding men hoped to gain their favour by the adoption of such an ordinance. Porphyr. de Abstin. lib. ii. § 58. p. 96.

(3.) And thus Porphyry himself, espousing the sentiments of Theophrastus, strenuously argues against the practice of ANIMAL SACRIFICE, as being clearly both unlawful and noxious and unholy.

When we slaughter an animal which has been guilty of no injustice, says he, do we not practically confess, that we ourselves act unjustly? Therefore, on the ground of honour, we ought in no wise to sacrifice animals. Neither ought we to sacrifice them for the sake of procuring certain benefits. For he, who seeks to obtain a benefit through an act of injustice, may well incur the suspicion of entertaining but small gratitude

the whole of his work is tacitly, perhaps I may rather say *expressly*, built upon it.

for any benefit which he may receive. Therefore we ought not to sacrifice animals to the gods, through a hope of deriving benefits from them. Hence, if we may not sacrifice animals for any of these reasons, it is manifest, that any sacrifice of animals to the gods cannot but be unlawful. Theophrast. et Porphy. apud Euseb. Præp. Evan. lib. iv. c. 15. p. 90, 91. Lutet. Rob. Stephan. 1544.

2. These masters of reasoning among the Gentiles were encountered by a fact, alike remarkable and indisputable; *the universal prevalence of ANIMAL SACRIFICE.* For the origination of the rite, under the aspect of a human invention, they professed themselves unable to account on any satisfactory principles: and Porphyry, after Theophrastus, argues, that the practice is altogether irreconcilable to right reason, and that on no such ground can the difficulty be solved.

3. I have thought it proper to state these particulars, by way of evincing the liberality of my concessions to Mr. Davison: for, under the authority of the ancients, I *might* have contended, that *the origin of ANIMAL SACRIFICE, as a mere human institution, is unaccountable on any satisfactory principles of right reason.*

II. Perhaps it may not be unimportant, or at least not uninteresting, to add, that Grotius, who advocated *the mere human origin of primitive sacrifice*, was so fully convinced of the impossibility of *uncommanded ANIMAL SACRIFICE* having been offered up by the pious anterior to the deluge, that he actually denied the oblation of Abel to have *been* an animal sacrifice; contending, that Abel devoted, not a firstling from his flock, but only the milk and the wool of his best sheep. Grot. in Gen. iv. 4. apud Outram. de Sacrif. lib. i. c. 1. § III. p. 3, 4.

The circumstance affords a very curious instance of the chivalrous determination evinced by a hard-pressed controvertist, to hazard any assertion rather than give up a

Under such circumstances, the question becomes narrowed, as he himself very judiciously has narrowed it to a single point:—

WHETHER ANY OF THE ANIMAL SACRIFICES, APPROBATIVELY OFFERED UP DURING THE CONTINUANCE OF THE PATRIARCHAL DISPENSATION, WERE, OR WERE NOT, PIACULAR.

If *any* of them *were* piacular; then, by the very terms of the argument, those piacular sacrifices must have been instituted of God: if *none* of them were piacular; then the primitive sacrifices, being universally either eucharistic or homologetic or deprecatory, can never be demonstrated, through the medium of any absolutely-inherent necessity, to have been of divine institution.

III. Thus fully aware, as a reasoning mind

favourite theory. This, however, is certain, that Grotius, like the ancients, found himself unable to account for the existence of *uncommanded* ANIMAL SACRIFICE on any conceivable or satisfactory principles of right reason.

III. As a simple matter of fact, it is my own belief, that not only *piacular sacrifice*, but likewise *eucharistic sacrifice* and *homologetic sacrifice*, was ordained of God from the beginning. The grossness of mere *deprecatory sacrifice*, in which it is wildly hoped to buy off the wrath of the Deity through the medium of a bribe or gift, exactly on the same principle as a wealthy offender may avert punishment by bribing a corrupt judge, is *alone*, as the very internal necessity of the case requires, of purely *human* institution. See below, sect. iii. chap. 4.

like that of Mr. Davison could not but be aware, that to ADMIT *the divinely-approved existence of piacular sacrifice before the promulgation of the Law*, was virtually to ADMIT also *the divine institution of piacular sacrifice under the antecedent Dispensation of Patriarchism*, he adopts, I had almost said *instinctively*, the ONLY foundation, upon which his superstructure can rest with any measure of security. The foundation is this.

DENYING *the divine institution of primitive sacrifice*, he DENIES also *its piacularity*. In other words, DENYING *the divine institution of primitive sacrifice*, he DENIES, altogether, even the BARE *existence*, and, therefore, of course, *the DIVINELY-APPROVED existence, of piacular sacrifice anterior to the promulgation of the Law of Moses*.

IV. His leading arguments, to this effect, may, I believe, be reduced under two heads.

1. He contends, that *we have no evidence whatsoever of the existence of the doctrine of an atonement previous to the delivery of the Law by the hand of Moses ; that doctrine, when for the first time promulgated under the Law, being an ENTIRELY NEW doctrine*.

Whence it will obviously follow, that, *if God did NOT reveal to the patriarchal religionists the*

doctrine of an atonement, they could not, with the divine sanction and approbation, have had the rite of piacular sacrifice.

2. And he further contends, that, *as we have no evidence of the existence of the doctrine of an atonement anterior to the delivery of the Law ; so, with strict consistency, we have no evidence that primitive patriarchal sacrifice was a divine institution.*

For, since primitive patriarchal sacrifice was not piacular, and since therefore it might well have been instituted by *man* himself ; Scripture is wholly and remarkably silent, as to its fancied, but utterly superfluous, institution by *God*.

V. On these grounds he denies, altogether, both the *BARE existence, and the DIVINELY-APPROVED existence, of piacular sacrifice anterior to the delivery of the Law :* and on these same grounds, the sole obstacle being now removed, he finally concludes, that *the origin of primitive patriarchal sacrifice was PURELY HUMAN.*

CHAPTER V.

Remarks on the Concession, that the Doctrine of an Atonement by Animal Sacrifice cannot be deduced from the Light of Nature, or from the Principles of Reason.

RESPECTING Mr. Davison's two grand objectory arguments, as specified above, I shall say nothing at present in the way of direct controversy*. Hereafter, in their proper places, they shall each be fully noticed and discussed†. Meanwhile, for the purpose of making certain remarks upon it, and of drawing certain conclusions from it, I shall here preparatively give at large his own statement of a concession, not less judicious in point of reasoning, than important in regard to the general question.

I. Mr. Davison's statement of this concession is couched in the terms following :—

“ Instead of attempting to deduce the doctrine
“ of *expiation and atonement by animal sacrifice*
“ from the light of nature or the principles of
“ reason, I confess myself unable to comprehend;

* See above, sect. i. chap. 4. § IV. 1, 2.

† See below, sect. ii, and iii.

“ with the most ignorant, how it can ever be
“ grounded on any such principles, or justified by
“ them. There exists no discernible connection
“ between the one and the other. On the con-
“ trary, nature has nothing to say for such an
“ expiatory power ; and reason, every thing to
“ say against it. For, that the life of a brute
“ creature should ransom the life of a man ; that
“ its blood should have any virtue to wash away
“ his sin, or purify his conscience, or redeem
“ his penalty ; or that the involuntary sufferings
“ of a being, itself unconscious and irrational,
“ should have a moral efficacy to his benefit or
“ pardon, or be able to restore him with God :
“ these are things, repugnant to the sense of rea-
“ son, incapable of being brought into the scale
“ of the first ideas of nature, and contradictory to
“ all genuine religion natural and revealed. For,
“ as to the remission of sin, it is plainly alto-
“ gether within the prerogative of God ; an act
“ of his mere mercy : and, since it is so, every
“ thing relating to the conveyance and the sanc-
“ tion, the possession and the security of it, can
“ spring only from his appointment. Reason
“ teaches repentance, as a preliminary condition
“ to the hope of pardon ; but reason can do no
“ more. External rites merely human, whether

“ rites of sacrifice or any other, may exhibit the
“ repentance: but they cannot rise above the effi-
“ cacy of that inward act which they exhibit.
“ They cannot supply the shortness, or cure the
“ infirmity, or satisfy the doubt, of its preten-
“ sions. The human instruments are here infi-
“ nitely unequal to the end proposed. They may
“ speak *the suppliant suing for pardon*: they can
“ never speak *the suppliant absolved*. And, though
“ mere natural reason, when best informed, may
“ not always have thought justly, or argued so-
“ berly, on the subject of repentance; we may
“ confidently assert, that one of its last resources
“ would have been that of adopting the blood of
“ a victim as the positive remedy for the guilt of
“ moral transgression.

“ If, therefore, the primitive age had its ex-
“ piatory sacrifices, sacrifices framed according
“ to this standard, it would be difficult to ac-
“ count for them as rational rites; still more
“ difficult to think that, under the palpable inca-
“ pacity of their human origin, they could have
“ been accepted by God. No: expiatory sacri-
“ fice must have been of God’s own appointment,
“ to reconcile it either to God, or to man himself,
“ till he was fallen under a deplorable super-
“ stition*.”

* Davison’s Inquiry, p. 27–29.

II. Such is Mr. Davison's very important concession: and, from it, I would draw the following conclusions.

Let *expiatory sacrifice* have originated where and when it may, it MUST, if *approved* of God, have been *instituted* by God.

Its leading doctrine, that of *an atonement*, cannot be deduced from the light of nature, or from the principles of reason: in the fertile soil of a guessing superstition, it might possibly, though accidentally and unauthoritatively, spring up.

Now God, we know, cannot approve of unwarranted and presumptuous superstition; and man, we know, could not have reached the doctrine of an atonement from the light of nature, or from the principles of reason.

Hence, on the present concession, it follows, that *if God can be shown to have received WITH APPROBATION piacular sacrifice anterior to the promulgation of the Law, or if piacular sacrifice anterior to the promulgation of the Law can be shown to have NOT originated from a guessing superstition: then, with the full consent of Mr. Davison himself, the divine institution of piacular sacrifice, even under the Patriarchal Dispensation, and even anterior to the Levitical Dispensation, will, independently of any other argument, have been sufficiently demonstrated.*

But, if, in addition to this argument from *the DIVINELY APPROVED existence of piacular sacrifice anterior to the delivery of the Law*, it can be shown, on the testimony of Scripture, both that *the earliest recorded sacrifice was piacular*, that *piacular sacrifice was in the beginning instituted of God*, and that *the rite of piacular sacrifice was accordingly observed during the patriarchal ages under the express sanction of God himself*: the proof of *the divine primordial origin of piacular sacrifice* will then be as complete, as perhaps can be reasonably desired or expected.

SECTION II.

EVIDENCE OF THE DIVINELY APPROVED EXISTENCE OF
THE DOCTRINE OF AN ATONEMENT PREVIOUS TO THE
DELIVERY OF THE LAW FROM MOUNT SINAI.

CHAPTER I.

Respecting the Assertion, that, at the Delivery of the Law, the Doctrine of an Atonement was a New Doctrine, of which we find no probable vestige in the Primitive Religion.

AN assertion has recently been hazarded, that, at the time when the Law of Moses was promulgated, the doctrine of AN ATONEMENT was altogether a NEW doctrine, of which in primeval theology we can discover no probable traces.

“ It will be found,” says Mr. Davison, “ that, “ In the primitive religion, we have actually no evidence extant, no one positive example, of any expiatory atoning virtue ascribed to the sacrifice. This “ is a material point, which I state. But I appeal to the Scripture History : that History, I “ believe, will fully sustain the statement made.

“ Turn next to the Mosaic Law. See what a

“ different scene of things instantly meets our
“ view; and how prominent the difference.

“ *For the life of the flesh is in the blood: and I*
“ *have given it to you, upon the altar, to make an*
“ *atonement for your souls, for it is the blood that*
“ *maketh an atonement for the soul*.*

“ This is the doctrine of the Mosaic sacri-
“ fice: and the whole body of the Mosaic Law
“ is sprinkled with the atoning power of blood.

“ *But this, I say, is A NEW DOCTRINE: a doctrine*
“ *of which we find no positive information, nor any*
“ *probable vestige in the primeval religion.*

“ And, though the transference has been very
“ confidently made, it is most evident, that we
“ have no right to transfer this doctrine of the
“ subsequent law to the elder history. In the
“ Mosaic Economy, the expiatory sacrifice is
“ pre-eminent: the atoning application of blood
“ is perpetually enforced: the need and the use
“ of that atonement are constantly inculcated.
“ But all this is by *a confessed institution.* The
“ divine sanction, promulged in this subsequent
“ religion, is the proper, the unambiguous, the
“ sole principle of it.

“ *Here then, in the Mosaic Law, the declared ex-*
“ *piatory power of sacrifice, of a certainty, BEGINS.*

* Levit. xvii. 11.

“ Here also commences the typical character
“ of sacrifice, as a rite of *atonement*, on the stock
“ of *an acknowledged institution*.

“ From this stock, sacrifice bears its evidence,
“ on solid grounds, and with unqualified force,
“ to that which is the one conspicuous and une-
“ quivocal object of its typical character, the
“ grace of the Christian atonement.

“ And, as the *human* principle of *expiatory*
“ *sacrifice* can never be vindicated at all, so the
“ *divine* principle of it, in the Mosaic Law,
“ will never be explained to any purpose, with
“ satisfaction to our reason, or with honour to
“ the divine economy, except by its reference,
“ as a preparatory rite, and as a prophetic sign,
“ directed to its pre-ordained prototype in the
“ Evangelical Dispensation *.”

* Inquiry, pp. 29, 31-33. It may be proper here briefly to observe, that the whole of Mr. Davison’s argument is avowedly built upon the ground, that *The doctrine of an atonement was, FOR THE FIRST TIME, revealed under the Law of Moses.*

With this position I have no *immediate* concern: for my present business is with his other position, that *The doctrine of an atonement was UNKNOWN and UNSANCTIONED anterior to the promulgation of the Mosaic Law.*

Yet, even here, lest I should be thought to make a *concession* which I in no wise make, it must be permitted me to put the following not unimportant question to Mr. Davison.

In

I. In discussing with Mr. Davison a very important topic of theology, I should be sorry to appear unhandsomely captious ; but I certainly think that, in the preceding passage, he has by no means expressed himself with sufficient caution and accuracy.

His words import, that *The very notion of an atonement, as connected with the rite of animal sacrifice, was UTTERLY UNKNOWN during the patriarchal ages : and they furthermore distinctly intimate that, As the doctrine of an atonement was, FOR THE FIRST TIME, revealed in the Law of Moses, so the doctrine in question was, at the era of this its earliest revelation, AN ALTOGETHER NEW DOCTRINE ; a doctrine of which we find no positive information, nor any probable vestige, in the primeval religion.*

II. Language of this kind, so far as I can judge, is much too large and comprehensive. It neither corresponds with matter of fact, nor does

In what part of the entire Law of Moses, from its first ordinance to its last enactment, does he find ANY EXPLICIT AND AVOWED REVELATION of the doctrine of an atonement, under the specific aspect of A NEW AND HITHERTO UNHEARD-OF DOCTRINE ?

Throughout the whole code of the Mosaic Law, I myself, after a long search, have been able to discover nothing more, than THE RECOGNITION AND MODIFICATION of a principle, ALREADY existing, and ALREADY quite familiar to the Israelites. This subject will, in its proper place, be resumed hereafter. See below, sect. iii. chap. 3. § II.

it fully agree even with Mr. Davison's own abatements and allowances.

1. In regard to simple matter of fact, *the doctrine of an atonement to be effected through the vicarious medium of a bloody piacular sacrifice*, most assuredly existed prior to the delivery of the Law of Moses.

Hence Mr. Davison is inaccurate in his assertion, that, *When that doctrine was made a constituent part of the Levitical Dispensation, it was A NEW DOCTRINE.*

For, even on the testimony of that identical Scripture History, to which he himself appeals, it was *not* A NEW DOCTRINE: unless, indeed, we can justly call *that* A NEW DOCTRINE, which, however it originated, was at least *already* in existence *anterior* to the authoritative promulgation of the law.

(1.) When the Israelites entered the land of Canaan, they found the inhabitants addicted to the practice of human sacrifice: and, notwithstanding the solemn warning which they had received, they also themselves sacrificed their sons and their daughters to the demon-gods of the country *.

* Deut. xviii. 9, 10. 2 Kings iii. 27. xvi. 3. Psalm cvi. 35-38.

This was the practice of the natives, at the time when the Israelites invaded Palestine. But the practice itself was no novelty. It had existed, not only anterior to the invasion of Palestine, but anterior likewise to the yet more early promulgation of the law. This is evident from the recorded denunciations against the practice.

Israel quitted Egypt in the year before Christ 1491: and, in the following year, or in the year 1490, the whole of the ceremonial law, contained in the book of Leviticus and in the latter part of the book of Exodus, was delivered*.

Now, in the ceremonial law then delivered, we find it expressly stated, that *the people of the land, hereafter to be possessed by the Israelites, were, even at that time, ALREADY addicted to the practice of human sacrifice*: and the language of the inspired writer is such as plainly to import, that they had *long* been addicted to this horrid abomination†. The rite, therefore, of human sacrifice most indisputably existed *anterior* to the promulgation of the law.

(2.) Such is the recorded *fact*: and the *notion*, associated with these offerings, was strictly *piacular*.

* Usser. Annal. Vet. Test. in A. A. C. 1490. p. 25-27.

† Levit. xviii. 21, 24, 25, 27, 28. xx. 1-5.

On this important point, the language of the prophet Micah permits us not to entertain a doubt. In a passage, plainly allusive to the human sacrifices of Canaan and Phœnicia, sacrifices too often imitated by the apostate Israelites, he distinctly teaches us, that an atoning virtue was ascribed to such oblations.

*Shall I give my first-born, an offering for my transgression : the fruit of my body, a sin-offering for my soul * ?*

* Micah vi. 7. I have given what I deem a somewhat more exact translation of the original, than that which occurs in our common English version: but, in either case, the sense is the same.

Micah, with an abundantly clear allusion (as Abp. Newcome justly remarks) to the bloody rites of ancient Palestine, distinctly specifies, that, among the Canaanites and Phœnicians, and thence also among their depraved copyists the Israelites, the notion, attached to human sacrifice, was, that *A man's first-born might be devoted as a sin-offering for his soul*: that is to say, soul for soul, life for life, body for body. Accordingly, with a singular correspondence to the words of Micah, the idea is precisely thus explained by Porphyry. *Πρῶτον ἱερεῖον θῆσαι μυθεύονται, ψυχὴν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς αἰτουμένους.* Porphyr. de Abstin. lib. iv. § 15. The testimony of Sanchoniathon, as to the immemorial doctrine and practice of the old Phœnicians, is the same as that of the Hebrew prophet. Pursuant to a very ancient custom, which required kings and rulers, in the event of great public calamities, to devote, as a ransom to the avenging demons (λύτρον τοῖς τιμωροῖς δαίμοσι), the best-beloved of their children, in the place of the destruction of the whole community (ἀντὶ τῆς πάντων φθορᾶς); Cronus, he relates, a

The doctrine of an atonement had, indeed, by these corrupt religionists, been most lamentably abused in symbolic practice: but still the doc-

primitive king and god of the country, in the course of a disastrous war, sacrificed, on this identical principle, his only son Jëud. He adds very remarkably, that persons, thus devoted, were sacrificed *mystically*. See Sanchon. apud Euseb. Præp. Evan. lib. i. c. 10.

To enter into this subject, after Dr. Outram and Abp. Magee, were plainly superfluous: yet there is a curious particular, mentioned by Plutarch from Castor, relative to the expiatory sacrifice of the Egyptians, which has been left unnoticed by both those writers, and which therefore I shall take this opportunity of adducing.

Herodotus had stated, that the Egyptians, in the devotion of their expiatory sacrifice, were wont to imprecate upon the head of the vicarious victim the several evils which might otherwise fall either upon the sacrificers themselves or upon all Egypt: and he had moreover remarked, that the bulls, destined for such oblations, were, after a careful examination, sealed upon the horns by sacerdotal officers set apart for that precise purpose. Herod. Hist. lib. ii. § 38, 39.

Both these matters are confirmed by Plutarch: but he adds, what Herodotus had omitted to specify, an account of the exact impression made by the sacred signet.

Those of the priesthood, says he, who are called sealers, mark the bull, destined for the expiatory sacrifice, with a seal, which (as Castor tells us) bears the device of a man in a kneeling attitude, with his arms bound behind him, and with a sword pointed to his throat. Plutarch. de Isid. et Osir. § 31.

Now, when the professed object of the sacrifice is considered, there can be little doubt, I think, as to the import of the device upon the signet. It set forth, that the penalty or deadly calamity, impending over the head of the sacrificer, was transferred to the head of the victim: it exhibited the fate of the sacrificer, when not secured by the mysterious efficacy of the vicarious sacrifice.

trine *itself*, exemplified in the bloody rite of human piacular sacrifice, had existed in the land of Canaan *long anterior* to the promulgation of the Law of Moses.

I may add, that the very abuse of the doctrine, in regard to practice, does itself serve to establish the high antiquity of the doctrine. In the common course of things, abuse cannot but be *always posterior* to use : for that, which is abused, must have existed *prior* to its abuse. The very abuse, therefore, of the doctrine of an atonement, through the practice of piacular human sacrifice, proves indisputably, not only its bare existence, but its high antiquity (previous to its abuse) under a pure and innocent modification.

2. Enough, however, has been said, as to the simple matter of fact, that *the doctrine of an atonement, to be effected through the vicarious medium of a bloody piacular sacrifice, existed PRIOR to the delivery of the Law of Moses* : I proceed to Mr. Davison's own abatements and allowances.

That *Paganism inculcated the doctrine of an atonement*, he denies not : on the contrary, he himself states and confesses the well-known circumstance, that *Paganism taught and maintained the expiatory power of animal sacrifice* *.

* Inquiry, pp. 143, 144.

Nor does he merely confess that *Paganism*, SUBSEQUENT to the promulgation of the Mosaic Law, inculcated the doctrine of an atonement: unless I wholly misunderstand him, his language of necessity imports, that *Paganism taught the expiatory power of animal sacrifice even BEFORE the law was promulgated*. He contends, indeed, that Paganism reached the doctrine of an atonement through the alone medium of a superstition, equally abhorrent from the light of nature, and from the principles of reason*: but then he also remarks, that “God, who had ordained the atoning sacrifice of the Gospel from the foundation of the world, owed no change of his purpose, or of the typical representation of it, to the vanity of human corruptions †.” Now, if God were not to be changed from the typical representation of his purpose by the circumstance that superstition had *already* struck out the doctrine of an atonement, and if (as Mr. Davison teaches) this typical representation by expiatory sacrifice commenced with the promulgation of the law: it is clear, that the doctrine of an atonement must confessedly have been held ANTERIOR to the promulgation of the law; and, consequently, it is clear,

* Compare Inquiry, p. 27, with pp. 143, 144.

† Inquiry, p. 144.

that the bare doctrine itself could not have been an **ALTOGETHER NEW** doctrine when the law was first promulgated.

III. The soundness of the speculation, that *Paganism reached the doctrine of an atonement through the sole medium of an unnatural and irrational superstition*, I shall presently consider*: but I must first revert to Mr. Davison's own statement, which I have described as not characterized with perfect caution and accuracy.

In opposition, both to facts, and (if I mistake not) to his own allowance also, Mr. Davison asserts, that the very *notion* of an atonement, as connected with animal sacrifice, was *utterly unknown* during the patriarchal ages: and, in strict accordance with this assertion, he distinctly intimates, that *the HITHERTO UNKNOWN doctrine of an atonement was FIRST set forth in the Law of Moses under the precise aspect of a NEW doctrine*.

Now this statement, I apprehend, is very far from being strictly accurate.

In the consistent developement of *his own* hypothesis, Mr. Davison, I take it, would have expressed himself more correctly, had he said, not that *The doctrine of an atonement was TOTALLY*

* See below, sect. ii. chap. 2.

UNKNOWN *before the promulgation of the Law, inas-*
much as it was FIRST set forth in the Law as a NEW
doctrine : but that, *Before the promulgation of the*
Law, the doctrine of an atonement had no DIVINELY
APPROVED existence ; or, in other words, that,
Although the doctrine of an atonement might have
SIMPLY and SUPERSTITIOUSLY existed before the
promulgation of the Law, it did not exist, before the
promulgation of the Law, WITH THE DIVINE SANC-
TION AND APPROBATION.

IV. Mr. Davison's much too large assertion being now set aside, as corresponding neither with matter of fact nor even with his own abatements and allowances, I have henceforth to meet him upon ground considerably lower than that which he had originally taken.

At present, therefore, omitting the assertion, that, *At the promulgation of the Law, the doctrine of an atonement was an ENTIRELY NEW doctrine, a doctrine hitherto UNKNOWN and UNTHOUGHT OF ;* I consider Mr. Davison as speaking in the following more moderated terms.

We have no evidence whatsoever of the DIVINELY APPROVED existence of the doctrine of an atonement PREVIOUS to the delivery of the Law by the hand of Moses. Whence it will result, that, if God did NOT reveal to the patriarchal religionists the

doctrine of an atonement, they could not, WITH THE DIVINE SANCTION AND APPROBATION, have had the rite of placular sacrifice.

In this manner I understand Mr. Davison's present argument. The true question is not, *Whether the doctrine of an atonement EXISTED anterior to the delivery of the law*; for, with respect to its bare previous EXISTENCE, there cannot be a shadow of doubt: but the true question is, *Whether the doctrine of an atonement existed anterior to the delivery of the Law WITH THE DIVINE SANCTION AND APPROBATION.*

Of the present question, I understand Mr. Davison to maintain the *negative*: I myself rather incline to maintain the *affirmative*.

CHAPTER II.

Evidence of the divinely approved existence of the Doctrine of Atonement during the Patriarchal Ages, from its universal prevalence throughout the Gentile World.

THE UNIVERSAL prevalence of expiatory sacrifice throughout the heathen world has been so amply shewn by the excellent Archbishop Magee, and is (unless I wholly misapprehend him) so fully

allowed by Mr. Davison, that, without further investigation, I assume it as *an established fact*: and this fact I am willing to make the basis of an argument in favour of *the divinely approved existence of the doctrine of an atonement during the patriarchal ages* *.

Throughout the ENTIRE world, the religion of Paganism taught and maintained *the expiatory power of animal sacrifice*.

Now whence did the Pagans receive this notion of an atonement? From *the light of nature* and from *the principles of reason*, as Mr. Davison most justly remarks, they *could not* have received it: from *revelation*, as Mr. Davison further contends, they *did not* receive it. What then, on the principles of Mr. Davison, was the medium, through which it was conveyed to them?

I. "The reply," says Mr. Davison, "is obvious. " *Superstition*, by an easy corruption of mind, " might soon come to think, that the animal victim was not merely *the representative of a deserved punishment*, in which use it was rational; " but *the real equivalent for it*, in which sense it " was most unreasonable: and might thus resort " to sacrifice for *pardon*, as well as *confession*"†.

* Magee's Disc. on Atonem. and Sacrif. No. V, XXXIII, LVI. Davison's Inquiry, pp. 143, 144.

† Inquiry, p. 144.

II. Certainly, the solution of the difficulty is given with Mr. Davison's characteristic acuteness: and, though it doubtless rests upon a mere unproved conjecture, yet I am free to say, that this hypothetical solution would have accounted very handsomely for the existence of the pagan notion of an atonement, if that notion had been confined to a SINGLE people. But such is not the case. The pagan notion of an atonement was UNIVERSAL: and, upon the precise fact of its UNIVERSALITY, I claim to join issue with Mr. Davison.

Of superstition the vagaries are so endless and so extraordinary, that we cannot easily determine what it might or might not strike out: but the obvious tendency of this inventive humour is the production of *variety*, not of *uniformity*. Peradventure the priesthood of any SINGLE people, acting agreeably to Mr. Davison's very plausible conjecture, might strike out the notion of an atonement, and might practically exemplify that notion in the rite of bloody piacular sacrifice: but, according to what is called *the doctrine of chances*, it were a marvel, that the priesthood of EVERY people, however widely separated, and however socially unconnected, should, with a rare concurrence of sentiment, *harmoniously*

and *uniformly* agree to adopt the self-same modification of superstitious belief and practice. I have always thought, and I still think, that *an* UNIVERSAL accordance in matters purely arbitrary evinces, of necessity, that *those matters had a common origin* *. Now, if this principle be just, (and I have not, as yet, seen any reason to doubt its justice,) *the* UNIVERSAL accordance of the pagan world, in the *purely arbitrary* doctrine of an atonement and in the *purely arbitrary* practice of pious sacrifice, invincibly demonstrates, that *that* doctrine and *that* practice could not, in point of fact, have been INDEPENDENTLY struck out by all the nations of the world in their insulated state, but that the doctrine and practice in question must have been derived to all nations from some one *common* origin to which the ancestors of all nations must have had an equally easy access.

III. And, now, what shall we pronounce to be the common origin, from which the UNIVERSAL doctrine and practice alike emanated?

1. Shall we adopt the wild speculation of Huetius and other writers of the same school,

* This, accordingly, I have made the professed basis of my work on the Origin of Pagan Idolatry: and I do not perceive any ground for deeming such a foundation insecure.

who would so resolutely derive the whole manifestly connected theology of the Gentiles from the history of Moses and the Israelites, that, as Bishop Warburton somewhere expresses it, they will scarcely leave Rome in possession of her own Romulus*? Even if an adventurous spirit of literary chivalry prompted us to undertake, on its own abstract merits, such an utterly hopeless enterprise: we should at once be checked, in mid career, by the stubborn fact, that both the doctrine and the practice existed in the pagan world *anterior* to the promulgation of the Law by Moses and *anterior* to the occupation of Palestine by Israel.

2. Clearly, the common origin, of which we are in quest, must be far more ancient than the time of Moses: and perhaps it will not be easy to give any satisfactory account of it, if we stop short of that second father of mankind whom the traditions of the Gentiles themselves harmoniously describe as the earliest postdiluvian sacrificer.

Let Noah be propounded, as the common origin of the doctrine and the practice to ALL his posterity; and the riddle of pagan UNIFORMITY will be forthwith read: let Noah be rejected, as this common origin; and the riddle of pagan

* See Huet, *Demons. Evan. Propos.* iv. c. 3—10.

UNIFORMITY must then be left for a more satisfactory solution to those who advocate Mr. Davison's opinion.

3. But, if Noah be admitted as the common origin of the doctrine and the practice to ALL his posterity, the necessary conclusion will, I fear, be fatal to the system now under discussion.

Noah could not *communicate* what he himself did not *possess*. Hence, if Noah *communicated* the doctrine and the practice to all his posterity, Noah must assuredly have been *well acquainted* both with the doctrine and with the practice.

But in what manner did the doctrine and the practice become known to that great patriarch? Was it from a special revelation, made to himself or to his remote ancestors? Or was it from the wayward operation of a presumptuous and unauthorised superstition?

The character of the just man, who was perfect in his generations, and who walked with God, forbids, I think, the latter part of the alternative. Mr. Davison himself allows, that the doctrine and the practice could not emanate from the light of nature or from the principles of reason. It remains only, that Noah received them from revelation either mediate or immediate.

CHAPTER III.

Evidence of the divinely-approved Existence of the Doctrine of an Atonement during the Patriarchal Ages, from the Character of the Sacrifices recorded in the Book of Job.

It may be said, that a common origin, of a far less venerable nature than that propounded by myself, may be well assigned to the doctrine and the practice of atonement and piacular sacrifice as they UNIVERSALLY prevailed among the Gentiles.

From Babel the nations of the earth proceeded, as from a general source: Babel was confessedly the fruitful parent of idolatry and superstition: what hinders then, that we should seek at Babel the common origin of the doctrine and the practice in their unauthorised condition of mere superstitious derivation?

The objection to such a theory is such, I think, as cannot easily be removed.

If the doctrine and the practice, *anterior* to the promulgation of the Law, sprang only from the working of a presumptuous and unhallowed superstition; they must alike, from their very

nature and tendency, have been *utterly abominable to God*. But we seem to have sufficient proof from Scripture, that such was *not* the case. Therefore, apparently, the doctrine and the practice, *anterior* to the promulgation of the Law, cannot have sprung from the mere working of a presumptuous and unhallowed superstition.

Whatever inspired writer may have been the author of the *book* of Job; there can be no reasonable doubt, I think, that the *individual* Job flourished anterior to the promulgation of the Law: and, whatever possible incidental allusions to the peculiarities of the Law may be detected in the poetical and parabolical parts of the book, thus evincing the book itself to have been written subsequent to the promulgation of the Law; we cannot believe, consistently with the inspiration of its author, that he would exhibit Job and his friends, as performing certain acts under a certain peculiar aspect, which yet they never *did* perform.

On this basis, which (I trust) is unexceptionable, I am willing to frame my present argument*.

* Respecting my basis, I have no dispute with Mr. Davison. He fully admits the high antiquity even of the *book* of Job, supposing it to be as old as the time of Moses. If

I. In the book of Job, the rite of offering up sacrifice to God is twice mentioned and described.

1. The ordinary practice of the holy man himself, prior to the occurrence of his trials, is approbatively detailed by the inspired writer in manner following.

His sons went, and feasted in their houses, every one his day: and sent and called for their three sisters, to eat and to drink with them. And it was so, when the days of their feasting were gone about, that Job sent and sanctified them, and rose up early in the morning, and offered burnt-offerings according to the number of them all: for Job said; It may be, that my sons have sinned, and cursed God in their hearts. Thus did Job continually.*

2. Such was the ordinary practice of Job anterior to his trials: at the conclusion of them, we find a charge given by God himself to Eli-phaz and his two friends, that they should devote a burnt-offering, on the express ground that the wrath of the Almighty was kindled against them

such, therefore, be the admitted antiquity of the *book*, the *individual* must obviously be yet more ancient. So far as I can judge, there is no reasonable doubt that Job flourished anterior to the delivery of the Law. See Davison's Inquiry, p. 190.

* Job i. 4, 5.

because they had not spoken of him as they ought to have spoken.

It was so, that, after the Lord had spoken these words unto Job, the Lord said to Eliphaz the Temanite: My wrath is kindled against thee and against thy two friends; for ye have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my servant Job hath. Therefore take unto you now seven bullocks and seven rams, and go to my servant Job, and offer up for yourselves a burnt-offering; and my servant Job shall pray for you; for him will I accept: lest I deal with you after your folly, in that ye have not spoken of me the thing which is right, like my servant Job. So Eliphaz the Temanite and Bildad the Shuhite and Zophar the Naamathite went, and did according as the Lord commanded them: the Lord also accepted Job.*

II. These two passages undoubtedly record two sacrifices, which were offered up *anterior* to the delivery of the Law from mount Sinai: and the latter of them is specially remarkable from the circumstance, that it exhibits God himself as *enjoining* the rite.

That the two recorded sacrifices were neither *eucharistic* nor simply *homologetic*, is, I think,

* Job xlii. 7—9.

too evident to be denied: that they were assuredly *sacrifices* for *sin*, is, I think, too plain to be controverted*. The only question, therefore, with which we are concerned, is this: *Under what aspect, and with what prevailing idea, were the two sacrifices devoted?*

1. A sacrifice, offered up for sin, may (as I have already observed†) either express a mere act of *deprecation*, or it may express an act of *deprecation associated with the idea of an expiatory atonement*.

Hence, though every expiatory sacrifice is *deprecatory*, it does not of necessity follow, that every deprecatory sacrifice should be *expiatory*.

The matter, therefore, to be inquired into, is this: *Whether the sacrifices for sin, recorded in the book of Job, were real expiatory sacrifices: or whether they simply and nakedly expressed a mere act of deprecation?*

2. It will not, I apprehend, be now asserted, that those sacrifices *could not* have been offered up with the purpose of making an atonement, on the ground that this idea was as yet *unknown*

* Such, accordingly, of old was the opinion of Cyprian. He describes Job as offering daily sacrifices to God, on behalf of his children, *pro peccatis eorum*. Cyprian. de Oper. et Eleem. p. 205. Oxon. 1682.

† See above, sect. i. chap. 4. § I. 3, 4.

in the world: for the actual existence of the idea *anterior* to the promulgation of the Law, whencesoever that idea might originate, is fully established by the fact of *the human sacrifices of Canaan and Phenicia* compared with *the illustrative language of the prophet Micah*. The *possibility*, therefore, of their having been expiatory sacrifices, is clear and indisputable.

With respect to the *probability* that such was the case, I shall say nothing. What may seem probable to one person, will seem improbable to another person: and, after all, even in its very best estate, probability is not demonstration. Hence, in regard to the *probability* of the matter, I shall be silent.

As for the simple detail of the transactions, it is couched in such phraseology that it leaves the point altogether undecided. In the Hebrew language, the word, which we translate *sin-offering* when used in its sacrificial sense, invariably denotes *an EXPIATORY offering for sin*, agreeably to the strict definition of the term which has been given by Moses himself*. But, in the detail of the transactions before us, *that* word is *not* employed. On the contrary, a *diffe-*

* Exod. xxx. 10. See also Exod. xxix. 36.

rent word is used: which *different* word, though it *may be*, and often *is*, fitly employed to describe a proper expiatory sin-offering, does not of necessity, by the mere force of its etymology, convey any such idea; it *may*, or it *may not*, just as the context shall determine, express the sense of what Moses calls a *sin-offering of atonements**, Consequently, the phraseology of the passages in the book of Job leaves it undetermined, whether the sacrifices, respectively offered up by the holy man and his three friends, were merely *deprecatory sacrifices for sin*; or whether, with the additional idea of an atonement, they were also *expiatory sacrifices*.

Hitherto, therefore, from the book of Job, we have learned nothing to our purpose, which can be fairly esteemed definite and explicit.

3. But there is a remarkable circumstance, attached to the sacrifice of the three friends, which may possibly throw some additional light on the subject.

They did not devote it *of their own spontaneous motion*: but they offered it up BY THE EXPRESS COMMAND OF GOD.

Hence, let its attendant idea have been what

* Compare Exod. xxx. 10, with Levit. ix. 7.

it may, the sacrifice, THUS ATTENDED BY ITS OWN SPECIAL IDEA, WAS OFFERED UP UNDER THE FORMAL SANCTION AND WITH THE UNAMBIGUOUS APPROBATION OF THE DEITY.

Such being the case, not only WAS THE SACRIFICE ITSELF commanded of God; but likewise ITS ATTENDANT IDEA WAS unambiguously stamped by the divine approbation.

Now, if its attendant idea were that of *an atonement*, we shall experience no difficulty: for we know, that the doctrine of *an atonement* has been solemnly and expressly and practically ratified by the Deity. But, if its attendant idea were that of *simple deprecation without any reference whatsoever to an atonement*; we shall forthwith encounter a difficulty, which, so far as I can discern, is plainly insuperable.

(1.) Of a *simple deprecatory sacrifice for sin*, from which all idea of *a vicarious atonement* is carefully excluded, the only distinct notion which I can frame to my own mind, so far as its *rationalè* or *principle* is concerned, is this.

The offerer supposes, that God will accept his sacrifice, as a voluntary fine or bribe or gift for the sin which he has committed: and he thence imagines, that his sin will be pardoned, and that its merited punishment will be bought off, as

by a sort of donative presented to a corrupt judge, in consideration of, or by virtue of the expense of, his self-imposed deprecatory sacrifice.

I can frame no other distinct notion of the *rationalè* or *principle* of a simple *deprecatory sacrifice for sin*, than that which I have here stated: and, until I be better informed, I shall incline to think, that no other distinct notion can be framed. Let us, however, discuss the matter somewhat more copiously: for I wish, if possible, to avoid the possibility of misapprehension.

The idea, attendant upon such a sacrifice, cannot be a *confession that the offerer deserves to suffer the death inflicted upon the victim*: for this idea constitutes not *deprecatory*, but *homologetic*, sacrifice. Neither can the attendant idea be *the grateful presentment of a free gift*: for that idea constitutes the sacrifice denominated *eucharistic*.

Now it is obvious, that neither *homologetic sacrifice*, nor *eucharistic sacrifice*, can, without an extraordinary confusion of ideas, be identified with simple *deprecatory sacrifice on account of sin*. For *homologetic sacrifice* expresses, by significant action, the duty of humble and contrite confession; and *eucharistic sacrifice*, also by significant action,

expresses the duty of praise and thanksgiving: but *deprecatory sacrifice for sin*, unless we hopelessly confound it with these two other sorts of sacrifice, must certainly express, by significant action, some idea, *strictly proper* to itself, and *altogether distinct* from the two specific ideas attendant upon the other two kinds of sacrifice.

What, then, is the *strictly proper* idea, which *deprecatory sacrifice*, simply as such, and as professedly contradistinguished from *expiatory sacrifice* which involves the additional idea of an *atonement*: what is the *strictly proper* idea, which mere *deprecatory sacrifice* expresses by its own significant action?

I repeat it, that I can discover no idea, save that which I have already stated.

The offerer supposes, that God will accept his sacrifice, as a voluntary fine or bribe or gift for the sin which he has committed: and he thence imagines, that his sin will be pardoned, and that its merited punishment will be bought off, as by a sort of donative presented to a corrupt judge, in consideration of, or by virtue of the expense of, his self-imposed deprecatory sacrifice.

At this answer I have arrived by the mere reason and necessity of the case: but its strict correctness is fully established by that best of all evidence, naked matter of fact.

The ancients have expressly stated *the attendant notion*, under the influence of which they offered up *the simple deprecatory sacrifice*: and to their testimony I make my appeal.

Tame, O Achilles, thy mighty anger, says the Homeric Phenix to the ruthless hero of the Iliad. *It befits thee not to have a merciless heart. The very gods themselves, whose virtue and honour and strength are greater than thine, are capable of being turned. For, with sacrifices and vows and libations and the odour of victims, suppliant men turn them aside from their purpose, whensoever any person sins and transgresses**.

Gifts, says Ovid, *captivate both men and gods: Jupiter himself is appeased by the gifts, which are offered to him†*.

With what bribe, says Persius, *would you purchase the ear of the gods? Shall your oblation be the lungs and the milk of a slaughtered victim‡?*

If then my answer to the question be correct, (and I see no particular reason to doubt its correctness,) the idea, attendant upon *simple deprecatory sacrifice* as contradistinguished from *complex piacular sacrifice*, will be: that *The punishment of sin can be bought off, and that a reconciliation*

* Homer. Iliad. lib. ix. ver. 492—497.

† Ovid. Art. Amat. lib. iii. ver. 658, 654.

‡ Pers. Satir. ii. ver. 29, 30.

with God can be purchased, at the sufficiently easy expense of donatively presenting (as Homer speaks) sacrifices and vows and libations.*

(2.) We have now acquired, by no unfair or irrational process, I trust, the specific idea attendant upon *simple deprecatory sacrifice*.

If then *simple deprecatory sacrifice* were the sacrifice offered up by Job's three friends, such, so far as I can see, must have been the *inward idea* attendant upon the outward rite. But God himself *commanded* the sacrifice offered up by Job's three friends. Therefore, if that sacrifice were a *simple deprecatory sacrifice*, God himself must have *sanctioned* and *approved* its *inward attendant idea*: in other words, God himself must have *sanctioned* and *approved* the idea, that *The*

* I am not without some suspicion, that this grossly-corrupt mode of sacrificature is alluded to and justly castigated by Solomon.

On what principle our translators have rendered, as they *have* done, Prov. xiii. 6, I shall not pretend to determine: the following strikes me, as being its proper and legitimate version.

Righteousness shall hedge in the perfect way: but wickedness will pervert the sin-offering.

Of some men the sottish wickedness will be such, that, perverting the expiatory sin-offering from its appointed use and intent, they will misdeem it a bribe or a gift by which they may purchase from God the forgiveness of their transgressions: but righteousness, better instructed, shall hedge in the perfect way ordained of the Lord himself.

punishment of sin can be bought off by a gift or a bribe, and that A reconciliation with offended heaven can be cheaply purchased by devoting, under the notion of a self-imposed fine or voluntary present, seven bullocks and seven rams.

Such is the result, to which, if I mistake not, we are inevitably brought by the supposition, that the sacrifice offered up by Job's three friends was *a simple deprecatory sacrifice* as contradistinguished from *a complex piacular sacrifice*. But this result is alike contrary to reason and to scripture*. Therefore it cannot but be erroneous. If then the result be thus palpably erroneous, the sacrifice, enjoined by God upon

* It may be said, that oblations to God are, in scripture, frequently denominated *gifts*: which might be thought to imply a notion, not very dissimilar to that entertained by the Pagans.

Doubtless they are so denominated: but can a single instance be brought in which they are *approbatively* represented as *gifts bestowed for the purpose of mercenary deprecation*?

Gifts, appointed to be offered unto God, were clearly gifts, not *deprecatory*, but either *eucharistic* or *piacular*. See Levit. xviii. 11, 12. Matt. v. 23, 24: and compare Matt. viii. 2—4, with Levit. xiv. 1—32. In fact, God expressly disclaims any gift presumptuously offered to him for the purpose of deprecation.

There is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of persons, nor TAKING OF GIFTS. 2 Chron. xix. 7.

Compare this declaration with the language of the pagan testimonies, as cited above.

Eliphaz and his two friends, cannot have been a *simple deprecatory sacrifice*. Now sacrifices for sin must be, either *simply deprecatory*, or *complexly expiatory*: and, assuredly, the sacrifice, commanded by God in the present case, was a *sacrifice for sin*. But the sacrifice, commanded in the present case by God, could not have been a *simple deprecatory sacrifice*: because the idea, of necessity attendant upon *such* a sacrifice, could not, consistently with his immutable moral attributes, have been sanctioned by the Deity. Therefore, finally, the sacrifice of Job's three friends, enjoined by God himself, must have been an *expiatory sacrifice**.

4. The only mode, in which this argument

* Dr. Spencer, who denies the *divine institution of primitive sacrifice*, and who yet allows that *expiatory oblations were offered up even by the pious, anterior to the promulgation of the Law*, endeavours to account for the uncommanded existence of the latter, on the ground that they were a sort of gifts presented for the purpose of buying back the favour of the offended Deity. Spencer. de Leg. Heb. Rit. lib. iii. dissert. 2. cap. 4. sect. 2. vol. ii. p. 149.

Agreeably to this speculation, he elsewhere describes them as constituting a kind of traffic between God and man: man presenting them to God, under the aspect of bribes; and God remitting to man his offences, on the mercantile principle of value paid and received. Ibid. cap. 3. sect. 2. vol. ii. p. 144.

The notion of driving a bargain with God (*nundinationem quandam cum Deo*, as the learned author speaks) has doubtless been ever familiar to the genius of gross superstition: but the true question, at present before us, is, not *Whether*

can be rebutted with any show of equity, is by the assertion, that the sacrifices, recorded in the book of Job, were of the class denominated *homologetic*.

Certainly such an assertion *may* be made: but, no less certainly, it stands directly and immediately contradicted by the very exact and specific account of the sacrifice offered up by *such a notion might not have existed anterior to the Law; but Whether it could ever have been entertained by the really pious, and, above all, WHETHER IT COULD EVER HAVE BEEN SANCTIONED AS A RELIGIOUS VERITY BY GOD HIMSELF. Now God clearly must have thus sanctioned it, if he ever approbatively received sacrifices offered up to him on this avowed principle.*

It may not be improper to add, that, according to the present mode of accounting for the human origin of expiatory sacrifice, Dr. Spencer by no means states with accuracy the real idea attendant upon such oblation. The principle of expiatory sacrifice is not a *project to buy off the wrath of God with a bribe*: but its true principle is the *imputative transfer of sin and punishment from the sacrificer to the victim*. Dr. Spencer, in short, has ascribed to *complex expiatory sacrifice* the idea, which exclusively belongs to *simple deprecatory sacrifice*: and this idea, I contend, cannot possibly, in the very nature of things, have ever been sanctioned by God.

Much more just and correct is Mr. Davison's estimate of the question, than that of Dr. Spencer. Mr. Davison, instead of attempting to deduce the doctrine of expiation and atonement from the light of nature or the principles of reason, very wisely declares, as every thinking man *must* declare when the question is accurately stated, his inability to comprehend, how that doctrine can ever be grounded on any such principles or justified by them. Inquiry, p. 27.

Eliphaz and his two friends at the express command of the Deity.

We are distinctly told, that the sacrifice was to be offered up, not merely under the idea of a *confession of sin*, but *LEST God should deal with the offerers after their folly*.

Clearly, therefore, the sacrifice was *deprecatory*, not *homologetic*: and the sole question remains as before; Whether it was *simply deprecatory*, or whether it was *complexly deprecatory by the introduction of the additional idea of an atonement*.

Now, if I have at all succeeded in establishing the latter part of this alternative, the general conclusion will plainly be this: that *The doctrine of an atonement by piacular sacrifice, as it existed pure and unperverted to the abomination of human devotements anterior to the promulgation of the Law, sprang, not from the workings of superstition, but from a specific divine revelation*.

III. The mode, in which Mr. Davison would deal with the narrative of the sacrifice offered up by Eliphaz and his two friends, is not a little unsatisfactory.

“The instances of sacrifice recorded in the “book of Job,” says he, “are cited in proof “of early *expiatory sacrifice for sin*. I do not “dispute the high antiquity, which is assigned

“ to this book by the Primitive Christian Church;
“ an authority, the most entitled to our attention
“ in the question of its age and origin. Let
“ it be supposed as ancient as the time of
“ Moses. The account, which it gives of sacri-
“ fice, does not denote an expiatory institution.
“ The burnt-offering of Eliphaz and his com-
“ panions is joined with the intercession of Job.
“ The burnt-offering of the three friends was
“ presented; and the Lord also accepted Job:
“ a proof this, of *the efficacy of Job's prayer*,
“ not of *the expiatory power of the sacrifice of*
“ *his friends** ”.

From the circumstance of *the intercessory prayer of Job being mentioned in conjunction with the burnt-offering of his friends*, Mr. Davison takes occasion to deny altogether the expiatory power of the sacrifice.

I am at a loss to perceive, how such a conclusion results legitimately from such premises.

If the friends of Job were to be reconciled with God *exclusively* through the holy man's intercession, it will be difficult to specify wherein consisted the *utility* of the sacrifice. Clearly the sacrifice was to be offered up, BECAUSE *they had sinned*, and LEST *God should deal with them after*

* Inquiry, p. 190.

their folly: and clearly it was altogether useless, unless it operated in some mode or another to procure the remission of their offence. So differently do different persons view the same matter, each probably more or less under the influence of their respective previously-adopted opinions, that Mr. Davison's premises would have conducted myself to a precisely opposite conclusion.

By the command of God, the friends of Job offer up a burnt-offering, *BECAUSE they have offended*, and *LEST God should deal with them after their folly*: and, by the command also of God, Job himself intercedes on their behalf, for the same reason and with the same purpose.

These, I apprehend, are the premises common to Mr. Davison and myself: and, from them, I should certainly conclude, not that the intercession of Job was *exclusively* efficacious, and that the sacrifice of his friends possessed *no* expiatory power; but that Job's intercession would be wholly inefficacious, if the prescribed expiatory sacrifice were *omitted*.

In drawing such a conclusion, I am not a little influenced by the apparently analogical case of the great Christian sacrifice.

Our Lord was offered up on our behalf, that

by his one sacrifice of himself he might fully atone for all our offences: and our Lord also, as we learn from Holy Writ, ever liveth to make intercession for us*.

Intercessory prayer and piacular sacrifice are here, we see, avowedly united: and we are certain, that the prayer of the great intercessor, no less than the prayer of Job, will be heard and accepted of the Lord. Yet, notwithstanding this undoubted circumstance, it were most unsatisfactory reasoning thence to infer, that, BECAUSE *the prayer was efficacious*, THEREFORE *the sacrifice possessed no expiatory power*.

CHAPTER IV.

Evidence of the divinely-approved Existence of the Doctrine of an Atonement during the Patriarchal Ages, from the Character of the Sacrifice of Noah.

THE preceding remarks may perhaps throw some light upon the true character of the sacrifice of Noah: and, when the true character of that sacrifice shall have been ascertained, it may possibly tend yet additionally to establish *the divinely-approved existence of the doctrine of*

* Heb. vii. 25.

an atonement during the period of the Patriarchal Dispensation.

Mr. Davison, with some reason, censures Dr. Spencer for pronouncing the sacrifice of Noah to have been piacular*. In saying this, I wish not to be understood as intimating, 'hat Dr. Spencer was *mistaken* as to his opinion of its piacularity; for I believe his opinion, in that particular, to be *perfectly correct*: but the fact is, that he tacitly assumes, what he ought explicitly to have proved. Thus far, therefore, Mr. Davison's censure is just. In Dr. Spencer's very brief discussion of the matter, his arguments may shew, that the sacrifice was *deprecatory*: but the establishment of *this* point, as *he* has left the question, does not *therefore* demonstrate, that the sacrifice was also *expiatory*.

This defect in Dr. Spencer I shall endeavour to supply: and, for the sake of clearness, I shall argue the whole matter from the beginning.

I. The history of Noah's sacrifice is detailed by the sacred writer in manner following:—

Noah builded an altar unto the Lord: and took of every clean beast and of every clean fowl; and offered burnt-offerings on the altar. And the

Lord smelled a sweet savour; and the Lord said in his heart: I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake; for the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth: neither will I again smite any more every thing living, as I have done. While the earth remaineth, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night, shall not cease.*

II. In this narrative, so far as the character of the sacrifice itself is concerned, we learn nothing definite.

The Hebrew word, employed by Moses to describe the oblation of Noah, is that identical generalising word, which is used to describe the respective oblations of Job and his three friends, and which our translators render by the English term *burnt-offering*.

Now this word may, or may not, describe an *expiatory sacrifice*: and, if our information had extended no further than the simple statement of Noah's oblation; we should not, on any solid grounds, have been able to determine, whether it were *eucharistic* or *homologetic* or *simply deprecatory* or *complexly piacular*. The object of the sacrifice, or the intention of the

* Gen. viii. 20—22.

sacrificer, would have been left in such a state of total uncertainty, that it would have been mere folly to hazard any explicit opinion.

III. But, from the narrative, we learn much more than the naked fact, that *Noah, with whatever intention, offered up burnt-offerings*: we additionally learn from it, both *the mode in which God accepted the sacrifice, and the answer which he inwardly gave to it.*

Now it is obvious, that, when *this* information is conveyed, much information is *also* inevitably conveyed as to *the intention of the sacrificer*: for we may always learn, from the purport of an answer, *the nature of the address or the question which produced that answer*; and, if the mode in which a sacrifice is received be specifically detailed, we may always learn, from such detail, *the object of the sacrifice itself.* The one plainly involves the other. Hence, from the sequel of the narrative, we may gather, I think, without much difficulty, *the object of Noah's sacrifice.*

1. The mode, in which God accepted the sacrifice, is described in our English translation, which here follows the Greek of the Seventy, by the expression, that *The Lord smelled a sweet savour*: but, as Dr. Spencer has justly

observed, the original Hebrew ought rather to have been rendered, *The Lord smelled an odour of rest.*

This phrase, the learned writer, with good reason, supposes to mean, that *God, who was previously offended, became, by Noah's sacrifice, pacified and appeased**: and, in support of his interpretation, he adduces the Syriac version, which explains the Hebrew of Moses by the expression *An odour of placability†.*

The same view was evidently entertained by Josephus, as likewise cited by Dr. Spencer: for, arguing retrogressively from the mode in which the sacrifice was accepted, he very naturally supposes Noah to have prayed, that *God would favourably accept his oblation and that the earth might never hereafter experience similar anger‡.* I may add, that this identical exposition of the phrase now before us is adopted also by Aben-Ezra, as cited by Buxtorf. He rightly

* *Odoratus est Dominus odorem quietis: hoc est, Qui antea commotus erat, quietus et placatus, Noachi sacrificio, reddebatur.* Spencer. de Leg. Heb. lib. iii. dissert. ii. cap. 3. sect. 2. p. 143.

† *Odorem placabilitatis.* Ibid.

‡ *Ευμενὺς τε οὖν αὐτὸν προσδέχεσθαι τὴν θυσίαν παρεκάλει, καὶ μηδεμίαν ὀργὴν εἶτι τὴν γῆν ὁμοίαν λαβεῖν.* Joseph. Ant. Jud. lib. i. c. 3. § 7. p. 13. Hudson.

translates it *An odour of rest*: and its import he pronounces to be, that *The odour of the sacrifice was such as caused God to rest from his anger**. In truth, I see not what other sense can rationally be put upon the expression. But, if such be its sense, it implies of necessity, that Noah devoted his burnt-offering *for the purpose* of diverting God from his anger: because *the specific and well-defined mode, in which God accepted the sacrifice*, distinctly, as in the way of question and answer, teaches *the intention of the sacrificer*†.

2. We shall be brought to exactly the same conclusion by the recorded internal answer, which God is said to have given to Noah's burnt-offering.

I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake; for the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth: neither will I again smite any more every thing living, as I have done. While

* *Odor quietis, id est, gratus, qui Deum ab ira sua quiescere facit.* Aben-Ezra in Gen. viii. 21. Buxtorf. Lex. Heb. in voc. p. 429.

† In the original, the Hebrew scholar will readily observe a play upon the name of Noah: and I take it, that here was accomplished the prophecy, under the influence of which the name itself was proleptically bestowed upon the patriarch. Compare Gen. v. 28, 29, with Gen. viii. 20, 21.

the earth remaineth, seed-time and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night, shall not cease.

What this answer can possibly mean, I see not; if it be not an intimation on the part of God, that, pursuant to the *object* of the sacrifice, he would cease from his wrath, and would never again punish the wickedness of man as he had recently done by the waters of the deluge. The answer of God, like his peculiar mode of accepting the sacrifice, clearly teaches us *the nature and object of that sacrifice*. From the drift of the answer, we learn the drift of the petition. Such an answer could not have been given to the accepted sacrifice, had not the intention of the sacrificer been *the deprecation of God's wrath*.

IV. Thus, both from the well-defined acceptance of the sacrifice and from the specific answer given to the sacrifice, we learn, I think, most clearly, that the burnt-offering of Noah was a *deprecatory sacrifice*, as contradistinguished from either a *simple eucharistic sacrifice* or a *simple homologetic sacrifice*.

Probably, indeed, it might comprehend all the three ideas of *deprecation* and *thanksgiving* and *confession*: but still the sequel of the narrative plainly intimates, that its leading and palmary

idea was that of *deprecation**. Emphatically and properly, it was *a deprecatory sacrifice*: and, accordingly, God accepted it as *a savour of rest*, and promised that he would never more smite every thing living as he had recently done. Adopt the opinion, that it was *a deprecatory sacrifice*; and the whole narrative is harmonious and consistent; reject the opinion, that it was *a deprecatory sacrifice*; and the whole narrative is discordant and inconsistent.

V. On these grounds, I consider it as proved, that the sacrifice of Noah was *a deprecatory sacrifice*.

The next matter, to be discussed, is, *Whether it was simply a deprecatory sacrifice; or whether it was that complex deprecatory sacrifice, which involves also the superadded idea of an expiatory atonement.*

Here, as I have already intimated, is the real point, where Dr. Spencer fails. He clearly saw, what every thinking person *must* see who attends to the *rationale* of question and answer, that the burnt-offering of Noah was *a deprecatory sacrifice*:

* Thus Cyril of Alexandria speaks of Noah's sacrifice as being *eucharistic*: and so, to a certain extent, it probably was. But the circumstance does not obliterate its special character. Cyril. Alex. cont. Julian. lib. i. p. 8.

but, unless he could give some adequate reason for his assertion, he certainly had no right to pronounce, that this *deprecatory sacrifice* was also *an expiatory one*. Now, so far from giving any adequate reason, Dr. Spencer gives no reason whatsoever. Hence, most undoubtedly, he assumes the matter, which he ought to have proved.

Have we then any ground for maintaining, that the burnt-offering of Noah was *an expiatory sacrifice* : or must we rest content with the fact, which *alone* has hitherto been established ; the fact, I mean, that it was *a deprecatory sacrifice* ?

We have, I think, ample ground for maintaining, that it was *that complex modification of deprecatory sacrifice, which, to simple deprecation, superadds the idea of an expiatory atonement*.

1. The sacrifice of Noah, at the point to which we have now brought it, manifestly corresponds with the sacrifice offered up by the three friends of Job.

Each alike was *a deprecatory sacrifice* : each alike was *accepted and approved by God*. Whether each was *more than a deprecatory sacrifice*, must be determined precisely by the same train of reasoning.

Now this train of reasoning, I am willing to

hope, has fully demonstrated, on the principle of *a reduction to an absurdity*, that the sacrifice of Job's three friends COULD NOT, consistently with the known moral attributes of God, have been a *simple deprecatory sacrifice*. Whence, as it was neither an *eucharistic sacrifice* nor an *homologetic sacrifice*, it MUST have been that *complex deprecatory sacrifice which involves the idea of an atonement*.

The same train of reasoning, founded as it is on the unchangeable moral attributes of God, is equally applicable to the sacrifice of Noah.

That sacrifice certainly WAS a *deprecatory sacrifice* of one description or another. In consistence with God's known moral attributes, it COULD NOT have been a *simple deprecatory sacrifice*, offered up as a bribe to the Almighty. Therefore it MUST have been a *complex deprecatory sacrifice involving the idea of expiation or atonement*.

2. The propriety of this conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance, that it perfectly agrees with the conclusion to which we have already been brought by the UNIFORMITY observable in the various systems of Paganism*.

From times of the most remote antiquity, the

* See above, sect. ii. chap. 2.

notion of an atonement and the practice of piacular sacrifice have been UNIVERSALLY familiar to the Gentiles.

Now this accordance, in a notion and a practice alike altogether *arbitrary*, can only be rationally accounted for on the supposition of its having sprung from *a common origin*: and that *common origin* we shall vainly seek elsewhere than in the patriarch Noah.

But the patriarch Noah could not *communicate*, what he himself did not *possess*.

Therefore, to the second great father of mankind, the *communicated* notion and practice of atonement and piacular sacrifice must, I think, inevitably have been *familiar*.

Such was the conclusion, which I drew from the UNIFORMITY of Paganism in a matter purely *arbitrary*: and, with it, the view, which I have been led to take of the recorded sacrifice of Noah, perfectly corresponds. The two confirm each other: and the general result from the whole inquiry is, that *We have sufficient evidence of the DIVINELY-APPROVED existence of the doctrine of an atonement during the period of early patriarchism*.

VI. Since Mr. Davison, perhaps, (as we may

hereafter find *,) somewhat too hastily, claims the suffrage of the whole body of the ancient Christian Fathers in regard to *the mere human institution of primitive patriarchal sacrifice*: it may not be improper, at the close of the present discussion, to gather, through the same evidential medium, the apparent opinion of the early church, relative to *the existence or the non-existence of the doctrine of an atonement, during the patriarchal ages, and under the Patriarchal Dispensation*.

1. Our Lord, according to St. John, declared to the Jews, that *Their father Abraham rejoiced to see his day: and he saw it, and was glad* †. From this remarkable text, Cyril of Alexandria contends, that Abraham and his posterity down to Moses were instructed, not only in the doctrine of an atonement by the sacrifice of the promised Saviour, but likewise even in the mystery of the incarnation itself ‡.

2. The knowledge of an atonement, thus ascribed by Cyril to Abraham and his successors, Eusebius of Cesarèa would carry yet further

* See below, sect. iv. chap. 8.

† John, viii. 56.

‡ See Cyril. Alex. cont. Julian. lib. viii. p. 280, 281. Lips. 1696.

back than the times of that patriarch. He asserts, that the ancient lovers of God, from the very beginning, had learned, through the teaching of the Divine Spirit, that a certain venerable victim should at length purify the whole world by the sacrifice of himself: and he adds, that, of the future expiatory devotement of this august victim, they were well aware, through the same heavenly teaching, that every animal victim, from the first-recorded sacrifice of Abel down to the last-offered sacrifice of the Mosaic Law, was an appointed and intentional symbol*.

3. Whether properly or improperly, whether with reason or without reason, simply as *a matter of fact*, Cyril at least and Eusebius, probably also the generality of their Christian contemporaries, do not seem to have thought with Mr. Davison, that *The doctrine of an atonement was FIRST revealed by Moses*, and that *It was altogether UNKNOWN during the continuance of the Patriarchal Dispensation*.

* Euseb. Cæsariens. Demons. Evan. lib. i. c. 8. p. 24, 25. Lutet. Rob. Stephan. 1545.



SECTION III.

EVIDENCE OF THE PRIMEVAL INSTITUTION OF EXPIATORY SACRIFICE.

CHAPTER I.

Evidence of the Primeval Divine Institution of Expiatory Sacrifice from the History of the Offerings of Cain and Abel.

PART. I.—RESPECTING THE IMPORT OF THE HEBREW WORD CHATTATH.

By those persons, who maintain *the primeval divine institution of piacular sacrifice*, the scriptural history of the offerings of Cain and Abel has been thought very strongly to favour their opinion.

Instead of a mere eucharistic offering of vegetable productions which acknowledged no sin and which confessed no want of an atonement, they contend, that, by the very necessity of a remarkable passage in that history, when the passage itself is properly translated, God must plainly be understood as ENJOINING Cain to offer up an animal victim under the precise aspect of a piacular sacrifice.

If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?

And, if thou doest not well, A SIN-OFFERING coucheth at the door *.

Now this injunction to devote a sin-offering, imperative as it is upon Cain, is yet no injunction then *for the first time* delivered. On the contrary, it evidently refers to a *well-known* and *already-existing* institution. For the injunction is so worded, that Cain is in effect REMINDED of a *duty*, which he ought to have *performed*, but which he had presumptuously *neglected*.

Hence, on the supposition that the proposed rendering of the passage expresses the genuine sense of the original (a supposition, which, in *their* judgment, is abundantly well founded), these persons conceive themselves to be irresistibly conducted to the following most important conclusion.

FROM THE VERY TIME OF THE FALL OF MAN, GOD HIMSELF INSTITUTED THE RITE OF EXPIATORY SACRIFICE, FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF SIGNIFICANTLY EXHIBITING THE DOCTRINE OF AN ATONEMENT †.

* Gen. iv. 7.

† I need scarcely remark, that, for this excellent version of Gen. iv. 7, we are indebted originally to the eminently learned Lightfoot. Why it occurs not in the writings of the Fathers, may easily be accounted for. So far as I have noted them, they uniformly quote, not from the original Hebrew, but from the Version of the LXX.

It is evident, that, if this interpretation of the passage be correct, Mr. Davison's opinion, that *The rite of piacular sacrifice was, FOR THE FIRST TIME, divinely instituted at the promulgation of the Law of Moses*, falls at once to the ground.

Hence his business is to remove the necessity of such an interpretation, by producing another, which, in the abstract, shall be wholly unobjectionable. For, if the passage be capable of *two* interpretations, to neither of which any just objection can be made, we must fairly allow, that it can no longer be adduced as affording a satisfactory proof, that *Piacular sacrifice was DIVINELY instituted at the commencement of the Patriarchal Dispensation* *.

In a word, the business of Mr. Davison is to *neutralise* the passage, and thus to render it argumentatively ineffective.

The medium, through which Mr. Davison would reach his object, is a criticism upon the import of the Hebrew word *Chattath* † : and the drift of his criticism is to shew, that the word in question may be rendered *a punishment for sin*, no less properly than *a sacrifice for sin*.

* Our common English translation, *If thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door*, though verbally possible, is every way objectionable. It is either flatly tautological, or hopelessly unintelligible. See below, sect. iii. chap. 1. part 2. § II. 2.

† Heb. חַטָּאת.

This criticism I think it equitable to give, at full length, in his own precise words.

“The whole doctrine, concerning the secondary sense of the word *Chattath*,” says he, “requires to be more correctly stated: and, when so stated, it will be seen to leave no authority to the idea of a *sin-offering* in this particular place.

“The true secondary signification of the word, I take upon myself to assert, is not precisely *sin-offering* at all; but *something for sin*, or *some adjunct relative to it*, as its *price*; whether that *price* be a *ransom* or a *punishment*: and, when the term is put for a *sin-offering*, that precise sense is derived to it through the more general idea which I have here stated: in which the restricted signification of *offering* cannot be held to be essential to it, or even strictly to belong to it. And, therefore, although *sin-offering* is not an improper phrase, as it stands in our version, in the context of the Levitical Law (where the institution and description of the *offering* are the subject of the text); yet the word *Chattath*, by itself, can be no more, in its secondary signification, than the *Lytron* or the *Poenè* of sin indifferently. It is either the context, or it is an occasional

“ and accidental use, which invests it with the
 “ specific character of an *offering*.

“ This remark I expect to be fully confirmed
 “ by those, who will reflect for a moment on the
 “ true principle of the Hebrew language in the
 “ derivation of its secondary senses. But I ap-
 “ peal to some proofs of it.

“ First, I appeal to the Septuagint. The Sep-
 “ tuagint translators have shewn what they
 “ thought of the term and of its true extent,
 “ by commonly translating it *for sin*, or *on be-*
 “ *half of sin*, without any appendage of *offer-*
 “ *ing* *.

“ Secondly, I appeal to the actual force of the
 “ word *Chattath*, as expressive of *punishment* ;
 “ *sin-suffering*, as well as *sin-offering*. So the
 “ English translators have twice rendered it.

“ *For the punishment of the iniquity of my*
 “ *people is greater than THE PUNISHMENT OF THE*
 “ *sin of Sodom* †. This complex phrase, *The*
 “ *punishment of the sin*, is simply *Chattath* in the
 “ original.

“ *This shall be THE PUNISHMENT of Egypt and*

* Gr. *περὶ ἁμαρτίας* or *ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτίας*. “ In some read-
 ings of the Septuagint, it is simply *ἁμαρτίας ἐστίν* :
 “ a correct and consistent translation.”

† Lament. iv. 6.

“ THE PUNISHMENT of *all nations* *. In the Hebrew, *Chattath*.

“ And, although, in one or both of these passages, some interpreters have fluctuated between the idea of *sin* and that of *punishment*; yet the translation of *punishment* is not disputed, as though the word were incapable of that sense. In fact, Hebrew Critics, Lexicons, and Concordances, are familiar with *punishment*, as one secondary signification of the word.

“ My object, at present, is only to shew, that its secondary signification embraces at once the two ideas of *atonement* and *punishment*.

“ It follows, if this account be a correct one, that *Chattath*, in Gen. iv. 7, if it is to be there understood in its secondary sense, may as well be the *punishment* of sin, as an *atonement* for it” †.

I. With respect to the present criticism, I am very willing to allow, that Mr. Davison has accurately stated the *ideality* or the train of thought, through the medium of which the word *Chattath*, that primarily denotes *sin*, comes secondarily to denote *an offering for sin*: and I am equally willing to allow, that, on the well-known principle

* Zechar. xiv. 19.

† Inquiry, p. 55—58.

of Hebraic derivation, we might, *in the abstract*, fairly conjecture the grammatical possibility of the word's bearing the yet additional sense of *punishment on account of sin*.

But, while I readily allow these matters, I am constrained to say, that, as yet, I have seen no proof that the word *Chattath* actually *does* bear this third signification. Instead of PROOF, Mr. Davison, so far as I can find, has given us nothing save ETYMOLOGICAL CONJECTURE.

Yet the point, I take it, is not, what, on the acknowledged principle of *Hebraic ideality*, the word *abstractedly* may be thought CAPABLE of meaning: but the point is, what, *in well-ascertained usage*, it actually DOES mean.

In other words, it is not enough for Mr. Davison to shew, that *speculatively* and *conjecturally*, on the principle of *Hebraic ideality*, the word MAY BE THOUGHT CAPABLE of denoting *punishment for sin*: he must further shew, by *absolute proof*, that the word, as employed in scripture, ACTUALLY DOES bear such a sense.

II. Now, so far as I can see, the only mode, in which this necessary matter can be accomplished, is by the production of a passage, in which the word *Chattath* MUST denote *punishment for sin*, and CANNOT denote either *sin* or *sin-offering*.

Such, if I mistake not, is the rational and satisfactory process, by which that word is absolutely DEMONSTRATED to signify, not only *sin*, but also *an offering for sin*.

In the Hebrew scriptures, we read of *the blood of a Chattath**: in the same scriptures, we find it asserted, that *a sacrificed bullock is a Chattath*†: in the same scriptures again, we find *the priest laying his hand upon the head of the Chattath*‡: and, still in the same scriptures, we have it asserted, that *a Chattath may be eaten*§. Now, that the word *Chattath* primarily denotes *sin*, all are agreed. But it is quite clear, that *sin* has no blood, that *sin* is not a sacrificed bullock, that *sin* is non a material substance upon which a priest can lay his hand, that *sin* is not a thing which is capable of being eaten. Therefore, when the word *Chattath* is thus constructed, it clearly CANNOT denote *sin*. What then, under such construction, does it denote? Evidently it denotes *a sin-offering*: for, in truth, the word is utterly INCAPABLE of any other translation. Hence, by a perfectly legitimate and intelligible process, we demonstrate, that the word *Chattath*, which primarily denotes *sin*, MUST secondarily denote *a sin-offering*.

* Exod. xxx. 13.

† Exod. xxix. 14.

‡ Levit. iv. 29.

§ Levit. x. 17.

Now, to the same practically rational process, for the purpose of eliciting the sense of *punishment for sin*, let Mr. Davison subject this identical word *Chattath*: and let him try, whether, by such a process, he can bring out a satisfactory result. From the entire volume of the Hebrew scriptures, let him produce even a *single* passage, in which the word SO MUST OF NECESSITY be translated *a punishment for sin*, that it is clearly INCAPABLE of any other translation. Let him do this; and I will then allow, that he has fully established his point: let him do this; and I will then allow, that he has effectually neutralised the litigated text in the book of Genesis. But, until this palmary matter shall have been accomplished, I must continue to think, that he has given us INGENIOUS CONJECTURE instead of SOLID PROOF: I must continue to think, that his proposed version of the text in question rests only upon the insecure basis of UNAUTHORISED SPECULATION*.

* Perhaps it may not be improper to remark, that, as the word *Chattath* primarily denotes *sin*, while it secondarily denotes *a sin-offering*; so the ancient Greek translators occasionally view it, as bearing the yet additional sense of *purification*. See Numb. viii. 7. xix. 9.

In this interpretation they have been followed by the authors of our common English version.

But such a rendering will afford no benefit to the cause

III. To produce *authority* for his proposed version, Mr. Davison, no doubt, has made an attempt: but, in this attempt, I scruple not to say, that he has completely failed. He has NOT proved, that the word *Chattath* ever denotes, in actual use, a *punishment for sin*: and, if he should hereafter be able to produce a text to that effect, it will be my misfortune, in the present stage of the discussion, to have totally overlooked it.

Mr. Davison's attempt to establish his version by *authority* is two-fold: he appeals to the Septuagint; and he produces what he requires us to receive as actual examples.

1. With respect to his appeal to the Septuagint, the whole, that he brings forward in regard to certain Greek phrases as renderings of the

of Mr. Davison: for it evidently springs out of the word *Chattath's* secondary sense of a *sin-offering*; nor has it the slightest connexion with his proposed hypothetical idea of *sin-punishment*. To trace the process of the notion, from *sin-offering* to *purification*, is no way difficult. When a *sin-offering* had been devoted on behalf of the congregation, its result was *purification* through the medium of *expiation*.

I have thought it right to notice this rendering of the Seventy: but, after all, even in the two passages referred to, there is no absolute necessity to translate the word in the involved sense of *purification*; it may just as well be rendered *sin-offering*. Certainly, it cannot be rendered *sin-punishment*.

word *Chattath*, proves nothing whatsoever to his purpose.

His evidence of this description shews, what I presume no person ever thought of denying, that, in point of etymological *ideality*, the secondary sense of *Chattath* is *something for sin*: whence, obviously, the word comes to signify a *sin-offering*: but it does *not* shew, that the word was ever USED to denote, or that it was ever THOUGHT to denote, a *punishment for sin*. As I have already observed, the question is not, what the word, in point of etymological *ideality*, MIGHT BE CONJECTURALLY GUESSED TO MEAN: but the question is, what, in *absolute use* or in *naked matter of fact*, it IS ACTUALLY EMPLOYED TO DENOTE.

Now this vital matter is not, in the slightest degree, determined by Mr. Davison's Appeal to the Septuagint. That version proves indeed, what we all knew, that, in point of *ideality* or in respect to the train of thought which influences the process of Hebrew derivation, the secondary sense of *Chattath* is *something for sin*: but it does *not* prove, that, in matter of fact or in actual use, the word was ever EMPLOYED to denote a *punishment for sin*.

2. In his production of alleged examples, Mr. Davison does not strike me as more felicitous than in his reference to the Septuagint.

“ I appeal,” says he, “ to the ACTUAL force
 “ of the word *Chattath*, as expressive of *punish-*
ment; *sin-suffering*, as well as *sin-offering*”:
 and, in pursuance of his appeal, he adduces
 two several places; the one from the book of
 Lamentations, the other from the book of
 Zechariah*.

That our translators have so rendered the
 word in both these passages, I readily admit:
 but I venture to deny the conclusion, that *there-*
fore it MUST be so rendered. Let us, however,
 examine the passages themselves: and let us
 afterward examine yet a third passage, unno-
 ticed by Mr. Davison, in which the word, or
 a modification of the word, is again rendered
 by them in the same sense of *a punishment for*
sin.

(1.) The *first* of the texts, adduced by Mr.
 Davison, runs, in our common English version,
 after the following manner.

For the punishment of the iniquity of the daugh-
ter of my people is greater than THE PUNISHMENT
OF THE SIN of Sodom†.

So runs the text in our English version; but
 is there any such NECESSITY thus to translate
 it, that it CANNOT, consistently with common

* Lament. iv. 6. Zechar. xiv. 19.

† Lament. iv. 6.

sense, be *otherwise* translated? Mr. Davison will scarcely hazard the assertion. Why our translators have chosen to introduce the idea of *punishment*, I shall not pretend to determine: certain, however, it is, that the place may just as well, so far as the requirement of common sense is concerned, be rendered in manner following.

For the iniquity of the daughter of my people is greater than THE SIN of Sodom.

Such, accordingly, is the version of the Septuagint: and such, in good sooth, I doubt not, is the proper version*.

Clearly, then, the present text is wholly inefficient to prove, that the word *Chattath* is ACTUALLY EMPLOYED in the sense of *punishment for sin*.

(2.) The *second* text, adduced by Mr. Davison, promises far better than the first: but I fear, that, in the performance of its promise, it will be equally inefficient.

Our English translators have rendered the present text, as follows.

This shall be THE PUNISHMENT of Egypt and THE PUNISHMENT of all nations that come not up to keep the feast of tabernacles†.

* Καὶ ἐμεγαλύνθη ἀνομία θυγατρὸς λαοῦ μου ὑπὲρ ἀνομίας Σοδόμων.

† Zechar. xiv. 19.

That such a translation produces excellent and consistent sense, I deny not: but this is not exactly the question at present before us. The *true* question I apprehend to be, *Whether there is such a NECESSITY of thus translating the text, that it CANNOT, in common sense, be otherwise translated.* Let Mr. Davison establish the affirmative of this question; and his business is done: but that important work I have not as yet seen accomplished.

With respect to the text before us, I take upon me to assert, that, with equal grammatical propriety and with equal production of good sense, it may be rendered in manner following.

This shall be THE SIN of Egypt and THE SIN of all the nations, because that they come not up to keep the feast of tabernacles.

To an accomplished scholar like Mr. Davison, it is superfluous to insist upon the strict grammatical propriety of this translation*: and, to the unlettered, it is equally superfluous to point out the perfectly good and consistent sense which it produces.

In exact accordance with the preceding context, the passage simply imports, that *A refusal*

* For a similar construction of the word אָסַר, see Gen. xxxiv. 13.

to come up, for the purpose of keeping the feast of tabernacles, should constitute the sin of Egypt and the sin of all the nations.

Such, accordingly, unless I quite misunderstand its purport, is the precise sense which the version of the Septuagint ascribes to the passage*.

(3.) But there is yet a *third* place, unnoticed by Mr. Davison, in which the word *Chattath* or *Chatäa* is again rendered by our translators in the sense of *punishment for sin*. This I mention in equity: for, so far as my knowledge extends, I should be most sorry to keep back any thing which might seem adverse to my own opinion.

The passage, like the first of those adduced by Mr. Davison, occurs in the book of Lamentations: and, in our common English version, it runs as follows.

* Αὕτη ἔσται ἡ ἁμαρτία Ἀιγύπτου, καὶ ἡ ἁμαρτία πάντων τῶν ἐθνῶν, ὅς ἂν μὴ ἀναβῇ ἑορτάσαι τὴν ἑορτὴν τῆς σκηνοπηγίας.

The construction of the Greek in this passage is the same, if I mistake not, as that which occurs in the two following passages of Euripides.

Τὰ τῶν φίλων, αἷσχιστον, ὅστις καταβαλὼν εἰς ξυμφορὰς, αὐτὸς σέσωσται. Iphig. in Taur. ver. 609—611.

Ἀνδρία γὰρ, τὸ πλεόν ὅστις ἀπολέσας, τῷλασσαν ἔλαβε. Phoeniss. ver. 519, 520.

*Wherefore doth a living man complain: a man, for THE PUNISHMENT OF HIS SINS?**

Thus, no doubt, write our translators: but still I perceive not the NECESSITY of such a rendering. We may just as reasonably translate the passage, so as to express simply the idea of *sin*, and so as to exclude altogether the idea of *punishment*.

Wherefore doth a living man complain: a man, concerning his SIN?

In giving this translation of the place, I merely follow the Greek of the Septuagint, which expresses precisely in the same manner the supposed sense of the original Hebrew†: and it may not be unimportant to observe, that we have here a *third* instance of the marked hostility which that ancient version displays toward Mr. Davison's criticism. He has cited *two* passages, by way of proof that the word *Chattath* denotes *punishment for sin*: and I have added a *third*, omitted by himself, in which the word is again similarly rendered by our English translators. Yet, in not *any one* of the *three* places, could the ancient Greek translators dis-

* Lament. iii. 39.

† Τί γογγύσει ἄνθρωπος ζῶν, ἀνὴρ περὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας αὐτοῦ;

cover such a sense. They UNIFORMLY render the word, not *punishment for sin*, but simply *sin*.

It may be said, that, however translated, the *notion* at least of *punishment* is involved in the last-cited passage: for, if a man complain *concerning his sin*, he complains *on account of its punishment either actually inflicted or fearfully apprehended*.

Should such an assertion be made, I venture by anticipation to deny its accuracy.

A man may complain concerning his sin, without any specific reference to its punishment. If a bad man, he may impiously and falsely complain concerning his sin, on the pretended ground that he is fated to do evil by the necessity of his nature: if a good man, he may piously and truly complain concerning his sin, on the just ground that he ungratefully offends against his heavenly Father, and that he lamentably falls short of that measure of holy obedience which in purpose he aims at*.

I am willing, however, to be liberal in my concessions. Let it be granted, that the man in the book of Lamentations complains concerning his sin with a special reference to its punishment. What then? How does this prove,

* See Rom. ix. 19, 20. vii. 12—24.

that the word *Chatäa*, by which he legitimately and accurately expresses his *sin*, denotes also *the punishment for his sin*? So far as I can see, we might argue with equal cogency, that an expression of sorrow for having committed murder is a clear proof, that the Hebrew word *Hereg* denotes, not only *murder*, but likewise *the punishment of murder**.

* I cannot refrain from here noticing the singularly unguarded inaccuracy of that most respectable prelate, Bishop Patrick, when commenting upon the passage litigated between Mr. Davison and myself.

As a proof, that the Hebrew word *חַטָּא*, as it occurs in Gen. iv. 7, denotes *the punishment of sin*, his Lordship refers us to Gen. iv. 13. and Gen. xix. 15. Now, in *neither* of those places, does the word *חַטָּא* occur: for, in *both* those places, the *entirely different* word *פָּשַׁע* is employed. With regard to the *many other places* indefinitely alleged by the Bishop, though I have carefully sought for them, I have not as yet been able to find them. See Comment. on Gen. iv. 7.

The same fearlessness of assertion, though not the same inaccuracy of reference, characterises a part of Dr. Outram's Treatise on Sacrifice.

Commenting on the phrase, *He bare the sin of many*, as it occurs in Isaiah liii. 12, Dr. Outram remarks, that the *sins*, here mentioned, are not sins properly so called, but *the punishment of sins*: a sense of the word, which occurs *PERPETUALLY* (*passim*) in Holy Scripture. Outram. de Sacrif. lib. ii. c. 5. § ix. p. 306.

With this *PERPETUAL* occurrence of the word *חַטָּא* in the sense of *punishment*, I am compelled to confess myself altogether unacquainted. Certainly, it bears no such sense in the phrase commented upon by Dr. Outram. When our Lord is prophetically said to *bear the sin of many*, the idea, specifically conveyed by the expression, is *not the punish-*

On the whole, then, I maintain, that, by the IMPERIOUSNESS of the present passage, we are no way *bound* to render the word *Chattath* or *Chatâa* in the sense of *punishment for sin*: we are quite free to render it, with the Greek of the Septuagint, in its primary sense of *sin* merely. This place, therefore, no more establishes the point to be established by Mr. Davison, than the two texts which he himself has corroboratively adduced*

IV. The entire matter finally resolves itself into the following statement.

For the purpose of *neutralising* the language *ment of sin, but the imputation of sin, by its transfer from the real offender to the appointed vicarious oblation*. Doubtless the victim suffers punishment *in consequence* of this transfer: but *punishment* is not the precise notion conveyed by the phrase *itself*. Dr. Outram's mistake is the more singular, because, in the course of his discussion, he himself actually gives the true sense of the phrase: a phrase, the idea of which is plainly borrowed from that significant action under the Law, by which the sin of the sacrificer was transferred to the head of the victim his substitute. See Outram. de Sacrif. lib. ii. c. 5. § vii. p. 303.

* Some have thought, that the idea of *punishment* is involved in Prov. x. 16, and in Job v. 24.

I do not perceive, that any such involution is NECESSARY to the production of good sense in either passage: nor do the Seventy, in their translation, express the alleged idea.

It will be recollected, that, in order to establish his point, Mr. Davison must produce a text, in which the sense of *punishment* is so absolutely NECESSARY, that no other sense is ADMISSIBLE.

of God addressed to Cain, and of thus nullifying the argument derived from it, Mr. Davison contends, that the word *Chattath* may be rendered *a punishment for sin* just as properly as *an offering for sin*.

Now this assertion I take upon myself to controvert. I DENY, that the word *Chattath* ever denotes *punishment for sin*: Mr. Davison MAINTAINS the contrary. With *him*, therefore, rests the burden of demonstration. Let him PROVE his point by the adduction of *any one* definite text from the whole Hebrew Scriptures: and I will acknowledge, that he has *neutralised* the passage in which God addresses Cain. As yet, his point remains UNPROVED*.

* Mr. Davison states, that “the translation of *punishment* is not disputed, as though the word were INCAPABLE “of that sense; for, in fact, Hebrew Critics, Lexicons, and “Concordances, are familiar with *punishment*, as one “secondary signification of the word:” and he cites Vatablus and Grotius, as intimating, that this sense of *punishment* is frequent among the Hebrews. Inquiry, p. 57, 59.

I. It would have been more satisfactory, if Mr. Davison had given us PROOF, instead of attempting to bear us down by the mere AUTHORITY of Critics and Lexicographers. Vatablus and Grotius may cheaply say, that the sense of *punishment* is FREQUENT among the Hebrews: but I should have been better pleased if they had produced some one of these FREQUENT instances. The word נָפַח, I allow, frequently occurs in the sense of *punishment*: but the production of any single text, wherein the word נָפַח occurs in the sense

V. Mr. Davison, however, though he maintains that the word *Chattath* denotes not only

of *punishment*, is as yet, if I mistake not, a critical desideratum.

II. With respect to Lexicographers, if Mr. Davison means to speak of them *universally*, he is most certainly incorrect.

The poverty of my own library furnishes me with only two Hebrew Lexicons: and the locality of my situation in life precludes me from any convenient access to libraries of reference. Respecting Lexicons, therefore, which I have had no opportunity of consulting, I can say nothing: respecting those which I *have* consulted, I can speak from the evidence of my own senses.

1. Parkhurst, who is thought (I believe) to be no mean Hebræan, and who is characteristically abundant in remark and comment, does not even so much as mention, under the mere aspect of a critical speculation, the sense which has been advocated by Mr. Davison. With him חטאת or חטאת primarily denotes *sin*; secondarily, *a sin-offering, an offering for sin, on which the sin was put, or to which it was imputed*. As for any third meaning of a *punishment for sin*, Parkhurst is totally silent. Nor was his silence without amply-sufficient reason. Like myself, I suspect, he had been unable to discover the slightest EVIDENCE for any such interpretation.

2. Buxtorf may be thought somewhat more favourable to Mr. Davison: for, by the professed aid of a metonymy, he is willing to translate the place before us, *The punishment of sin lieth at the door*. But the wary Lexicographer will not commit himself by giving the sense of *punishment* as a regular and stated grammatical sense of the word חטאת: on the contrary, the only two senses, which he explicitly and confidently lays down, are *Peccatum* and *Sacrificium pro peccato*. As for Buxtorf's speculative metonymy in Gen. iv. 7, I need scarcely observe, that to argue from *that* is to beg the question in debate. That this great Hebræan could produce no text on which he could establish

an offering for sin but likewise *punishment for sin*, professes himself no way careful or anxious to enforce his opinion too rigidly.

“ I do not ask so much to be conceded,” says he, “ as that the direct sense of *punishment* “ should be introduced. *Sin*, with its consequences *implied*, is enough.”*

If, in this apparent concession, Mr. Davison means simply to say, that it is difficult to employ the word *sin*, without at the same time exciting both in ourselves and in others the idea of *attendant punishment*; he probably may speak the truth. But I see not, how his evidence is improved by *that* circumstance. Such an involuntary concatenation of ideas is no way *peculiar* to the Hebrew word *Chattath*. It *equally* belongs to *SIN*, in *whatever* language the notion of *sin* may be expressed: it *always* belongs to *sin*, *whenever* the term *sin* is employed.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Davison wishes to the sense of *punishment*, is abundantly evident. His silence and caution speak volumes.

3. Since this was written, I have been informed by a literary friend, that I may add Avenarius and Castell to Parkhurst and Buxtorf. Avenarius, in his Hebrew Lexicon, does not mention *punishment of sin* as one of the senses of *Chattath*: and Castell, in his Heptaglott Lexicon, finds no hint of such a meaning in any of the cognate languages.

* Inquiry, p. 59.

intimate, that the Hebrew word *Chattath*, UNLIKE the Greek word *Hamartia* or the Latin word *Peccatum* or the English word *Sin*, is sometimes grammatically and significantly used in the complex sense of *sin followed by punishment*: I shall be ready to assent to the propriety of his speculation, whensoever he shall bring me PROOF that the speculation is well founded.

For my own part, throughout the whole compass of the Hebrew Scriptures, I recollect only two modes of constructing the word *Chattath*, which, with any show of plausibility, can be thought to countenance Mr. Davison's opinion.

1. The first mode occurs in a text contained in the book of Numbers.

But, if ye will not do so, behold, ye have sinned against the Lord: and be sure your SIN will find you out.*

In this passage, *sin* may be thought to involve the idea of *consecutive punishment*. Whence the passage may be thought to furnish an example of that complex sense, with the admission of which on the part of his opponents Mr. Davison professes himself to be content.

Such an interpretation would be plausible: yet, as it is no way *necessary*, so I doubt whether it be in any wise *correct*.

* Numb. xxxii. 23.

Of the present passage, if I mistake not, the true notion is the *detection* of a sinner, not his *punishment*.

Your sin, says Moses to the children of Gad and Reuben, *shall find you out or detect you: and, by thus appearing in evidence against you, it shall bring you in undeniably guilty.*

That this is the true notion of the passage, is manifest from the preceding context.

If the Gadites and the Reubenites would assist their brethren, by going armed over Jordan; then they should be guiltless before the Lord: but, if they should refuse to assist them by passing over; then, antithetically, they would sin against the Lord, and the very notoriety of their offence would incontrovertibly establish their guilt*.

2. The second mode occurs in any one of those numerous passages, wherein the substantive *sin* is constructed with the verb *bear*.

Neither must the children of Israel henceforth

* It is not unworthy of note, that in the copies used by the Seventy, a word must have occurred in this passage, which does not appear either in the present Hebrew, or in the present Samaritan. The Seventy render the place: Γνώσεσθε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ὑμῶν, ὅταν ὑμᾶς καταλάβῃ ΤΑ ΚΑΚΑ. *Ye shall know your sin, when evil shall overtake you.* The word, which they express by τὰ κακά, was most probably רעה.

come nigh the tabernacle of the congregation, lest they BEAR SIN and die.*

Here, and in other similar places, it may be said, that the idea of *consecutive punishment* is plainly involved in the word *Chattath*: for, if a man be described as *bearing his sin*, the meaning of the phrase is, that *He bears the punishment of his sin*.

This gloss upon the phrase I deem altogether inadmissible. The expression imports, not *the punishment of sin*, but *the imputation of guilt* †. That such is the case, is evident from the very mechanism of the phrase ‡. Until atonement was made by an expiatory sacrifice, the offender was said to bear imputatively the weight of his own guilt. But, when atonement was made through the medium of an expiatory sacrifice, the guilt was then viewed as transferred imputatively from the offender himself to his substitute the victim. He no longer bore his own sin: to

* Numb. xviii. 22. Comp. Levit. xx. 20. xxii. 9. xxiv. 15. Isaiah liii. 12, and see Numb. xii. 11.

† In this sense, the Seventy plainly understood the phrase: for they uniformly, I believe, explain it by ἀμαρτίαν λαμβάνειν, *to take or incur sin*.

‡ For the precise notion of the phrase, TO BEAR SIN, see Levit. i. 3—9. iii. 1—5, 7—17. iv. 13—21, 22—26, 27—35. xvi. 20—22.

the victim, devoted by him, his guilt was henceforth imputed*.

* From the circumstance of the ancient sin-offerings being typical of the alone meritorious sin-offering of Christ, many persons have inclined to understand Hebraistically the word ἁμαρτίαν in 2 Corinth. v. 21. *He made him to be a SIN-OFFERING for us, who knew no sin.*

Mr. Davison, unless I misapprehend him, strongly censures the version before us; alleging, that it rests only upon the cold officious criticism of later commentators, who have been carried away by a suggestion of their philological erudition unskilfully applied: whence, as cited by Grotius, he brings against them, from among the better-judging ancients, Chrysostom and Œcumenius and Theophylact, who understand the text as it appears in our common English translation. Inquiry, p. 63—65.

I do not pledge myself either to defend or to oppose the version rejected by Mr. Davison. Very probably he may be right in his judgment: and very possibly he may be wrong. But, however this may be, I cannot think it quite equitable to make the cold officiousness of MODERN criticism bear more than the sufficiently ponderous burden of its own proper misdemeanours. Right or wrong, at all events the reprobated gloss is certainly as old as the fourth and fifth centuries: for we find it patronised alike by Augustine of Hippo, and by Cyril of Alexandria.

Dicit Apostolus: *Obsecramus pro Christo, reconciliamini Deo. Eum, qui non noverat peccatum, pro nobis peccatum fecit; ut nos simus justitia Dei in ipso.* Deus ergo, cui reconciliamur, fecit eum pro nobis peccatum; id est, sacrificium per quod dimitterentur nostra peccata: quoniam *peccata* vocantur sacrificia pro peccatis. August. cont. Pelag. et Celest. de peccat. original. lib. ii. c. 32. Oper. vol. vii. p. 304. Colon. Agrip. 1616.

Ὁ πάνσοφος Παῦλος γέγραφέ, — Τὸν μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν, ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησε. Θῦμα γάρ γέγονεν ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτίας. Ὡνομάζοντο δὲ αἱ ἁμαρτιαὶ τὰ ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτίαν

I have now given the subject as full an examination as I deem necessary. Should there be any other text, which will better serve to establish the propriety of Mr. Davison's speculation, it has hitherto escaped my notice*.

σφαζόμενα. Cyril. Alex. cont. Julian. lib. ix. p. 303. Lips. 1696.

In favour of his interpretation, Augustine, perhaps not unreasonably, argues from the context of the passage. The Apostle had said, in the immediately preceding verse, *Be ye reconciled to God*. Now *reconciliation to God* was effected *through the medium of the sin-offering*. Hence, the mention of *reconciliation to God* led Augustine to suppose, that, in the immediately succeeding verse, Christ was relatively and coideally styled, through the Hellenistic use of a well-known Hebrew idiom, not *sin*, but *an offering for sin*. Many persons will probably think with Augustine, that the context of the place obviously requires such an interpretation.

* The extreme danger of practically building upon the system of etymological speculation, which has been advocated by Mr. Davison, is strikingly exemplified in the different fates of the two Hebrew words חטאת and ער.

In its primary sense, חטאת denotes *sin*; in its secondary ideal sense, *something for sin*: while ער, in its primary sense, denotes *iniquity*; and, analogously, in its secondary ideal sense, *something for iniquity*.

Yet mark the singular difference or divergence of meaning, when, in the development of their common secondary ideal sense, they are each brought into practical employ.

The word חטאת, in the development of its secondary ideal sense, NEVER denotes *punishment for sin*; ALWAYS denotes *an offering for sin*. But the word ער, in the development of its strictly identical secondary ideal sense, NEVER denotes *an offering for iniquity*; ALWAYS denotes *punishment for iniquity*.

Now, according to Mr. Davison's system of etymologic

PART II.—RESPECTING THE TRUE PURPORT OF THE SCRIPTURAL HISTORY OF THE OFFERINGS OF CAIN AND ABEL.

The gloss upon the word *Chattath*, proposed by Mr. Davison, has now, I trust, been effectually displaced. Nothing, therefore, remains but the easy task of showing, from the history of the first-recorded sacrifice, that *The rite of piacular oblation must have been DIVINELY instituted at the very commencement of the Patriarchal Dispensation.*

I. Respecting the two sons of Adam and Eve, we read, that Abel was a keeper of sheep, but that Cain was a tiller of the ground. In process of time, or rather *from the end of days* (an expression which has been thought to indicate a regular habit of sacrificing at certain appointed seasons), Cain brought the vegetable produce of the earth as an offering to the Lord: but

speculation, each word *alike*, in the practical development of its secondary ideal sense, ought to have signified both *sacrifice* and *punishment*: yet, in despite of system, plain matter of fact has demonstrated, that this is NOT the case.

On Mr. Davison's principle of settling the sense of *Hebrew* words through the instrumentality of *etymological conjecture*, I have as good a right to maintain that *קָרַב* denotes a *sacrifice for iniquity*, as he can have to maintain that *קָרַב* denoted *punishment for sin*.

Abel brought a lamb with its fat from the first-born of his flock. As their respective offerings thus differed in their nature, so did they experience a marked difference in their reception. *The Lord*, we are told, *had respect unto Abel and to his offering ; but, unto Cain and to his offering, he had not respect.* This diversity of treatment forthwith stirred up the jealous indignation of Cain : but, with wonderful condescension, God was pleased to argue with him, and apparently to point out the ground or principle of such diversity.

Why art thou wroth : and why is thy countenance fallen ? If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted ? And, if thou doest not well, SIN lieth at the door.

II. Thus runs the scriptural history of the transaction : and thus, in our common English version, runs the explanatory expostulation of God with Cain.

Now, that God's expostulation is *verbally* capable of such a rendering, no person will deny : but the question is, *whether this rendering, either conveys any very distinct explanation of the difference which was made between the two offerings, or describes the Almighty as speaking in a manner suitable to his own wisdom and dignity.*

1. It is evident, that the expostulation was intended to account for the difference which God made between the two offerings of the two brothers: on all hands, *this* matter is fully allowed.

How then, in its present form, does it account for that difference?

They, who think with Mr. Davison, contend, that, according to the obvious import of the expostulation, God rejected the offering of Cain simply on the ground of his *antecedent* bad conduct; while he accepted the offering of Abel simply on the ground of his *antecedent* piety.

Such an account of the matter is not devoid of plausibility; yet it is attended with some measure of difficulty.

As to the *antecedent* wickedness of Cain and the *antecedent* piety of Abel, the history is altogether silent: nothing is said respecting the character of either. We may conjecture what we please: but, from the history, we know nothing.

It may be urged, that the alleged *antecedent* difference of character, though not mentioned in the history, is yet set forth by St. John.

This is the message which ye heard from the beginning, that we should love one another. Not as Cain, who was of that wicked one and slew his

brother. And, wherefore slew he him? Because his own works were evil; and his brother's righteous*.

In the present passage, I must confess myself unable to discover any intimation, that the characters of the two brothers were *antecedently* different. Certainly Cain hated his brother, and slew him: because his own works were evil; and his brother's, righteous. But, whether these works of Cain were *antecedent* to his offering, or whether they were *involved* in the nature and spirit of the offering itself, the inspired apostle is altogether silent: and, if there be any text of scripture, in which God is said to have accepted Abel's offering BECAUSE Abel was righteous, and to have rejected Cain's offering BECAUSE Cain was wicked; that text has hitherto escaped my notice. With respect to the *antecedent* characters of the two brothers, we, in fact, know nothing: and, to ascribe the rejection and acceptance of their several offerings to any supposed *antecedent* diversity between them, is, I apprehend, a purely gratuitous interpretation. As for myself, I decidedly prefer a strict adherence to what is revealed †.

* 1 John iii. 11, 12.

† The notion of an *antecedent* diversity of moral conduct

In the history, no action of either is recorded, save the bringing of their oblations. Hence, if we be guided by the context, and not by our own unwarranted conjectures, we must plainly refer God's expostulation with Cain, not to any FANCIED antecedent diversity of character between the two brothers, but to the DECLARED difference of their several offerings. This, I scruple not to say, is required by the context: and, if we depart from this, we may give the reins to our own *imagination*, but we certainly propound nothing that has been *revealed*.

between the two brothers, from its superficial plausibility, has not only been very commonly adopted, but is likewise of high antiquity in the Church. It was the solution, resorted to by Irenæus in the second century.

Ab initio enim respexit Deus ad munera Abel; quoniam cum simplicitate et justitia offerebat: super sacrificium autem Cain non respexit; quoniam cum zelo et malitia, quæ erat adversus fratrem, divisionem habebat in corde. Iren. adv. Hær. lib. iv. c. 34. § 2.

This, no doubt, is very plausible: but it is mere CONJECTURE, wholly unsupported by PROOF. We have no evidence whatsoever, that Cain entertained any malice against his brother *previous* to their sacrifices: on the contrary, his malice was plainly *generated* by the rejection of his offering. Such, accordingly, is the very just opinion both of Athanasius and of Jerome. Πρῶτον ἀμάρτημα φθόνος, ἐπὶ τῇ προτιμῇ τοῦ Ἀβελ. Athan. Dict. et interpret. Sac. Scriptur. Oper. vol. ii. p. 336. Commel. 1600. Tam gratè sacrificium ejus (scil. Abelis) acceptum Deo fuerit, ut fratrem in invidiam concitaret. Hieron. ad Demetriad. de Virgin. epist. i. Oper. vol. ix. p. 2. Colon. Agrip. 1616.

Here then is the difficulty, attendant upon that interpretation of God's language, which, as I have allowed, seems, on the first view, abundantly plausible.

The interpretation is wholly UNWARRANTED by the context: and it rests upon nothing more solid, than the sandy basis of UNAUTHORISED CONJECTURE.

If the context be attended to, and if conjecture be thrown aside, God's expostulation with Cain MUST refer to *the recorded diversity of the two offerings*: for, in the context, there is nothing else, to which it *can* refer. The nature and spirit, therefore, of Cain's sacrifice was the matter, which stamped him with the character of evil: and, on the other hand, the nature and spirit of Abel's sacrifice was the matter, which impressed upon him the character of righteousness.

Now, under this view of the subject, it is certain, that God's expostulation, which allowedly was intended to account for the marked difference put between the two offerings, conveys, in our common version, no distinct and intelligible explanation whatsoever. We learn not from it, why the one offering was accepted, and why the other offering was rejected.

2. As God's expostulation, according to our common English version, conveys no distinct explanation of the difference which was made between the two offerings; so neither does it seem to exhibit the Almighty, as speaking in a manner suitable to his own wisdom and dignity.

From long habit, our English ear has become familiarised to the phrase of *sin lying at the door of a person*: and, when we employ the phrase, we mean to intimate by it, that *the person, thus characterised, is a sinner*.

Now, on the supposition that such is the just and proper import of the phrase as it occurs in the original, we actually find ascribed to the divine speaker nothing better than a mere unmeaning tautology. For, in that case, the clause, *If thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door*, is precisely equivalent to the declaration, *If thou art a sinner, thou assuredly art a sinner*. The proposition, indeed, is undeniably true: yet it required not a voice from heaven for its communication. Clearly, we cannot, for a moment, dispute it: yet I can with difficulty believe, that God, by a voice from heaven, would authoritatively declare to Cain, that, *If a man BE a sinner, he certainly IS a sinner*.

But it may be more than doubted, whether the idea, which *we* annex to the now familiar phrase of *sin lying at a person's door*, can be legitimately extracted from the original. If the word *Chattath*, in the present passage, be rendered *sin*; the whole clause, according to the strict sense of the Hebrew, ought to have been rendered in manner following. *If thou doest not well, sin, like an animal, coucheth at the door.* Such, if the word *Chattath* be rendered *sin*, is the language, of necessity, ascribed to God: and this language, to my own apprehension at least, is utterly and hopelessly unintelligible*.

Under these circumstances, it is not the part of prudence to retain a translation either grossly tautological or hopelessly unintelligible, if an-

* I readily admit, that the *glosses* of Bp. Hall and Bp. Patrick, with all other *glosses* framed on the same principle, are quite intelligible: but then their intelligibility results from their introducing the idea of VENGEANCE or PUNISHMENT, which, as we have seen, the Hebrew word *Chattath* will not bear. The PUNISHMENT of sin may be figuratively said to *couch in the attitude of a wild beast ready to spring upon its victim*: but *SIN itself* cannot, with any regard to decorum and propriety, be thus described. Accordingly, what fully shows the justice of this remark, we may observe, that both Hall and Patrick, as if conscious that the simple idea of *SIN* would not serve their turn, gratuitously introduce the idea of PUNISHMENT. See Bp. Hall's Paraph. on Hard Texts, Gen. iv. 7. and Bp. Patrick's Comment. on Gen. iv. 7.

other equally possible translation, altogether free from such formidable objections, should readily and naturally present itself.

III. The Hebrew word, employed in the second clause of the expostulation, is the precise word which has been litigated by Mr. Davison and myself.

That this word *Chattath* primarily denotes *sin*, is acknowledged by all: that it secondarily denotes a *sin-offering*, is likewise universally acknowledged. Mr. Davison contends for yet a third sense, that of *punishment for sin*: but, unless I have wholly failed of my purpose, we have not a shadow of EVIDENCE, that the word is ever employed as bearing such a signification. I venture, therefore, to think, that the ascription of any such sense to the word can never be *legitimately* made the basis of a serious argument; because the ascribed sense rests upon mere CONJECTURE, not upon solid PROOF: I venture to think, and I shall continue so to think until I meet with PROOF to the contrary, that the word does NOT denote a *punishment for sin*: I venture to think, that the word does NOT grammatically import *sin with punishment of necessity implied as its consequence*.

Under such circumstances, I take upon me

to pronounce, that the *only two* significations of the word *Chattath* are *sin* and *sin-offering*.

Now, in the passage at present before us, this precise word *Chattath* is the word employed by the sacred historian. Hence, in the passage before us, that word must be translated either *sin* or a *sin-offering*: for of no third translation is it CAPABLE. So far as mere grammar is concerned, the word may be translated *either way*; that is, it may be translated either *sin* or a *sin-offering*: but, if we find that the one *possible* translation of it produces the very reverse of good sense, we shall not be blamed by any reasonable person, if we try the other equally *possible* translation. Let the experiment, then, be made: and let us observe the result.

*If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?
And, if thou doest not well, a sin-offering coucheth
at the door.*

The strict grammatical or mechanical propriety of this translation will not be contested: the only question therefore is, whether *it* produces, what the *other* equally possible translation has failed to produce, a sense good and consistent and contextually harmonious.

Now, I contend, that it perfectly answers such a description. From the context we are bound

to infer, that the rejection and the acceptance of the two offerings rested, not upon the *antecedent* moral conduct of the two brothers respecting which we know nothing, but upon the nature and spirit of the two offerings themselves: and it is certain, that God's expostulation with Cain was intended to *account for* the difference which he made between the two offerings of the two brothers. Accordingly, if we adopt the present translation, every thing is clear and harmonious and consistent. For some reason or other, God was displeased with the nature and spirit of Cain's offering: for some reason or other, God was pleased with the nature and spirit of Abel's oblation. Let Cain act in the matter of sacrifice, as Abel did: and Cain's oblation will be accepted, no less than the oblation of Abel*.

* Very remarkable is the rendering of the present text, which has been given by the Greek translators.

Οὐκ, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς προσενέγκῃς, ὀρθῶς δὲ μὴ διέλῃς, ἥμαρτες; ἡσύνκασον.

If thou hast rightly brought, but if thou hast not rightly divided, hast thou not sinned? Be still.

Such a version is unaccountable, except on the supposition that the system of Masoretic punctuation was unknown when it was made. Let the points, however, be rejected: and we shall then find no great difficulty in ascertaining how it originated. The Seventy have clearly mistaken שָׁחַח and לַפְּחָח for two infinitives: while they have made שָׁחַח the second person singular of an indicative; and רַבֵּץ, an imperative.

IV. What then was the reason, WHY God accepted the one offering, and WHY he rejected the other?

According to their unpunctuated arrangement, the *literal* version of the passage would run as follows.

If thou hast done well in bringing, and if thou hast not done well in opening, hast thou not sinned? Be still.

In this manner the Seventy understood the place: but the very genius of Hebrew antithetic poetry alone shows them to have erred, and fully establishes the strict propriety of the Masoretic punctuation.

If thou hast done well: shalt thou not be accepted?

And if thou hast not done well: at the door a sin-offering is couching.

A learned friend and neighbour of mine has ingeniously suggested to me, that, although, at first sight, the translation of the Seventy might appear favourable neither to Mr. Davison's version nor my own; inasmuch as it excludes, from the fancied verb *הטאת*, both the sense of *punishment for sin* and the sense of *offering for sin*: yet it involves, on the part of the Greek translators, a concurrence of opinion with my own view of the general question. This concurrence is established by the very turn of the phraseology: for such phraseology implies, that Cain's sin consisted in disobeying some *imperative direction* respecting the mode of sacrifice, which *imperative direction* was well known by the fratricide to have been *anteriorly communicated by God himself*.

The sacred historian had already informed us, that Cain and Abel each BROUGHT an offering unto the Lord: and, according to the Greek, God's expostulation with Cain runs; *If thou hast rightly BROUGHT (thy offering), but if thou hast not rightly divided (it), hast thou not sinned?*

Now this expostulation, by introducing the idea of *RIGHTLY bringing* and *NOT RIGHTLY dividing*, implies of necessity some *previous command* on the part of God relative to the ordinance of sacrifice, the daring breach of which constituted the sin of Cain and produced the rejection of his

The reason may be gathered, both from the different nature of the two oblations, and from

offering: for, without *an antecedent imperative direction*, there clearly could not have been a mixture of RIGHT and WRONG in Cain's devotement of his sacrifice.

Hence it obviously follows, that the ancient Greek translators believed the rite of sacrifice to have been divinely appointed from the beginning.

What precise idea they meant to annex to the word διῆλγς, may be a matter of some uncertainty. The bare notion of *division* they seem to have taken from a sense, which the verb ἵσθ occasionally bears. Primarily, it denotes *to open*; whence springs its derivative substantive ἵσθ, a *door*: but, secondarily, it denotes *to open a line or furrow*, as by a *graving instrument* or a *plough*; which mode of opening imports a *division of parts previously united*. Hence, I take it, sprang the rendering διῆλγς: but still it is difficult to say, what precise idea they wished to annex to the word.

The gloss of Irenæus, *Cum zelo et malitia, quæ erat adversus fratrem, divisionem habebat in corde* (Iren. adv. Hæc. lib. iv. c. 34.), strikes upon my own apprehension as being singularly irrelevant and unnatural. I rather, though with entire submission to better judgment than my own, incline to paraphrase the Greek translation in some such manner as the following.

In bringing a sacrifice, thou hast acted rightly; because I myself prescribed the ordinance of sacrifice: but, in bringing an eucharistic sacrifice through studied contempt and disregard of a piacular sacrifice, thou hast not drawn a right line of division between two oblations of such totally different principles. Hence, from the circumstance of thy not drawing this right line of division between them, inasmuch as thou hast retained the one sacrifice and hast systematically rejected the other; thou hast sinned with a high hand against the Lord, thou hast not properly distinguished between the two modes of sacrifice.

After some such manner, the translation may seem to have been understood by Augustine.

that different spirit of the two offerers which made Cain evil in the sight of God and Abel righteous.

Abel offered up an animal victim, under the aspect of *a sin-offering* or *a piacular sacrifice*: Cain offered up a mere vegetable oblation, apparently under the aspect of *an eucharistic sacrifice*.

Now, whether we suppose both animal sacrifice and vegetable sacrifice to have been *divinely instituted* from the beginning, or whether we deem them both alike of mere *human institution*; on either hypothesis, we shall have no reason afforded us from the supposed case itself, why God accepted the offering of Abel and why he rejected the offering of Cain. Hence the sin of Cain must have consisted, not in the mere oblation of an eucharistic sacrifice abstractedly considered, but in the spirit or temper with which it was presented.

1. Under these circumstances, our business is to inquire, what was the spirit or temper, which so grievously offended God, and which

Non autem rectè dividitur, dum non discernuntur rectè vel loca, vel tempora, vel RES IPSÆ QUÆ OFFERUNTUR. August. de Civ. Dei. lib. xv. c. 7. Oper. vol. v. p. 162.

Whether this be the purport of the Greek translation or not, at all events it clearly implies, that, in the judgment of the translators, *Cain sinned in the act of sacrifice by violating some well-known antecedent command of God.*

prevented his acceptance of Cain's eucharistic sacrifice?

The Lord's expostulation with the elder brother fully answers this important question.

If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? If thou doest not well, a sin-offering coucheth at the door.

Cain, as we learn from the tenour of the expostulation, claimed to *do well*: and, in consequence of this claim, instead of devoting a sin-offering like his brother, he satisfied himself with bringing a mere eucharistic vegetable oblation. His moral conduct, I apprehend, had hitherto been exemplary; for, otherwise, he could have set up no plea that he *did well*: and, from the language of God, we may infer, I think, that he had proudly and exclusively built upon it. God, therefore, condescends to argue with him on his own principles.

“ If thy whole conduct be so irreproachable,
“ that thou art free from sin, and that thou
“ needest not an atonement to be made by a
“ sin-offering: then, assuredly, on the just plea
“ of sinlessness, thou shalt be accepted. But,
“ if that be *not* the case (and thou mayest be
“ certain, that it is *very far* from being the case),
“ then, as an atonement, a sin-offering coucheth

“ at the door of thy tent ready to be offered
“ up by thee.”

The spirit, then, of Cain was that of a proud meritorious asserted sinlessness: and it was that spirit which rendered his otherwise laudable eucharistic sacrifice so utterly abominable in the eyes of the Lord. He presented his eucharistic sacrifice, not in humble conjunction with, but in haughty opposition to, a piacular sacrifice. The former, upon theologic principle, he offered: the latter, upon theologic principle, he offered not. Hence God directed him to supply the omission, and thus to imitate the more dutiful behaviour of his brother Abel. *If thou doest not well, a sin-offering coucheth at the door.*

2. Of Abel, the spirit was the very opposite to that manifested by Cain.

From the firstlings of his flock he brought, as a sin-offering: and thus, through the instrumentality of the symbol, he confessed his need of an atonement. This better spirit caused his offering to be accepted by God: this better spirit procured for him the appellation of *a righteous man*: this better spirit gained him the enmity of his jealous and unhumbled relative. Cain was of that wicked one, the very father of unhallowed pride: Cain slew his brother.

And wherefore, asks the Apostle, slew he him ? Because his own works were evil ; and his brother's, righteous.

V. Thus, in every point of view, does the present translation bring out a sense good and consistent and contextually harmonious: while, upon the common translation, no such praise can justly be bestowed*.

But, either the one, or the other, of these two translations must be adopted: because the word *Chattath* denotes ONLY *sin* and a *sin-offering*.

Our choice, therefore, must lie, between a

* Mr. Davison asserts, that " Our English translators, without committing themselves to this more limited sense of *punishment*, have yet kept their translation on fair terms with it. They FAVOUR, although they do not EXPRESS, it." Inquiry, p. 59.

Where is Mr. Davison's *proof* of this assertion ? Whence did he *learn*, that our translators FAVOURED the gloss which he would put upon the text now under discussion ?

Had our translators THOUGHT with Mr. Davison, they would doubtless have RENDERED the place accordingly. As for a dread of " committing themselves," they could not possibly have entertained any such apprehension: for, however erroneously, in three several passages, as we have seen above, they actually interpret the word *Chattath* " in this " more limited sense of *punishment*." Hence it is obvious, that, had they BELIEVED such to be its meaning in the present text, they would have rendered it accordingly.

Our translators, so far from FAVOURING Mr. Davison's gloss, are plainly, I think, HOSTILE to it. Certainly, the whole evidence of their alleged FAVOUR rests upon the simple circumstance, that they wrote *SIN lieth at the door*.

consistent and intelligible translation, and an inconsistent and unintelligible translation.

VI. The translation, however, for the plain NECESSITY of which I venture to contend, is recommended, not only by its own inherent merit, but likewise by the very phraseology of the entire passage itself.

In our common English version, the Hebrew text is rendered *Sin LIETH at the door*: but, as it is well known, such a translation by no means expresses the force of the original. The word, which inadequately has been rendered LIETH, properly describes *the COUCHING or RECUMBENCE of an animal*.

Nor is this the only peculiarity of the clause, as it stands in the Hebrew. Contrary to the strict rules of grammar, the masculine participle *Robetz*, which expresses *the act of couching*, is constructed with the feminine substantive *Chat-tath*, which by our translators is rendered *sin*.

Here, then, we have a double peculiarity; a peculiarity of *import*, and a peculiarity of *grammar*: and each peculiarity alike directs us to the version for which I am contending.

A participle, which properly describes *the recumbence of an animal*, is employed, simply because *an animal* is spoken of: and this par-

tiple is irregularly written in the *masculine* gender, because, agreeably to the more common sacrificial practice, the animal, pointed out to Cain, was a *male**.

Mr. Davison's proposed rendering, if admissible, would produce a metaphor. But metaphor there is none. The whole is plain matter of fact. An animal is the appointed sin-offering. Hence, obviously and naturally, the sin-offering is said to couch, as a recumbent beast, at the door of the tent†.

* See Phil. Jud. de Victim. Oper. p. 843. I may here add, that the use of the feminine word בכרות in Gen. iv. 4, where it is applied to the firstlings of Abel's flock, does not invalidate the criticism on the words *Chattath* and *Robetz* in ver. 7: for בכרות is a noun of multitude, denoting collectively *male firstlings*. Compare Deut. xii. 6, 17. xiv. 23. xv. 19. Exod. xiii. 12. Levit. xxvii. 26. See Parkhurst's Heb. Lex. in voc. בכר.

† Mr. Davison has, I think, dismissed the grammatical irregularity in the present passage much too rapidly. With Dathe, he pronounces the difficulty to be a *light one*; and thence, somewhat unceremoniously, throws it aside. Inquiry, p. 49, 50.

Now, without entering into an accurate calculation of the *amount* of the difficulty, I may at least fairly remark, both that his very statement *confesses* its existence, and that his proposed rendering (even if admissible) would not *remove* it: whereas, by the version for which I contend, the difficulty is at once both *explained* and *removed*; or rather, the difficulty is *removed* by the mere act of giving what I deem the true *explanation* of the passage. Though the word *Chattath* itself be feminine, the animal, which would have

VII. There is yet another matter, which, as it is altogether fatal to Mr. Davison's speculation while it decidedly corroborates the exposition adopted by myself, I may well be allowed to bring forward.

The final clause of the expostulation, which God addresses to Cain, our English translators have rendered in a manner which refers it to Abel.

And unto thee shall be HIS desire; and thou shalt rule over HIM.

In such a version, they have doubtless been influenced by the parallel clause in the preceding chapter*: yet there is a considerable gramma-

constituted the sin-offering enjoined upon Cain, was masculine. Hence, by a familiar involution of ideas, a masculine participle is joined to a feminine substantive, because the feminine substantive expresses a masculine victim.

The difficulty, therefore, with which Mr. Davison has to contend, I take to be this.

In the passage before us, we have a confessed grammatical anomaly. Let the word *Chattath* be translated a *sin-offering*, as the annexed participle descriptive of an *animal's* recumbence naturally leads us to translate it; and the difficulty is at once removed, simply because the anomaly is explained. But let the word *Chattath* be translated either *sin* or *punishment* (if, for a moment, we grant the possibility of the latter version); and the difficulty remains in full force, not so much as even an attempt having been made to account for the anomaly.

* Gen. iii. 16.

tical difficulty in thus referring the place to Abel. Throughout the whole of God's expostulation, the younger brother is never once mentioned*. Hence it seems not a little harsh and abrupt, that, without any preparation, Abel should suddenly be referred to by the mere terms HIS and HIM.

Influenced by this palpable circumstance, some of the early Fathers deny the *grammatical possibility* of so referring the clause; contending, that the pronouns must assuredly have some antecedent in the course of the expostulation or at least of the transaction. Thus Athanasius would refer the clause to Cain's *offering*: and thus Augustine would refer it to Cain's *sin*, as expressed in the word *Chattath*†.

Now, if such a principle of reference be just (and I much incline to think, that an inspection of the original Hebrew will tend to establish its justice), no mean accession of strength will accrue to my general argument.

The reference being made to a *thing* and not to a *person*, the two pronouns ought to be trans-

* See Gen. iv. 6, 7.

† Athan. Dict. et Interpret. quæst. 60. Oper. vol. ii. p. 336. August. de Civit. Dei, lib. xv. c. 7. Oper. vol. v. p. 162.

lated, not HIS and HIM, but ITS and IT. For, *grammatically*, we have nothing in the whole expostulation, to which the pronouns can be referred, save the word *Chattath*. And, accordingly, to this precise word, viewed as describing a *masculine* victim, and therefore associated with the confessedly *masculine* participle *Robetz*, I more than suspect, that the two *masculine* pronouns, in the concluding clause of the expostulation, ought to be referred.

*If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?
And, if thou doest not well, A SIN-OFFERING lieth
couching at the door: and, unto thee, is ITS desire;
and thou shalt rule over IT.*

Thus runs the clause, according to what the Fathers deemed its *grammatical necessity*: and the obvious import of the entire place I take to be this.

*If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?
And, if thou doest not well, an animal victim coucheth
at the door, ready to be piacularly devoted by thee
as A SIN-OFFERING: to thee this victim is sub-
mitted; and thou mayest freely exercise over IT
the power of death.*

In this manner I am led, through mere *grammatical necessity*, to understand the passage. As Athanasius speaks: *To thee shall be the*

submission of the gift, which thou hast brought ; and over it thou shalt have full power.*

If, then, *grammatical necessity* compels us to refer the two pronouns to the substantive *Chattath*, Mr. Davison's proposed version, even if abstractedly possible, is forthwith converted into a hopeless absurdity : for it is quite clear, that the submissiveness of *his own* PUNISHMENT cannot be unto Cain, and that there is no conceivable mode in which Cain can be said to rule over *his own* PUNISHMENT incurred by his own sin.

VIII. And now we may be allowed to inquire into the general result of the whole discussion.

The word *Chattath*, when viewed abstractedly, can ONLY be rendered in the two significations of *sin* and *sin-offering*. Between these two significations, therefore, in the present passage, we MUST take our choice.

If we adopt the former signification, we produce a version, unaccountably anomalous, hopelessly unintelligible, and altogether unworthy of the divine speaker : if we adopt the latter signification, we produce a version, in every

* Ἀυτοῦ τοῦ δώρου, οὗ προσήγαγες, προσγένησεται σοὶ ἡ ἀποστρεφὴ αὐτοῦ· καὶ σὺ ἐξουσιάζσεις αὐτοῦ. Athan. Dict. et Interpret. quest. 60. Oper. vol. ii. p. 336.

point of view, both grammatical and contextual, perfectly satisfactory and quite unexceptionable. Hence, so far as I can see, by the laws of mere plain common sense, we are absolutely *compelled* to prefer the latter signification.

But, if we be thus *compelled* to adopt the latter signification, the question at issue is forthwith decided.

Cain omits to sacrifice a sin-offering: and God, in consequence, plainly **COMMANDS** him to perform that necessary rite.

If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? And, if thou doest not well, A SIN-OFFERING coucheth at the door ready to be presented by thee.

The passage, however, not only contains a plain **COMMAND** that Cain should present a sin-offering: it likewise, from the very turn of the sentence, involves of necessity an intimation, that the rite of piacular sacrifice had **ALREADY** been divinely appointed.

Cain is not now enjoined, for the first time, to perform a rite, hitherto *uncommanded*, and therefore hitherto *unattended by any religious obligation*: but he is **REMINDED** of what he **OUGHT** to have done; he is **REFERRED** to what his brother actually **HAD** done; he is urged to the perform-

ance of what nothing but AN ANTECEDENT COMMAND could have constituted A BINDING DUTY.

So, likewise, the very acceptance of the one sacrifice, and the very rejection of the other sacrifice, clearly import A PREVIOUS REVELATION: for, unless Cain had already KNOWN that God had instituted the rite of piacular sacrifice for the express purpose of making an atonement, he could not have sinned in bringing an eucharistic vegetable oblation rather than an expiatory animal sin-offering.

Hence the rite must have been divinely appointed, not merely when the sacrifices of Cain and Abel took place, but at some time or other PREVIOUS to their occurrence.

Now the very rite of *an offering for sin*, by the plain necessity of language, undeniably supposes *the existence of sin*. The rite could not have been appointed anterior to its cause: the first sin-offering could not have been devoted by man in a state of innocence.

Hence, if the rite *were not* FIRST ordained when Cain and Abel sacrificed, and if it *could not* have been ordained PREVIOUS to the introduction of sin into the world by the fall of man; it *must* have been ordained at some period between the fall of man and the sacrifices of the two brothers.

But the special character of the rite, a character impressed upon its very name, is that of AN OFFERING FOR SIN.

Therefore the natural and reasonable presumption is, that God first ORDAINED it, when through sin it first became NECESSARY.

This last particular, I freely allow, is a matter only of rational presumption, not of strict demonstration: but enough has already been established for our present purpose. It is denied by Mr. Davison, that *God ordained the rite of piacular sacrifice under the Patriarchal Dispensation*. My answer is, that God COMMANDED Cain to devote A SIN-OFFERING.

IX. It may be useful, at the close of the present discussion, to exhibit the whole of God's expostulation with Cain, both according to what I deem its most just translation, and according to the metrical form in which this very ancient specimen of antithetic or responsive poetry ought to be arranged.

Why is there hot anger unto thee:

And why hath fallen thy countenance?

If thou doest well; shall there not be exaltion?

And if thou doest not well; at the door a sin-offering is couching.

And unto thee is its desire :

And thou shalt rule over it*.

The perfect harmony of the whole expostulation, when thus exhibited, must, I think, strike even the most careless observer: and this perfect harmony does itself tend to establish the propriety of the interpretation which I have been led to adopt.

CHAPTER II.

Evidence of the Primeval Divine Institution of Expiatory Sacrifice, from the Attestation of the Inspired Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

WITH the necessary tenor of the history of the first-recorded sacrifice, agrees the remarkable attestation of the inspired author of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

* I have already observed, that the very genius of antithetic poetry demonstrates the Greek translation of the middle distich of this short ode to be erroneous, even if no other objection could be made to it. In that version, the necessary, and therefore expected, response of the middle distich is entirely destroyed: and, instead of regularly arranged metrical poetry, the distich itself becomes a sentence of mere bald prose. *If thou hast rightly brought, but if thou hast not rightly divided, hast thou not sinned? Be still.*

I. This writer takes occasion largely to celebrate the power of *Faith*: and, in furtherance of his purpose, he adduces a great variety of instances or examples, wherein certain enumerated persons acted under the influence of this principle.

Now the very necessity of his illustration requires, that the faith of all these several persons should be *identical*: or, in other words, the very necessity of his illustration requires, that the faith of each individual should be *capable of a common definition*.

The faith of the several persons, when in operation, might act indeed upon *different objects*: but still, in some harmonising *principle*, the faith of them all must have been fundamentally *the same*.

Hence, if we require an accurate definition of their faith, we must seek it, not in *the objects upon which it respectively operated*, but in *the common principle which constituted its essence or vitality*.

This is prose, not antithetic poetry. Mark how different the just version, according to the Masoretic punctuation:

If thou doest well; shall there not be exaltation?

And if thou doest not well; at the door a sin-offering is couching.

Here we have, no prose, but a perfect distich of regular antithetic poetry.

Thus, if, on the ground that Moses is said, through faith, to have esteemed the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures in Egypt, we define the word *Faith*, as here employed by the Apostle, to be *a faith in Christ*; we shall err: because it was clearly through no special *faith in Christ*, that Noah prepared an ark to the saving of his house*. And thus, if we define the same word *Faith* to be *a firm belief that the children of Israel would at length depart out of Egypt*, on the ground that such indisputably was the faith of Joseph, which led him to give commandment concerning his bones; we shall again err: because it is through the working of no such specific *faith in the promised exodus*, that we believe the worlds to have been framed by the word of God.

In each of these supposed cases, the error would plainly consist in defining the word *Faith*, from *some one of the several objects upon which the Faith in question variously operated*, rather than

* I am far from meaning to deny, that a prospective faith in Christ was the faith of the Patriarchs in general, and of Abel in particular: I mean simply to say, that, *as a strict definition*, we cannot assert, that this *prospective faith in Christ* is the *Faith* celebrated by the Apostle through the entire chapter. The reason is simply this: such a definition is too narrow and exclusive. To *many* of the enumerated cases it may apply: to *all* it certainly does *not* apply.

from the common or general principle which constituted its essence or vitality.

What, then, is the true definition of *Faith*, as the term is here employed by the Apostle? what, in other words, is that definition of *Faith*, which, with equal propriety, will suit the various described cases of ALL those confessedly faithful persons whom he enumerates?

The inspired writer himself has provided us with such a definition: and, as if to prevent the possibility of error in regard to his intended meaning, he has most luminously and most methodically prefixed it to his series of personal illustrations.

Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen *.

Now, certainly, the *things hoped for*, and the *things unseen*, which are specified in this definition, cannot mean *things which are the subject of mere human unauthorised conjecture and speculation*: they must, on the contrary, denote *things which are the express subject of an authoritative divine revelation*. For, as St. Paul elsewhere distinctly teaches us, *Faith cometh by HEARING, and hearing by THE WORD OF GOD* †. The very idea, therefore, of *Faith*, according both to rea-

* Heb. xi. 1.

† Rom. x. 17.

son and to Scripture, involves, of plain necessity, the idea of *A Divine Revelation*.

Such being the case, the Apostle's definition may otherwise be rightly expressed in manner following.

Faith is an assured belief in divine revelation, whatever may be the specific object or nature of any divine communication in particular.

That this definition, in varied phraseology, accurately sets forth the true meaning of the Apostle's definition, no one, I presume, will venture to deny. Accordingly, the present definition, or rather (to speak more properly) the Apostle's own definition, will be found accurately to suit EVERY case which he has adduced in illustration of the principle. The faith of Enoch, of Noah, of Abraham, of Joseph, of Moses, of Rahab, of Gideon, of Barak, of Samson, of Jephthah, of David, of Samuel, *might* severally vary, as it *did* vary, in regard to its *specific object*: but, in *principle*, their faith was UNIFORMLY *a faith in divine revelation*; that is to say, in the words of the Apostle, their faith was UNIFORMLY *the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen* *.

* It may be objected, that the faith of Daniel by which he stopped the mouths of lions, and the faith of Hananiah and

II. We have now obtained the only true definition of that Faith, which the sacred writer so largely celebrates and illustrates: let us next apply it to the particular faith of Abel, who occupies a conspicuous place in the apostolic catalogue of recorded worthies.

By faith, Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain, by which he obtained witness that he was righteous; God testifying of his gifts: and, by it, he being dead yet speaketh.*

The word *Faith*, we have established, as employed by the Apostle throughout his entire eulogy, invariably denotes *faith in a divine reve-*

Mishael and Azariah by which they *quenched the violence of fire* (Heb. xi. 33, 34.), cannot be said to have been *Faith in a divine revelation*: because it was not previously revealed to Daniel, that he should be saved from the lions; neither was it previously revealed to the three children, that they should be preserved from the furnace.

This, no doubt, is true: but then I take such a view of their faith to be altogether erroneous. The faith of Daniel consisted in his manfully performing his religious duties to his God, according to *the revealed Law* of his fathers, in despite of the mad atheistical decree of Darius: and the faith of the three children consisted in their daring the furnace, rather than violate *the revealed prohibition* of idolatry. Thus, in each case, their faith was *Faith in a divine revelation*: and, in truth, their faith was so much the greater, because they knew not anteriorly, whether in their bodies they should be severally delivered from the lions and the furnace.

* Heb. xi. 4.

lation. The faith, therefore, of Abel was *faith in a divine revelation*, whatever might be its specific object or nature.

Now we are assured, that, by faith, Abel offered up unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain. If, then, *faith* were the ground, on which Abel offered a more excellent sacrifice than Cain; it is clear, that, in regard to this more excellent sacrifice, Abel *possessed* a faith which Cain did *not possess*: for nothing, I think, can be more evident, than that, if Cain *had* possessed Abel's faith, he would have offered to God Abel's sacrifice. But the faith, here spoken of, is *faith in a divine revelation*. Abel, therefore, possessed *a faith in a specific divine revelation*, which Cain, by the very terms of the Apostle's statement, did *not* possess. Now the *faith in a divine revelation*, possessed by Abel, led him to offer a sacrifice from the firstlings of his flock: for, says the Apostle, BY FAITH Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain. Consequently, the want of *faith in a divine revelation*, on the part of Cain, led him to offer a vegetable sacrifice, which the Apostle describes as a less excellent sacrifice than that of Abel. Hence I deem it manifest, that the faith of the one brother, and the unbelief of the

other brother, respected the specific action of devoting that animal sacrifice, which Abel actually *did* devote, and which Cain (in consequence of his unbelieving omission) was afterward commanded by God himself *to* devote. But the faith of Abel, as to its principle, was *faith in a divine revelation*: while, as to its special object, it was *faith in the religious necessity of devoting an animal sin-offering*. Therefore, finally, *the religious necessity of devoting an animal sin-offering* was the specific object of that divine revelation in which Abel is said to have believed. This conclusion, however, is equivalent to the proposition, that *Expiatory sacrifice was, from the first, instituted of God*. Hence, through the medium of the Epistle to the Hebrews, I claim to have demonstrated *the primeval divine institution of patriarchal expiatory sacrifice*.

III. Like myself, Mr. Davison professes to have defined the true principle of the eleventh chapter to the Hebrews: and, from that definition, he would bring out a result, which, in the matter of Abel's sacrifice, should not contradict his own favourite system.

Unless I have wholly and unintentionally misunderstood him, he would define the *Faith*, described by the Apostle in various actual opera-

tion, to be *A firm belief, on the part of the characters illustratively introduced, in the large and indefinite promises of the Lord, that he would be their God and their great reward**.

If such be Mr. Davison's proposed definition, I am compelled to say, that it certainly is erroneous.

* Inquiry, p. 129. I subjoin Mr. Davison's own words, that any error of conception on my part, if I have erred, may be rectified.

"If we will follow the sense of Scripture, we shall now see, how God, without having granted to those patriarchs the *explicit revelation of an eternal heavenly state*, a revelation which is no where exhibited in the Pentateuch, trained them to the aim and implicit persuasion of that eternal state, *by large and indefinite promises of being their God and their great reward*; promises, to which the present life, as to *them*, furnished no adequate completion. This, therefore, is that intermediate Faith, strong though dim-sighted, which St. Paul so admirably describes, in the distant vision, and the unsatisfied longings and aspirations, of patriarchal belief."

In these words, Mr. Davison professes to have "defined the true principle of the eleventh chapter to the Hebrews." He subsequently adds, speaking of the ancient patriarchs, that "to those, who can consent to be taught by St. Paul, it is certain, that the memorable exposition, which he has subjoined, of Enoch's faith, takes away all pretence for assuming, that any other revelation was necessary to constitute the basis of their faith, than simply to know and be persuaded, that *God is, and is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.*" p. 123. Hence, agreeably to what I understand his definition to be, he elsewhere explains Heb. xi. 4, as importing, that "Abel's faith in God, *as a rewarder*, induced him to offer a larger or more copious sacrifice." p. 128.

The reason of its erroneousness is evident. This proposed definition of the *Faith*, described by the Apostle, does not apply to ALL the adduced illustrations. For it is NOT through *faith in the large and indefinite promises of God to be the God and the great reward of his servants*, that we believe the naked historical fact of *God's creation of the Universe*, or (in the language of the Apostle) that *we believe the worlds to have been framed by the word of God*: NEITHER was it through *any such faith in God's indefinite promises to be the great reward of his servants*, that *Noah prepared an ark for the saving of his house*; but, on the contrary, it was through *faith in an express and definite revelation of an approaching deluge*. Therefore, *this definition of Faith*, being clearly inapplicable to ALL the adduced illustrations, cannot be the true definition of the *Faith* celebrated by the Apostle.

Now Mr. Davison's whole argument to prove, that *Abel did not sacrifice in obedience to any explicit divine command*, rests upon the propriety of his definition: for he contends, agreeably to his definition, that *Abel sacrificed only through a firm belief in the large and indefinite promises of the Lord, that he would be his God and his great reward*. Therefore, the definition being

erroneous, the argument built upon it is, of plain necessity, altogether inconclusive*.

* Mr. Davison, after stating that the adjective *πλείονα*, in the passage before us, denotes either *better* or *more abundant*, inclines to adopt the latter interpretation: and thus, by the aid of what I have supposed to be his definition, he brings out the sense of the text in manner following.

“Abel’s faith in God, as a rewarder, induced him to offer “a larger or more copious sacrifice.” Inquiry, p. 128.

This theory of a *larger or more abundant sacrifice*, which wholly rests upon a gratuitous though grammatically possible translation of the word *πλείονα*, is to my own mind very unsatisfactory.

In the first place, *copiousness* or *penuriousness* of sacrifice is no measure of *Faith*: it is simply a measure of *Liberality* and *Avarice*.

And, in the second place, I am at a loss to divine, by what scale Mr. Davison will calculate the alleged *greater copiousness* of Abel’s sacrifice; a matter itself, which he assumes without any *legitimate* proof of its reality. Had Abel brought *two* lambs, while Cain brought only *one* lamb, we should have had room for an intelligible comparison: but, how any comparison of *quantity* is to be instituted between matters totally differing in *quality*, between a *lamb* on the one hand and a *basket-full of vegetables* on the other hand, it is not very easy to discover.

This circumstance alone is sufficient to shew, that Mr. Davison has misinterpreted the word *πλείονα*, in supposing it *here* to mean *more abundant in measure and quantity*. Abel brings a lamb for an offering: Cain brings a basket-full of vegetables. Such is the simple *fact*. With respect, then, to this simple *fact*, by what intelligible process can we estimate the *quantitive* proportions of two *dissimilar* oblations? By what known rules of Arithmetic or Geometry, shall we determine, that, *in point of measure and quantity*, Abel’s lamb was “a larger and more copious sacrifice,” than Cain’s basket of vegetables? Even if, dismissing

IV. The same remark applies to Dr. Spencer's mode of reasoning on the present topic.

If we may credit this very learned and able writer, the faith of Abel was merely *so firm and deeply-fixed a persuasion of God's love toward the pious, and of his purpose of recompensing them with most ample rewards, that it influenced his whole life, and induced him to devote to God not only his possessions but himself likewise* *.

Such an assertion is cheaply made: but it is not quite so easily established. The faith of Abel is doubtless the *Faith*, which is celebrated throughout the entire apostolic eulogy: but the definition, proposed by Dr. Spencer, will not

Arithmetic and Geometry, we call to our aid the mechanical operation of weighing; the only mode, so far as I can see, in which things *dissimilar* can be *quantitatively* compared: still, I fear, we shall be equally perplexed. The heaviest substances are not always the most valuable.

On the whole, we may safely assert, that the word *πλειονα* refers, not to the gross material quantity of Abel's offering, but to the higher theological principle on which it was devoted. An expiatory sacrifice, simply *by virtue of its piacularity*, is *better or greater or in quality much more*, than a simple eucharistic sacrifice. To the *specific character* of Abel's sacrifice, as contrasted with the *specific character* of Cain's sacrifice, there can be little doubt, I think, that St. Paul alluded, when he wrote, as our translators well and justly render the passage, *BY FAITH Abel offered unto God a MORE EXCELLENT sacrifice than Cain*.

* See Spencer. de Leg. Heb. Rit. lib. iii. dissert. 2. cap. 4. sect. 2. vol. ii. p. 148;

apply to EVERY particular instance of faith which is there recorded. Consequently, as I have argued above, his definition is inadmissible. The only definition, which will apply to EVERY instance, is *Faith in a divine revelation*. But *this* definition inevitably brings out the result, that *Abel sacrificed in obedience to a divine command*, and therefore that *primitive patriarchal sacrifice was a divine institution*.

V. Before I quit this part of my subject, I cannot refrain from noticing the consequences which result from the important text now under discussion.

I. Many persons, without a shadow of authority from Holy Scripture, have crudely imagined, that the *antecedent* moral conduct of Cain and Abel furnishes the true cause of the different fate of their respective sacrifices.

Now the present text is altogether fatal to such a speculation. According to the Apostle, it was not the *antecedent* righteousness of Abel, which procured the acceptance of his sacrifice: but it was the faithful offering of his sacrifice, which procured for him the character of righteousness. *By faith Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain, THROUGH WHICH he*

was testified of to be righteous*. Hence, analogically, we must conclude, that it was not the antecedent wickedness of Cain, which caused the rejection of his sacrifice; but we must conclude, that it was his daring infidelity in regard to an express divine revelation (manifested in his contumacious devotement of a mere eucharistic sacrifice, as avowedly opposed to the divinely-prescribed expiatory sacrifice), which procured for him the awful character of being of that wicked one the apostate spirit.

2. If the principle, upon which Abel acted, were *faith in a divine revelation*; and if the principle, upon which Cain acted, were *disbelief of that same divine revelation*: then the crying sin of Cain was infidelity; an infidelity specially operating upon the revealed doctrine of an atonement.

This conclusion, so far as I can see, follows, of plain necessity, from the apostolic definition

* Πίστει πλείονα θυσίαν ἸΑβελ παρὰ Κάϊν προσήνεγκε τῷ Θεῷ, ΔΙ' ἧς ἐμαρτυρήθη εἶναι δίκαιος.

There may be a doubt, whether the relative ἧς, in this sentence, refers to πίστει or to θυσίαν: but, in either case, the result is the same. It was through his faith, or through his sacrifice, or through the faith which led him to devote his sacrifice, that Abel was testified of to be righteous; not through the goodness of his antecedent moral conduct.

of *Faith*: nor, if the propriety of the definition be admitted, do I perceive how such a conclusion can possibly be avoided. Those persons, therefore, have judged rightly, who have pronounced Cain to be the first infidel upon record *.

3. Another consequence, which may be drawn from the present text, is the full establishment, that the view, which has been taken of the Mosaic history of the transaction, is substantially correct.

Why does the Apostle pronounce the sacrifice of Abel to be more excellent than the sacrifice of Cain?

(1.) Some writers have chosen to say, that Abel brought the best of his flock, while Cain offensively deemed the refuse of his produce quite good enough for a sacrificial purpose †.

* It is not unworthy of observation, that the Rabbins suppose Cain to have been a complete infidel upon every one of the great leading points of religion.

Cain said unto Abel his brother : There is neither judgment, nor judge, nor a future world, nor any reward to the just, nor any punishment to the wicked. And Abel answered and said unto Cain his brother : There is both judgment, and judge, and a reward to the just, and punishment to the wicked. Midbar Rabbah apud Selden. de Jur. Nat. lib. vii. c. 4. p. 844.

This dialogue, ingrafted upon Gen. iv. 8, is obviously a mere figment : but it effectually serves to shew the sentiments of the Rabbins respecting the character of Cain.

† See Cyril. Alex. cont. Julian. lib. x. p. 349. Lips. 1696.

For such a speculation we have not a shadow of authority. The Bible affords not to it the slightest warrant.

(2.) Others may possibly conjecture, that Abel believed *anteriorly* that his sacrifice would be accepted, while Cain believed *anteriorly* that his sacrifice would be rejected.

The supposition is palpably absurd: for, if *this* were the only faith spoken of by the Apostle, the very action of Cain shewed that he possessed *this* faith no less than his brother. He would not have offered his sacrifice at all, had he been *anteriorly* persuaded that God would reject it with disdain*.

* Much the same objection will apply to Mr. Davison's opinion, that *Abel sacrificed only through a firm belief in the large and indefinite promises of the Lord, that he would be his God and his great reward.*

If this were the *only* faith of Abel, we have no reason to suppose, that it was not *also* possessed by Cain: for, unless Cain had had faith in God *as a rewarder*, he clearly would not have sacrificed to him *at all*.

The Apostle, however, teaches us, that Faith was the impelling motive which caused Abel to offer a more excellent sacrifice than Cain.

Therefore, evidently, Cain could not have possessed the faith, which Abel possessed.

But, if the faith of Abel were *merely* the faith ascribed to him by Mr. Davison; this same faith, as the very act of sacrificing demonstrates, was possessed *also* by Cain.

Hence it follows, that the faith of Abel, not being pos-

(3.) Such phantasies being thrown aside as alike unwarranted and unsatisfactory, we may venture to pronounce, that the superiority of Abel's sacrifice must have consisted, partly in the peculiar faith with which it was offered, and partly in the specific contradistinctive nature of the sacrifice itself.

In *both* these respects, it must have *differed* from the sacrifice of Cain : otherwise, its alleged superiority is altogether unaccountable.

Now the Mosaic history fully corresponds with the apostolic attestation, if the exposition, for which I contend, be adopted : but let any other exposition be preferred, and the whole correspondence vanishes. Hence, with that harmony which ever characterises Holy Scripture, the interpretation of the Apostle's attestation, to which, by his own definition of Faith, we are irresistibly driven, requires, of very necessity, that natural and obvious exposition of the history which I have undertaken to maintain and defend.

possessed by Cain, could not have merely been the generalising belief ascribed to him by Mr. Davison : for *that* faith was possessed by Cain no less than by Abel.

CHAPTER III.

Evidence of the Primeval Divine Institution of Sacrifice, and of the Primeval Revelation of the Doctrine of an Atonement, from the peculiarity of the language employed under the Law of Moses.

THE discussion having thus far advanced, I now feel myself at liberty to draw, from the striking peculiarity of the very language employed under the Law itself, another proof of *the primeval divine institution of sacrifice*, and another proof of *the primeval revelation of the doctrine of an atonement*.

I. If the rite of sacrifice were indeed divinely instituted at the commencement of the Patriarchal Dispensation, we may naturally expect to find, under the Law, not any intimation that the rite was then *for the first time* divinely instituted, but only a *recognition* and *modification* of the rite, viewed as having *already* been long in well-known and familiar existence.

Now this precise matter, which might thus have been reasonably anticipated, is actually established by the direct evidence of facts. It is a remarkable circumstance, which (I think) has not been sufficiently attended to by Mr.

Davison, that the rite of sacrifice is introduced into the Law of Moses, not as if it were an ordinance then *for the first time* appointed by God, but as if it were an institution *already* familiar to the people in consequence of some well-known ancient precept: and it is also a remarkable circumstance, that every sacrificial command under the Law respects exclusively the *mode* and *occasion* of sacrifice, while the *observance of the naked rite itself* is never once independently and abstractedly enjoined. The Law, in short, *recognises* and *modifies* the rite: but no where, so far as I know, does it enjoin *the observance of the naked rite itself* under the aspect of a then first promulgated divine institution.

1. Taking this view of the question, we shall find, that the exordium of the book of Leviticus, where, with a reference to the Law, the ordinance of sacrifice begins to be regularly discussed, well deserves our most serious attention.

In that portion of Holy Writ, no COMMAND to sacrifice to the Lord their God is laid upon the Israelites, as if hitherto they had sacrificed *independently* of any divine command, and as if now at length they were to begin to sacrifice *in pursuance* of a divine command: but a form of speech is adopted throughout no less than three

entire chapters, which seems not obscurely to imply, that a divine command to that purpose was universally known to have been long since in actual existence.

The Lord called unto Moses, and spake unto him out of the tabernacle of the congregation, saying : Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them ; IF any man of you bring an offering unto the Lord ; ye shall bring your offering of the cattle, even of the herd and of the flock. IF his offering be a burnt-sacrifice of the herd ; let him offer a male without blemish : he shall offer it, of his own voluntary will, at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation before the Lord. And, IF his offering be of the flocks, namely of the sheep or of the goats, for a burnt-sacrifice ; he shall bring it a male without blemish. And, IF the burnt-sacrifice for his offering to the Lord be of fowls ; then he shall bring his offering of turtle-doves or of young pigeons. And, WHEN any will offer a meat-offering unto the Lord ; his offering shall be of fine flour : and he shall pour oil upon it, and put frankincense thereon. And, IF his oblation be a sacrifice of peace-offering, IF he offer it of the herd, whether it be male or female ; he shall offer it without blemish before the Lord. And, IF his offering for a sacrifice of peace-offering unto the Lord be of the flock, male or female ; he

shall offer it without blemish. If he offer a lamb for his offering; then shall he offer it before the Lord. And, if his offering be a goat; then shall he offer it before the Lord.*

2. Throughout the whole of this enumeration of particulars, which I have cited only in a very abridged form, various directions are given as to the *mode* of sacrificing; but the *rite* of sacrifice itself is not once commanded. On the contrary, so far as I can perceive, its previous existence, as a familiar ancient divine institution, is evidently, though tacitly, supposed. The Law of Moses found the rite of sacrifice *already* commanded and ordained by the Lord even from the very beginning of the Patriarchal Dispensation. No *additional* command, therefore, as to the observance of *the bare rite itself*, could in any wise be necessary. Under the Levitical Dispensation, then, in the very course of its introduction, nothing was wanted save the enjoining of certain characteristic particulars, either in regard to the *mode* in which sacrifices were henceforth to be devoted, or in regard to the *occasion* on which they were to be offered up, or in regard to the *specialty* of the animal to be devoted for a special purpose.

To these or the like subordinate particulars

* Levit. i. ii. iii.

every sacrificial commandment under the Law bears relation: no where, throughout the whole code, is *sacrifice itself*, as such, nakedly and abstractedly commanded. The precept does not run; *Thus saith the Lord, Henceforth thou shalt surely offer sacrifice unto the Lord thy God*: but it runs; *If an Israelite offer a sacrifice, let him henceforth offer it in this manner or in that manner; if an Israelite have sinned thus or thus, let him thus or thus make atonement for his sin by sacrifice; if this or that occasion present itself, let it be met by this or that specific oblation*. Invariably, the command respects the mere *mode* or the mere *circumstances* of sacrifice, not the *rite* of sacrifice itself viewed independently and abstractedly. As for the *naked rite itself*, its previous existence, as a divinely-commanded ordinance, is, I believe, always assumed and taken for granted. Throughout the entire code of the Mosaic Law, the *bare rite itself* is never once explicitly commanded.

This matter is not a little remarkable, though it has been altogether overlooked by Mr. Davison. He strenuously contends, that, as the *divine institution of sacrifice* is no where mentioned under Patriarchism, so we find it for the first time expressly mentioned under the Law.

Here lies his error. So far from his state-

ment being accurate, its terms ought to have been exactly inverted. Under Patriarchism, *the divine institution of sacrifice* is distinctly referred to in the history of Cain and Abel: but, under the Law, it no where appears. Much, under the Law, is said, as to the *regulation* of sacrifice; and commands to *this* purpose are recorded with a copious minuteness: but we are no where told, that, under the Law, the naked *rite* of sacrifice itself was first divinely instituted. Throughout the whole code of Moses, its *previous existence* is assumed as a *substratum*. The Law professes to do nothing more, than *regulate* and *modify* a very ancient divine institution of Patriarchism.

3. In making these remarks, I assert nothing, save what God himself has declared by the mouth of his prophet Jeremiah.

Thus saith the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel: Put your burnt-offerings unto your sacrifices, and eat flesh. For I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt-offerings or sacrifices †.

God, we see, directly asserts, that, in the promulgation of the Law to Israel, he gave the

† Jerem. vii, 21, 22.

people NO COMMANDMENT concerning sacrifices or burnt-offerings.

Now the passage cannot mean, that God gave no commandment *in the way of regulation*: for, with commandments of *this* kind, the Law abounds.

Hence its import must be, that, under the Law, he gave no commandment as to *the institution of the naked rite of sacrifice itself*.

Accordingly, as this interpretation of the passage is borne out by absolute matter of fact, so is it the precise interpretation which has been given by that learned Jew Rabbi Kimchi.

When God, says he, in the Law, first treats concerning sacrifices, he DOES NOT COMMAND the people that they should offer them. On the contrary, his language is: IF a man shall at any time offer a sacrifice, then he shall do this and that. To this peculiar exordium of the book of Leviticus God has respect, when, by the mouth of Jeremiah, he says: I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt-offerings or sacrifices.*

4. The circumstance before us is readily accounted for by the fact, which, from indepen-

* Kimch. Comment. in Jerem. vii. 21, cited by Spencer.

dent testimony, has already been established; the fact, to wit, that *The rite of sacrifice itself was first divinely instituted at the commencement of the Patriarchal Dispensation*: but, at the same time, it most assuredly places Mr. Davison in a situation not a little extraordinary.

God, speaking through the mouth of his prophet Jeremiah, declares, that, *he did not command or institute the rite of sacrifice under the Levitical Dispensation*: and Mr. Davison assures us, that *he did not command or institute that rite under the preceding Dispensation of Patriarchism*.

Such being the case, the inevitable result from Mr. Davison's system is, that *the rite of sacrifice, from first to last, must henceforth cease to be esteemed a divine institution*: and the plain consequence, according to his own very just remark, will be, that *the rite, whether under the Patriarchal Dispensation or under the Levitical, "however it "might express the piety of the worshipper, "cannot," in future, "be reckoned among the "typical signatures of Christianity*"*.

But, if sacrifice *universally*, and therefore of course expiatory sacrifice *particularly*, which doubtless existed under the Law, were *not* a divine institution; and, thence, if expiatory sa-

* Inquiry, p. 3.

crifice were *not*, as it could not be, a type of the future sacrifice of Christ : *then* expiatory sacrifice, as it existed under the Law, although itself a mere human ordinance, could have been nothing better, as Mr. Davison has rightly taught us, than a deplorable superstition, alike incapable of deduction from the light of nature and the principles of reason *.

The general result, therefore, from his system cannot be better stated than in his own precise words.

“ As the human principle of expiatory sacrifice can never be vindicated at all ; so the divine principle of it, in the Mosaic Law, will never be explained to any purpose, with satisfaction to our reason, or with honour to the divine Economy, except by its reference, as a preparatory rite, and as a prophetic sign, directed to its pre-ordained prototype in the Evangelical Dispensation ” †.

Now Mr. Davison's system, compared with the text from Jeremiah, has brought us to the conclusion, that *Sacrifice was AT NO TIME a divine institution.*

Hence it follows, since he pronounces the human principle of expiatory sacrifice to be

* Inquiry, p. 27, 29.

† Ib. p. 32, 33.

incapable of vindication ; since he confesses, that expiatory sacrifice, unless ordained of God, cannot be a prophetic type of the expiatory sacrifice of Christ ; and since he declares, that expiatory sacrifice, as it appears in the Mosaic Law, can never be explained to any purpose, with satisfaction to our reason, or with honour to the divine Economy, except by its prophetic reference to the sacrifice of Christ under the Evangelical Dispensation : hence, I say, it follows, that, according to the system of Mr. Davison, when combined with the text from Jeremiah, *an irrational superstition, which neither had nor could have any good end or any intelligible utility, was approbatively recognised by God himself, and (though a mere absurd human institution) was actually permitted to exist in the divinely-communicated Levitical Dispensation* *.

* The silence of the Mosaic Law respecting the divine institution of sacrifice, and its exclusive treatment of mere circumstantialia, could not be left unnoticed by so acute an observer as Dr. Spencer.

Concerning peace-offerings and other sacrifices, says he, the Mosaic Law everywhere speaks, in very familiar terms, and as it were respecting matters PREVIOUSLY well known. The sacred Code is copious in prescribing the forms and circumstances, which were to be diligently observed in the oblation of all sacrifices : the matter likewise, of which the various sorts of sacrifices ought to consist, it has anxiously determined. But the ends of the various sacrifices it rarely or never explains : and the sacrifices themselves it does not so much describe, as

II. The train of argument, which has[•] been applied to *the origin of sacrifice*, will equally

suppose ; in a manner which intimates, that THEY WERE ALREADY WELL KNOWN AND PLACED IN FAMILIAR USE. Spencer. de Leg. Heb. Rit. lib. iii. dissert. 2. cap. 3. sect. 1. vol. ii. p. 142.

Thus far I perfectly agree with the learned writer : but his mode of accounting for the fact strikes me as being the reverse of satisfactory ; nor, in truth, is it by any means remarkable for its consistency.

He supposes, that, in the Mosaic Law, sacrifices were *permitted*, rather than *commanded* : that, when introduced into it, they were borrowed from the universal practice of the idolatrous Gentiles, but more especially of the Egyptians, among whom the Israelites had long sojourned : and that they were thus borrowed for the purpose of preserving the people from idolatry ; because, had the Israelites not been permitted to sacrifice to God, they would assuredly have sacrificed to demons. Spencer. de Leg. Heb. Rit. lib. iii. diss. 2.

I. To this theory, the very mode, in which sacrifice is mentioned throughout the Law, seems to me to be decidedly opposed.

The rite of sacrifice, though not *commanded* under the Law, is yet *approbatively recognised* as an already-existing institution by which God might be acceptably served. But this *approbative recognition* is inconsistent with the idea of the rite having been borrowed from Paganism : for, had the rite been *thus* borrowed, it could not, I apprehend, have been introduced under the aspect of *approbative recognition*, but must have been ushered into the Law under the express sanction of a *new and special command*.

Nor could such a command have been given nakedly and abstractedly. If the Israelites were to be at all benefited by it, the *rationale* or *principle* of the command must at the same time have been communicated. Now, according to Dr. Spencer, the *principle*, on which sacrifice was introduced into the Law from Paganism, was *the turning of the Israelites from idolatrous oblations to the sacrificial worship of the one true God*. Hence, not only must a command to

apply to the question that respects *the revelation of the doctrine of an atonement*.

sacrifice have been distinctly enunciated: but the command must have stated, that it was given for the express purpose of preventing, on the part of the Israelites, the oblation of any sacrifice to demons. Yet, respecting this purpose, which Dr. Spencer assumes to be the true *rationale* of the introduction of sacrifice into the Law, scripture, so far as I know, is profoundly silent.

II. As the theory of Dr. Spencer can scarcely be reconciled with the peculiar mode in which the rite of sacrifice is mentioned throughout the Law, so neither does it come recommended to us by its own inherent probability.

1. Both the particular ancestors of the Israelites, and the general and remote ancestors or predecessors of all mankind, had offered up sacrifice to the one living God: and, at a subsequent period, we find the rite of sacrifice approbatively recognised in the Mosaic Law, as an already-existing familiar institution.

These are the facts, on which our reasoning must be built. With such facts, then, before us, whence does probability lead us to seek the introduction of the rite into the Law of Moses?

So far as I can judge, nothing can be more probable and more natural than to deduce the rite from the early fathers of mankind and from the particular ancestors of the Israelitish nation: while nothing can be more improbable and more unnatural, than, by an unaccountable preterition of the early patriarchs, to deduce the rite from the idolatrous worship of the Gentiles.

2. This obvious difficulty seems to have been felt by Dr. Spencer himself: and it has led him into what I cannot but deem a manifest inconsistency.

If I justly understand him, he would deduce the rite of sacrifice under the Law, primarily indeed from the corrupt Paganism of the Gentiles, but ultimately from the blameless ritual of primitive Patriarchism. Hence, when describing the process of its introduction into the Law, he exhibits that process as being in truth *a studied recalling of the Israelites from the idolatrous sacrifice of the Gentiles to*

1. Mr. Davison contends, that no trace of the doctrine can be found under Patriarchism, and

the better practice of the early ages of mankind. Spencer. de Leg. Heb. Rit. lib. iii. dissert. 2. cap. 2. sect. 1, 2. cap. 3. vol. ii. p. 135, 140, 141.

Such a statement may, in itself, be very accurate : but, to reconcile it with Dr. Spencer's antecedent theory, is a task by no means easy. For, if the introduction of the rite of sacrifice into the Law was, in fact, *a recalling of the Israelites from the corrupt sacrifice of the Gentiles to the better practice of early Patriarchism*, I should apprehend, that the rite, as it exists in the Law, must clearly have been introduced into the Law, from the better practice of early Patriarchism, not from the corrupt sacrifice of the Gentiles. The truth, in short, seems obviously to be this. The idolatrous Pagans neither borrowed the rite of sacrifice from the Israelites, nor did the Israelites borrow it from the idolatrous Pagans : but the institution, whether corrupt or incorrupt, alike descended to both from remote patriarchal antiquity. This institution, not as corrupted by idolatry, but as forming an essential part of the religion of Patriarchism, God *approbatively recognised* in the Law. To *command* it under the Law was superfluous, because it had been *already* commanded under a prior Dispensation. Hence, as might naturally be expected, we find in the Law no *command* to sacrifice, but only an *approbative recognition* of sacrifice as an already-existing divine institution.

Accordingly, with whatever measure of consistency, Dr. Spencer himself allows, that altars and sacrifices were alike independently derived, both to Judaism and to Gentilism, from the common source of primeval Patriarchism : and this traduction he justly deems agreeable both to reason and to history. See Spencer. de Leg. Heb. Rit. lib. iii. dissert. 1. cap. 12. sect. 1. vol. 2. p. 113.

III. The theory, patronised by Dr. Spencer, had doubtless, as he very truly remarks, many advocates among the early Fathers : and, in favour of it, some of them adduce the alleged circumstance, that, *before the sacrificial worship*

that its first revelation occurs under the Law of Moses*.

Now, under the Law of Moses, we doubtless of the golden calf, the Law is silent respecting the rite of sacrifice, inculcating nothing save moral precepts.

Such is the language of Chrysostom and Jerome, as cited by Dr. Spencer. The sole wonder is, how they could have fallen into this strange error respecting a mere matter of fact. We have the sacrificial worship of the golden calf detailed in Exod. xxxii.: and, *previous* to the occurrence of this circumstance, not only are mere moral precepts enjoined, but both altars and sacrifices are expressly and repeatedly recognised. See Exod. xx. 24—26. xxiv. 4—6. xxix. 10—28, 36—42. xxx. 1—10, 27, 28. The rite of sacrifice, then, being actually recognised in the Law *anterior* to the worship of the golden calf, I see not how the introduction of sacrifice into the Law can have any relation to that worship, or how the worship of the golden calf can justly be adduced as an argument in favour of the theory advocated by Dr. Spencer and many of the early Fathers.

The author of the *Apostolic Constitutions*, also cited by Dr. Spencer, falls not indeed into the singular mistake of Chrysostom and Jerome: but his inaccuracy in another point is not less glaring.

According to this writer, God, *anterior* to the worship of the golden calf, *permitted*, but did not *command*, the Hebrews to sacrifice: whereas, *subsequent* to the worship of the golden calf, the tone of the divine Lawgiver altogether changed; and, henceforth, it was no longer said, *If thou shalt sacrifice*, but it was said, *Make an altar and sacrifice perpetually*.

So speaks the author of the *Apostolic Constitutions*: but the truth is, as any person may satisfy himself by merely turning to the Pentateuch, the permissive form, *If thou shalt sacrifice*, instead of *preceding*, actually *succeeds*, the worship of the calf. Compare Exod. xxxii. with Levit. i. ii. iii.

* Inquiry, p. 29—33. See above, sect. ii. chap. 1.

read much respecting the *bare* doctrine of an atonement: but, as for any *revelation* of that doctrine in the character of a doctrine *new* and *hitherto unknown*, throughout the whole Mosaic code, I vainly seek it. The Law *recognises* indeed, but no where, so far as I can discover, *reveals*, the doctrine.

Let us, however, turn to the Law itself: and let us hear, what it really *does* say.

The doctrine of an atonement, as mentioned under the Law, *first* appears in the book of Exodus. Here, therefore, if any where, we may expect to find *an avowed revelation of that doctrine*. Yet, however the fact is to be accounted for, its introduction bears no resemblance to a new revelation.

Aaron and his sons shall eat those things where-with THE ATONEMENT was made, to consecrate and to sanctify them. And thou shalt offer every day a bullock for a sin-offering, for ATONEMENT: and thou shalt cleanse the altar, when thou hast made AN ATONEMENT for it; and thou shalt anoint it, to sanctify it.*

Such is the mode, in which the doctrine of an atonement *first* appears under the Law. It is spoken of *familiarly*, as a doctrine *already well*

* Exod. xxix. 32, 33, 36.

known: nor does its introduction bear the slightest resemblance to a professedly *new* revelation. The very phraseology of the passage imports, not *the revelation of a new doctrine*, but *the recognition and modification of an old one*. Compare the present passage with the enactment of the Passover: and you will forthwith be struck with the total dissimilitude. In the case of the Passover, we have a new and minute and express revelation of an ordinance hitherto unknown: but, in the case of the doctrine of an atonement, we have nothing that bears the least resemblance to any such revelation. The doctrine is simply mentioned after a manner which imports, that it was *already* so well known to the Israelites as to require neither any formal command nor any specific explanation.

2. Mr. Davison adduces a text from Leviticus, apparently by way of intimating, that in *that* text the doctrine is specially revealed.

For the life of the flesh is in the blood: and I have given it to you, upon the altar, to make AN ATONEMENT for your souls. For it is the blood, that maketh AN ATONEMENT for the soul.*

Nothing, however, can make less for his purpose than the text in question. The doctrine

is not mentioned, for *the first time*, in the present text: but, on the contrary, it is mentioned repeatedly in yet *earlier* passages; and clearly, if revealed at all under the Law, it must have been revealed at its *earliest* introduction. Nor is this the only objection. If we are to view the adduced text from Leviticus, as containing a specific revelation of a *new* doctrine, certainly the revelation is communicated under a form not a little extraordinary. Had Mr. Davison quoted the *entire* passage, his readers would have seen, what possibly they may not now have observed, that the supposed revelation of a *new* doctrine is actually thrown into the unaccountable form of a parenthesis, and that it is delivered merely as the sacrificial reason of the ancient patriarchal prohibition to eat blood*.

Now can any prudent man believe, that this vitally important doctrine would, for the first time, have been *thus* revealed to our fallen race? Can any prudent man be brought to persuade himself, that the doctrine of an atonement would have been first revealed quite incidentally, and merely under the form of an explanatory parenthesis?

The matter is incredible: and I repeat it, that,

* See Levit. xvii. 10—14.

in the Law, we find no *new revelation*, but only a *recognition* and *modification*, of the doctrine of an atonement. That doctrine, when first mentioned under the Law, is mentioned under the aspect of being *already* familiar to the Israelites.

CHAPTER IV.

Evidence of the primeval divine Institution of Sacrifice, from the moral Argument, that a divinely-uncommanded superstitious Observance cannot be acceptable or well-pleasing to God.

THE proof of my main position I now consider as accomplished. I am unwilling, however, to pretermitt a strong moral argument, in favour of the *primeval divine institution of sacrifice*, deduced from the position, that *A superstitious observance, uncommanded of God, cannot be acceptable or well-pleasing to God.*

I. This argument, though under a modification so defective as altogether to destroy its conclusiveness, has been adduced by Hallet.

Abel's sacrifice, says he, *could not have been acceptable, if it had not been of divine appointment.*

according to that obvious maxim of all true religion; In vain do they worship God, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men. Thus Abel must have worshipped God in vain, had his sacrificing been merely a commandment of his father Adam, or an invention of his own. As Abel, then, did not sacrifice in vain, it was not will-worship, but a divine appointment*.

II. The defectiveness of such statements of the argument, a defectiveness which renders it wholly inconsecutive, so acute a writer as Mr. Davison could not fail to observe and expose. Accordingly, by the familiar process of the *reduction to an absurdity*, he nullifies it, without much difficulty, when presented under such a form as the present.

Of his reasoning, the sum and substance may be briefly stated in manner following.

The argument in question is avowedly built upon the general maxim, that, *Whatsoever is not expressly commanded by God, must be unacceptable to him*. But the texts, commonly adduced as the basis of the argument, are insufficient to establish any such general maxim. Therefore the argument itself cannot demonstrate the *primal divine institution of sacrifice* †.

* Hallet's Comment. on Heb. xi. 4. cited by Abp. Magee.

† Inquiry, p. 97—113.

III. I readily admit, that Mr. Davison has fully confuted the present argument, when stated in any such defective form as that which has been incautiously adopted by Hallet: but, at the same time, I must take permission to say, that his confutation affects not *the genuine argument itself*, but only *its defective and loosely inaccurate statement*. Correct, then, the statement: and the confutation becomes a weapon perfectly innoxious.

1. In the first of his Epistles to the Corinthians, after having given various directions for the meet conducting of God's worship, St. Paul, as if aware that an alteration of outward circumstances might easily at different periods require certain modifications of the ritual, and as if conscious that no regulations could be laid down so minutely as to suit every possible contingency, concludes this branch of his subject with the wise and liberal discretionary precept, *Let all things be done DECENTLY and IN ORDER* *.

Now this precept clearly confers authority upon the Church to regulate the mode of God's worship in whatsoever fashion shall seem most expedient to her, subject only to the general apostolic ordinance, that *DECENCY and GOOD ORDER should be strictly observed*. Accordingly,

* 1 Corinth. xiv. 40.

on such a basis, our English Church, in two of her Articles, most rightly and soundly pronounces, that *The Church hath power to decree rites or ceremonies*, and that *Every particular or national Church hath authority to ordain, change, and abolish, ceremonies or rites of the Church, ordained only by man's authority, so that all things be done to edifying**. Enactments of this description are, doubtless, mere commandments of men: and yet I scruple not to say, that the restless individual, who opposes them on the special ground that *They are not divine ordinances set forth in Holy Scripture*, unless he can distinctly prove that *They contravene the apostolic direction of doing all things DECENTLY and IN ORDER*, is guilty, to say the very least, of conduct most unseemly and most unjustifiable. The fantastical notion, here reprobated, was the controversial rock, upon which the Puritans split: for, both from reason and from Scripture, it is clear, that many commandments of men, which respect the outward ritual of divine worship, so far from being offensive to God, are in truth conscientiously binding upon man.

Hence, as Mr. Davison most justly argues, the bare circumstance of *primitive sacrifice having*

* Art. xx. xxxiv.

been accepted of God, is, in itself, insufficient to establish *the divine institution of primitive sacrifice* : because, agreeably to the apostolic direction, a mere commandment of men may, under certain aspects, be well pleasing to God.

2. The true question, therefore, in the matter of primitive sacrifice, is this : *Whether that ordinance, viewed as a commandment of men, could, on just scriptural grounds, have been acceptable to God ; when, by the hypothesis, God himself was not its institutor ?*

To solve this question, we must resort to the apostle's direction, as amplified and exemplified in his account of what he denominates *Ethelothrescy* or *Will-worship*.

Now, if we read his account of Will-worship, nothing can be more evident, than that the matter, stigmatized and reprobated by him as offensive to God, is *a divinely uncommanded and a humanly self-imposed superstition, deemed by its votaries praiseworthy and meritorious and expressive of a fond humility, and even obligatory upon the conscience* *. It is not that decent and orderly arrangement of the public worship of God, which St. Paul enjoins, though he leaves its specific modification to the human prudence

* Coloss. ii. 18—23

of the Church : but it is a rank and palpable and gross and unauthorised superstition.

Here then we have a test, by which we may easily settle the case of *divinely uncommanded sacrifice*.

If *divinely uncommanded sacrifice* be a decent and reasonable service, then it may be acceptable to God, though nothing more than a mere ordinance of man : but, if it be no better than a self-imposed and unauthorised superstition ; then, according to St. Paul's very distinct account of Will-worship, it clearly cannot be pleasing to God. The test, in short, respects *the inherent character of divinely uncommanded sacrifice* : and, to answer the question now before us, we have simply to consider, *Whether the inherent character of divinely uncommanded sacrifice be, or be not, essentially and palpably superstitious*.

3. To my own apprehension, a gross and unreasonable superstition marks every form and mode of sacrifice, when viewed as not commanded by God.

(1.) As for the rite of *expiatory oblation*, Mr. Davison himself being judge, it can be deduced neither from the light of nature nor from the principles of reason. Hence, if uncommanded of God, it cannot have been adopted by man, as

Mr. Davison justly remarks, until he was fallen under a deplorable superstition *.

(2.) With respect to *deprecatory sacrifice*, which is built upon the crude notion that God may be bribed by gifts to remit merited punishment, as it was at no time ever sanctioned by the Supreme Governor, so a most offensive superstition is clearly its leading characteristic.

(3.) Nor can the rite of *homologetic sacrifice* be exempted from a similar imputation. To confess our sins is a dictate of right reason: and, even if not specially enjoined upon us from above, we may be morally certain, that the performance of such an act would be well pleasing to the Lord. But the matter assumes a very different aspect, when we gratuitously attempt to represent the amount of our confession by the slaughter of an unoffending animal. The scenical representation may very possibly be quite accurate: and, by the death of the victim, we may distinctly shew our acknowledgment, that we ourselves merit the death to which we have consigned our dramatic representative. This, however, I take it, is not altogether the point in debate. The real matter is, *Whether, save under the influence of mere groundless superstition, we*

* Inquiry, p. 27, 29.

can imagine, that we are performing a service acceptable to God, when, without a shadow of authority from himself, we slay one of his harmless creatures for no better reason than practically to evince our acknowledgment that death is the meet recompense of our misdoings. Confession itself is a decent and rational service, even if not absolutely commanded of God : but I find it no easy matter consistently thus to designate confessional *sacrifice*, when, according to our hypothesis, uncommanded by the voice of Heaven.

(4.) It may be thought, that the rite of *eucharistic sacrifice* at least, whatever may be the case with other modes of oblation, bids fair to be exempt from all just charge of superstition. Gratitude to God is a sentiment which he cannot but approve : and to express that gratitude by the free presentation of gifts, out of the substance which he himself has bountifully bestowed upon us, is an act so natural, that, even if not directly commanded by him, we can with no shew of reason brand it by the name of *superstition*.

The whole of this I readily allow : but, unfortunately, such a statement does not meet the precise case before us. That case respects, not *gifts simply*, but *gifts offered up in sacrifice*. To present gifts simply to God, as expressive tokens

of our gratitude, is clearly no superstition: but, concerning gifts offered up in sacrifice, we cannot, I fear, safely hazard any such assertion. Gratefully to contribute from our substance for the purpose of promoting God's glory, by relieving the poor, by instructing the ignorant, or by providing the community with suitable and sufficient places of worship, were doubtless an act well pleasing to the Most High: but wantonly to destroy and wastefully to burn upon an altar the entire amount of our gifts, under the *gratuitous* and *unauthorised* belief that God will accept an eucharistic sacrifice though *uncommanded by himself*, as it would effectually preclude all possibility of usefulness, so it seems allied not very remotely to that species of superstition which the Apostle denominates *Will-worship*. If an unauthorised *Touch not, taste not, handle not, after the commandments and doctrines of men*, be censured, as having a mere specious and unreal shew of wisdom in will-worship and humility*: it is not, I think, very easy to exempt, from a similar charge of gratuitous superstition, all divinely uncommanded sacrifice of whatsoever description.

4. After all, should any doubt on this point

* Coloss. ii. 21—23.

remain upon our minds, let us bring the matter home to ourselves in actual practice.

Why do we never offer sacrifice in the *present* day? Why do we instinctively feel conscious, that any sober person, who beheld us thus singularly occupied, would forthwith bless our simplicity for imagining that God could be *thus* gratified or propitiated?

Clearly the reason is, because we are well aware, that any sacrifice, *now* offered up by us, would be a matter of such rank superstition, that it were even childishly hopeless to expect to purchase, through its instrumentality, the favour of the Almighty.

If then such be the case in the *present* day, simply because the rite of sacrifice is now no longer commanded of God: it must equally have been the case during the *patriarchal* ages, had the rite of sacrifice, during those ages, been a mere unauthorised human institution. Custom might have reconciled the early religionists to it, and desuetude may increase the strangeness of its appearance in our eyes: but the rite, if uncommanded of God, must still, under each aspect, have really possessed the very same essential character.

5. It may be said, that sacrifice is now abro-

gated, because Christ, the great end of sacrifice, has accomplished the ancient types by his voluntary devotement of himself, the alone meritorious and efficacious antitype. Hence it does not follow, that, what would be superstition *now*, would have been superstition at an *earlier* period.

In every point of view, such an answer, should it be given, is altogether unsatisfactory. In the first place, it meets only the case of *expiatory* sacrifice; for this species of sacrifice *alone* was typical of the sacrifice of Christ: it leaves wholly untouched the several cases of *deprecatory* or *homologetic* or *eucharistic* oblations. And, in the second place, it travels quite wide of the hypothesis, upon which the whole of the present discussion avowedly reposes: for, in the very nature of things, no *uncommanded* sacrifice, if such were the sacrifice of the patriarchal ages, can have been a prophetic type of the sacrifice of Christ.

6. On these grounds, I think it clear and indisputable, that sacrifice of whatsoever description, if not commanded of God, can only have been an act of that precise gratuitous superstition, which the Apostle censures under the name of *Will-worship*, and which evidently is represented as displeasing to God.

IV. The genuine moral argument, therefore, in favour of *the primeval divine institution of sacrifice*, will now, I apprehend, stand in manner following.

Sacrifice, when uncommanded of God, is a mere act of gratuitous superstition. Whence, on the principle of St. Paul's reprobation of what he denominates *Will-worship*, it is neither acceptable nor pleasing to God.

But sacrifice, during the patriarchal ages, was accepted of God and was plainly honoured with his approbation.

Therefore sacrifice, during the patriarchal ages, could not have been a mere act of gratuitous superstition uncommanded of God.

If then such were the character of primitive sacrifice; that is to say, if primitive sacrifice were *not* a mere act of gratuitous superstition uncommanded of God: primitive sacrifice must, in that case, indisputably have been a divine institution.

Thus, by a more precise statement of the argument than that which has been given by Hallet, I have exhibited it in its full effectiveness, and have sufficiently enervated (I trust) the alleged confutation of it by Mr. Davison.



SECTION IV.

NOTICES OF OBJECTIONS TO THE OPINION, THAT EXPIATORY SACRIFICE WAS DIVINELY INSTITUTED AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PATRIARCHAL DISPENSATION.

CHAPTER I.

Respecting the objection founded upon the alleged circumstance, that there is no express mention of the Primeval Divine Institution of Expiatory Sacrifice.

THOUGH I am willing to hope that I have already completed my purpose ; yet nothing, that escapes from such a man as Mr. Davison, can be unworthy of our serious attention. Before I conclude, therefore, I shall notice various objections which he has made to the opinion, that *the rite of expiatory sacrifice was divinely instituted at the commencement of the Patriarchal Dispensation.*

Of these, perhaps the most imposing is that which occurs almost at the very opening of Mr. Davison's Inquiry.

" I begin," says he, " by stating that *there is a total silence in Holy Writ as to the rise of sacri-*

“*fice* *. When the offerings of Cain and Abel,
“ the first recorded instance of that or any other
“ worship, are introduced, the record adds no-
“ thing, as to the authority or the appointment of
“ that kind of religious service. Whether com-
“ manded of God, or framed by man, the text
“ leaves wholly unexplained. Not only is there no
“ direct information, but neither is there any im-
“ plied evidence in the history of the *facts*, inti-
“ mating, whether the worshipper, when he came
“ to bring his offering, obeyed a command, or
“ acted upon the suggestions of a customary or a
“ spontaneous piety. And so much, on all
“ hands, is agreed; that *the scripture narrative*
“ *is neutral in the question*. Nor, in the follow-
“ ing examples of sacrifice, in the primitive or
“ patriarchal age antecedent to the Mosaic Law,
“ whether by victims or any other form of that
“ worship, is there any the most distant dis-
“ closure made, directing us to infer *how* it was
“ originally introduced.

“ But this *silence* of the Scripture history,
“ neutral in the narration, is far from neutral in
“ its import. For, had sacrifice been instituted

* The same assertion had already been made by the very learned Spencer. See Spencer. de Leg. Heb. Rit. lib. iii. dissert. 2. cap. 4. sect. 1. vol. ii. p. 147.

“ of God ; had it been the solemn rite and cha-
“ racter, with which religion from the beginning
“ was invested by a special revelation : most
“ reasonable is it to think, that some notice of
“ such an authoritative institution of it would
“ have been preserved and transmitted to me-
“ mory for the instruction of after-times. And,
“ although, in the great conciseness and sim-
“ plicity of the first annals of religion as deli-
“ vered in the book of Genesis, it will not be
“ right to take this *negative argument* from the
“ absence of all such notice, as conclusive in the
“ case ; yet it plainly has a great presumption
“ on its side : and, to this original presumption,
“ presented by the historical evidence, there is
“ nothing of greater force to be opposed. For,
“ if the earlier record of things in scripture is
“ concise, yet the paramount importance of that
“ divine institution, and of sacrifice itself when
“ so instituted, will constrain us to think, that
“ the memorial of it could scarcely have been
“ altogether withholden. For that institution
“ would make the worship by sacrifice, in every
“ view, a different object. In its difference, it
“ would affect the primitive worshipper, by its
“ *authority* : by its *history* and its *systematic*
“ *relation to the principles of their religion*, it

"would affect the Israelite and the Christian *."

I. When Mr. Davison pronounces it to be agreed on all hands, that *the scripture narrative is NEUTRAL in the question as to the rite of sacrifice*, I cannot refrain from thinking, that he says more than will be readily conceded.

With regard to myself at least (and I suspect, that many will agree with me), I am in no wise prepared to grant the existence of this alleged *neutrality*.

II. If indeed we be required to produce, in so many words, a specific declaration, that, *At the commencement of Patriarchism, God himself instituted the rite of expiatory sacrifice*; a task is certainly imposed upon us, which can never be performed: but a truth, I apprehend, may be clearly and distinctly conveyed in other modes than that of a regular scholastic enunciation.

I. A modern socinian writer has challenged us to bring forward a single text, in which *the two-fold nature of Christ* is unequivocally asserted: and he boasts, that, although such a challenge has often been given, it has never yet been accepted †.

* Inquiry, p. 8—10.

† Letters in Defence of Unitarianism by another Barrister, p. 114.

Doubtless he may make the boast with perfect safety : for, after the most careful examination of the whole Bible from the beginning of Genesis to the end of the Apocalypse, we must fairly confess that the precise words, *Christ has two natures*, no where occur. Yet we do not, on that account, the less hold the doctrine.

Why then, it will be asked, do we deem ourselves fully authorised to maintain it ?

Simply, because, in some passages, we find Christ expressly declared to be *God*, while, in other passages, we find him no less expressly declared to be *man*. These two declarations, each alike resting upon inspired verity, we combine in a single proposition : and the clear result is *the doctrine of Christ's double nature*.

2. The same remark, and the same mode of reasoning, may be extended to the all important doctrine of the Holy Trinity.

That doctrine forms the very nucleus of sound religion : but still, I fear, we must confess, that no where, in the regular scholastic form of an Article or a Symbol, are we explicitly taught, that *God is one in essence and three in personality*. Yet, notwithstanding this omission of a direct enunciation in some one specific text, every sound Catholic holds the doctrine to be of vital

necessity: nor will he allow the silence of Scripture to be any proof of its *neutrality*.

How then does he proceed, for the purpose of establishing his position and of vindicating his belief?

With Athanasius of old, he examines the Bible: and, since he there finds the essential unity of the Godhead expressly maintained, while the identical things predicated of the Father are also predicated of the Son and of the Spirit; he perceives, that in no way can Scripture be reconciled with Scripture save by the reception of *the doctrine of a Trinity in Unity**.

The demonstration is, I think, clear and invincible: but, after all, we must acknowledge, that it rests upon induction; after all, we must confess, that God has not revealed, in so many precise and formal words, that *The Deity is three in regard to personality and one in regard to essence*.

3. Now, on a principle somewhat similar, I venture to think, that *the primitive divine institution of expiatory sacrifice* is distinctly, though not in the form of a scholastic enunciation, propounded to us in the book of Genesis.

* See Athan. de Human. Natur. suscept. ab Unigen. Verb. Oper. vol. i. p. 464—478. Commel. 1600.

God, as I have already shewn through the medium of displacing Mr. Davison's unwarranted gloss upon the word *Chattath*, COMMANDS Cain to devote a sin-offering on the express ground of his being a sinner: and the mode, in which THE DIVINE INJUNCTION is delivered, implies of necessity, that Cain is not now instructed in his duty for the first time, but that he is authoritatively REMINDED of what he *ought* obediently to have done without the intervention of any additional precept.

III. Here, therefore, I presume to contend, that we have A CLEAR INTIMATION of the primitive divine origin of expiatory sacrifice: an intimation not the *less* clear, merely because, like the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of the two-fold nature of Christ, it is not conveyed in the form of a regular proposition.

I may add, that, even if we bountifully give up *the divine institution of expiatory sacrifice* IMMEDIATELY after the fall of man, what remains is still most amply sufficient to rebut Mr. Davison's objection.

He denies, that *God ordained the rite of expiatory sacrifice under the Patriarchal Dispensation.*

My answer is, that *God COMMANDED Cain to devote a sin-offering.*

CHAPTER II.

Respecting the objection founded upon the alleged circumstance, that, while the Primitive Divine Institution of Expiatory Sacrifice is no where expressly mentioned, the Primitive Divine Institution of the Sabbath is carefully and specifically recorded.

IN building confidently upon the alleged difference between *the primitive case of the sabbath* and *the primitive case of expiatory sacrifice*, for the purpose of establishing the system which he himself has adopted and of demolishing the system adopted by his opponents, Mr. Davison has followed Bishop Warburton.

With respect to the first case, if we may believe these writers, *We have the primitive divine institution of the sabbath carefully recorded at the close of the Mosaic history of the creation*: with respect to the second case, if we may also credit them, *We encounter nothing, save a suspicious silence, in regard to any primeval divine institution of sacrifice.*

This marked difference, Mr. Davison contends, is fatal to the opinion, that *God, immediately after the fall of man and from the very*

commencement of the Patriarchal dispensation, himself ordained the rite of expiatory oblation.

“The express mention of the SABBATH,” says he, “joined with the *omission* respecting SACRIFICE, has been urged by Bishop Warburton “with great force. He holds it, as almost “decisive in itself against the divine appointment of SACRIFICE. In this article, his reasoning is most just. The direct, the obvious, “impression, from the dissimilar state of the “Scripture evidence reflected upon the two institutions, is to create a belief in their different “origin. God’s own *blessing* and *sanctification*, “from the beginning, adhere to the first, that of “the SABBATH: his *blessing* indeed, but not his “precedent *sanctification*, to the other, that of “SACRIFICE *.”

* Inquiry, p. 11, 12. See Warburton’s Div. Legat. book ix. chap. 2. Works vol. vi. p. 279, 280. 8vo. edit. 1811. The Bishop’s argument is avowedly built upon two alleged facts: *the silence of Scripture, as to any divine primeval institution of sacrifice*; and *the explicit declaration of Scripture, that, from the beginning, the sabbath was divinely instituted as an ordinance of perpetual obligation*. From these two alleged facts he argues, that sacrifice could not, in the first instance, have been a divine institution; because, had such been the case, its divine appointment must have been recorded with the same distinctness and precision, as the primeval divine appointment of the sabbath as recorded in Gen. ii. 2, 3.

Mr. Davison pronounces the Bishop’s reasoning, in this

I. The objection is specious; and it may thence produce a considerable effect upon a superficial inquirer: yet, if I mistake not, it is more specious than solid.

By those, who advocate the theory of Bishop Warburton and Mr. Davison, we are assured, that *The primitive divine institution of expiatory sacrifice is no where mentioned in the Mosaic history: while, of the sabbath, the primeval divine institution is specially and circumstantially recorded.*

With respect to this allegation, I freely confess, that, IN THE FORM OF A REGULAR PROPOSITION, *the primitive divine institution of expiatory sacrifice, immediately after the fall of man, is no where mentioned**: but then I have yet to learn from Mr. Davison, in what part of the Mosaic narrative, or even in what part of the entire volume of Scripture, *the primitive divine institution of a perpetually recurring sabbath, to be observed by man as a matter of ordained religious obligation, is PRECISELY AND SCHOLASTICALLY ENUNCIATED.*

article, to be most just. With his lordship's *reasoning* I quarrel not. The reasoning *itself* is very good reasoning. But then I certainly think, that the learned prelate ought to have established his *premises*, before he drew his *conclusion*.

* See above, sect. iv. chap. 1.

So far as my own inquiries extend, upon Cain I find an absolute COMMAND laid to devote a sin-offering, with a manifest intimation that such was his DUTY in consequence of a well-known already-existing divine institution : but I vainly seek for any absolute COMMAND, that the subjects of the Patriarchal Dispensation should observe a perpetually recurring sabbath. The record is brief and simply historical.

*On the seventh day, God ended his work which he had made : and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made. And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it : because that in it he had rested from all his work, which God created and made *.*

The FACT, that God, having rested on the seventh day from the work of creation, sanctified the precise seventh day on which he rested from all his work, is indeed distinctly specified : but, in regard to the positive INSTITUTION of a perpetually recurring sabbath, we are neither indefinitely told that EVERY successive seventh day was sanctified, nor are we definitely taught that EVERY successive seventh day should always be set apart BY MAN for the duties and purposes of religion. On both these particulars, the gratuitous assumption of

* Gen. ii. 2, 3.

which constitutes the very strength of Bishop Warburton's argument, the book of Genesis is profoundly silent: and it is with but a very bad grace, I must needs say, that Mr. Davison denies *the primitive divine institution of piacular sacrifice*, on the express score that we read not of the rite having been commanded from the beginning; while yet he maintains *the primitive divine institution of a perpetually recurring sabbath*, though assuredly no such primitive divine institution is any where (so far as I know) expressly recorded.

I may add, that, in the statement of his objection, Mr. Davison's very phraseology is not a little incorrect where it ought to have been even scrupulously accurate.

"The express *mention* of the *sabbath*," says he, "joined with the *omission* respecting *sacrifice*, "has been urged by Bishop Warburton with "great force."

Mr. Davison's phrase, *THE sabbath*, clearly denotes, and is clearly meant to denote, *a perpetually recurring sabbath of everlasting obligatory observance by mankind*. Whereas, in the history, *THE sabbath* is not once mentioned; much less, therefore, *expressly* mentioned. We read, indeed, by implication, of *A sabbath*; the sabbath,

to wit, of God: for we are told, as a fact, that God rested on the seventh day of the demiurgic week. But, as for that “express mention of “*THE sabbath*” upon which Mr. Davison profess-
edly builds, I am altogether unable to discover it.

I myself hold the primitive divine institution *both* of the sabbath and of piacular sacrifice: and, in *each* case, I hold it much upon the same principle*. Yet, were I to set up any difference

* We may INFER, I think, from a comparison of Scripture with Scripture, that *the duty of sanctifying a perpetually recurring sabbath was enjoined upon the first race of men*: but, in this matter, we can attain only to A REASONABLE INFERENCE.

I. The record of the FACT, that *God rested on the seventh day of the creation and sanctified it*, though it sets forth no institution of a perpetually recurring sabbath, and though such institution can in no wise be *demonstrated* from it, may yet very fairly be thought to IMPLY the existence of that institution. Accordingly, there are other places of Scripture, which seem to indicate, that this inference from Gen. ii. 2, 3, is substantially correct.

II. From Gen. viii. 10, 12, we learn, not indistinctly, that the hebdomadal cycle was familiarly known to and used by Noah. Now that cycle is a measure of time altogether arbitrary: for it is not constructed upon physical principles, like the solar year or the lunar month or the earthly day. Hence, particularly at so early a period, we may be morally certain, both that it was borrowed, and that it was *known* to be borrowed, from the week of the creation. But such a mutation necessarily supposes a knowledge of the sabbatical seventh day: and Noah seems to have twice selected that holyday for the emission of the

between the two, I should not hesitate to assert, that the evidence for *the primitive divine institution*

dove, because, under *his* circumstances, its emission was virtually an act of religious confidence.

III. If Noah observed the sabbath as a primitive divine ordinance, we may reasonably infer, that it was likewise observed by at least the devout patriarchs of the *chosen* race. Accordingly, we find it actually observed by the Israelites in the wilderness, *anterior* to its formal adoption into the Law as delivered from mount Sinai. This circumstance constitutes the main strength of our inductive argument: and I reason from it precisely in the same manner, as I have heretofore reasoned from the peculiarity of the language employed under the Law respecting the rite of sacrifice and the doctrine of an atonement. See above, sect. iii. chap. 3.

In Exod. xvi. we find the Israelites observing the sabbath clearly under the aspect of *an obligatory divine institution*. Yet not the slightest intimation is given by the sacred historian, that the observance of it was then for the first time ordained. On the contrary, while the sabbath is mentioned as an obligatory divine institution, it is familiarly mentioned as an institution *already* well known to the Israelites. If then the sabbath was *already* well known to the Israelites *anterior* to its formal adoption into the Law when subsequently delivered from mount Sinai, the most rational account which we can give of this knowledge is, that they had derived the observance of the sabbath from the well-known practice of their patriarchal ancestors, who had themselves derived it from the equally well-known primitive institution of God.

I am perfectly aware, that certain of the Rabbins, who saw plainly enough that no original *institution* of the sabbath is recorded in Exod. xvi. were accustomed to maintain that *the sabbath was first instituted by Moses in Egypt for the purpose of easing the people from their labours*. But, as this speculation is wholly gratuitous and singularly impro-

of *piacular sacrifice* is stronger and more direct than the evidence for *the primitive divine institution of the sabbath*. For, almost at the very commencement of the Patriarchal Dispensation, we can produce a specific instance, where the devotement of a sin-offering is **COMMANDED**: but, throughout the whole book of Genesis (which, from the creation, brings us down well nigh to the birth of Moses), we are unable to produce a single instance, where either the observance of the sabbath is *enjoined*, or where it is mentioned as *a positive institution*, or even where it is barely noticed as *a mere occurrence*.

II. On this matter, since it has been so confidently brought forward by Bishop Warburton, and since it has been so unreservedly taken up by Mr. Davison, I cannot refrain from adducing the result (I believe, indeed, the *mistaken* result, but still the *result*) of the inquiry, which

bable, I do not conceive that its Rabbinical adoption constitutes any very formidable impediment to our belief, that *the sabbath was divinely instituted from the beginning*, and that in *Exod. xvi.* its *primeval divine institution is familiarly recognised as a matter already well known to the Israelites*.

On this *inductive reasoning*, I am willing to admit, that *the sabbath was divinely ordained at the very commencement of the Paradisiacal Dispensation*: but, as for any **EXPRESS RECORD** of its divine institution, I can find none.

was set on foot by one of the earliest of the Christian Fathers.

The evidence for the primitive divine institution of the sabbath, and the evidence for the primitive divine institution of sacrifice, Justin Martyr considers as equipollent: and, erroneously (as I think) judging it to be in neither case sufficient, he thence consistently and impartially rejects the primitive divine institution of them BOTH.

If, before Abraham, says he, there was no observance of circumcision; then neither, before Moses, was there any observance of the SABBATH or of festivals or of oblations: for Enoch, and all those others who were uncircumcised, kept neither SABBATHS nor these other ordinances, inasmuch as Moses was the person who enjoined their observance*. Wherefore, as circumcision began from Abraham: so, from Moses, began the SABBATH and sacrifices and oblations and festivals†. Hence, all the above-mentioned just men were well pleasing to God, though they observed not the SABBATH:

* 'Εἰ γὰρ πρὸ τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ οὐκ ἦν χρεία περιτομῆς, οὐδὲ πρὸ Μωϋσέως σαββατισμοῦ καὶ ἑορτῶν καὶ προσφορῶν. Dial. cum Tryph. Oper. p. 186. Sylburg. 1593. Τὸν Εὐαὺχ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας, οἳ μὴτε περιτομὴν τὴν κατὰ σάρκα ἔχοντες, μὴτε σάββατα ἐφύλαξαν, μὴτε δὲ τὰ ἄλλα, Μωσέως ἐντειλαμένου ταῦτα ποιεῖν. Ibid.

† Ὡς οὖν ἀπὸ Ἀβραὰμ ἤρξατο περιτομὴ, καὶ ἀπὸ Μωσέως σάββατον καὶ θυσίαι καὶ προσφοραὶ καὶ ἑορταί. Ibid. p. 202.

and likewise, after them, Abraham and all his posterity, until the time of Moses*.

Justin seems to have adopted the same severe, possibly the too severe, principle of inquiry, which has since been preferred by Mr. Davison.

Throughout the whole book of Genesis, he could not find recorded, under the form of a regular scholastic enunciation, either *the primitive divine appointment of the sabbath* or *the primitive divine appointment of sacrifice*: nor was he able to discover, until we reach the time of Moses, any one single instance of the observance of the sabbath. Hence he concluded (in my own judgment, far too rashly and precipitately), that *the religious observance of the sabbath*, and *the authoritative institution of sacrifice*, alike derived their origin from the great Hebrew legislator. That he was mistaken, I have no doubt: but it is a somewhat curious circumstance, that *the primitive divine institution of the sabbath*, which is so clear a matter to Bishop Warburton and Mr. Davison, that they contrast it even *argumentatively* with the alleged silence of Scripture as to *the primitive divine institution of sacrifice*, should yet

* Καὶ γὰρ μὴ σαββατίσαντες οἱ προωγομασμένοι πάντες δίκαιοι τῷ Θεῷ εὐηρέστησαν· καὶ, μετ' αὐτοὺς, Ἀβραὰμ καὶ οἱ τούτου υἱοὶ ἅπαντες μέχρι Μωϋσέως. Ibid. p. 183.

have been so totally overlooked by the philosophic and inquisitive Justin, that he actually mentions *the non-sabbatisation of the patriarchal religionists* as a circumstance quite indisputable, and that he alike ascribes to the legislation of Moses *the first-recorded divine command to observe the sabbath* and *the first-recorded divine command to offer up sacrifice*.

It may not be improper yet additionally to remark, that, among the early theologians of the Christian Church, Justin by no means stands alone in his speculation respecting the appointment of the sabbath. Irenæus and Tertullian, both of whom flourished in the second century, were equally unable to discover any divine institution of that holy festival under the Patriarchal Dispensation. Their language, as to *the non-sabbatisation of the primitive race*, is exactly the same as that of Justin: and, doubtless, it rested on the same principle of exposition. For, had God, in the judgment of Irenæus and Tertullian, instituted the sabbath from the beginning, those Fathers would never have represented the saints of the first Dispensation, as living in (what must *then* have been) a deliberate contempt of a *known* divine ordinance*.

* Ipse Abraham, sine circumcissione et sine observatione

Such, from these authorities and from this train of reasoning, I am inclined to think, was the prevalent opinion of the more early Christians respecting the institution of the sabbath. They found no express declaration, that the observance of the sabbath-day had been enjoined from the beginning : and they perceived not any record of its observance by the patriarchs, anterior to the time of Moses. Hence they too hastily inferred, more especially as the inference afforded them a good argument against the Jews, that the sabbath was *exclusively* a Mosaical ordinance.

III. It is remarkable, that the statement of Justin experiences no contradiction from his Jewish opponent Trypho. The learned Christian reiterates, almost to satiety, his assertion re-

sabbathorum, credidit Deo : et reputatum est illi ad justitiam, et amicus Dei vocatus est. Iren. adv. Hær. lib. iv. c. 30. § 2.

Qui contendit et sabbatum adhuc observandum quasi salutis medelam, doceat in præteritum justos sabbatizasse. Denique doceant, sicuti jam præloquuti sumus, Adam sabbatizasse ; aut Abel, hostiam Deo sanctam offerentem, sabbati religionem placuisse ; aut Enoch translatus sabbati cultorem fuisse ; aut Noe, arcæ fabricatorem præpter diluvium immensum, sabbatum observasse, aut Abraham, in observatione sabbati, Isaac filium suum obtulisse ; aut Melchisedech, in suo sacerdotio, legem sabbati accepisse. Tertull. adv. Jud. Oper. p. 121—123.

specting the *exclusively* Mosaical ordinance of the sabbath: and this identical assertion he makes even the basis of an *argument* against the cherished principles of his antagonist. Yet, however singular it may appear, Trypho seems never once to have thought of silencing Justin by a denial of his premises. He tacitly admits, that the sabbath was *not* observed by the early patriarchs, and that its divine institution cannot be traced *higher* than the time of Moses*.

Now, had Trypho thought with Bishop Warburton and Mr. Davison, he would speedily and confidently have met Justin by the round declaration, that *any inquirer might read the divine*

* Καὶ γὰρ, Τίνα οὖν ἀδύνατον ἔστι φυλάσσειν, παρακαλῶ, λέγε αὐτός· πεισθήσῃ γὰρ, ὅτι μὴ φυλάσσω τὰ αἰώνια δικαιώματα τίς ἢ πράξας, σωθῆναι ἐκ παντὸς ἔχει.

Κακεῖνος, Τὸ σαββατίζειν λέγω, καὶ τὸ περιτέμνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἔμμηνα φυλάσσειν, καὶ τὸ βαπτίζεσθαι ἀψάμενον τινὸς ὧν ἀπηγόρευεταὶ ὑπὸ Μωσέως, ἢ ἐν συνουσία γενόμενον.

Καὶ γὰρ ἔφην, Ἀβραάμ, καὶ Ἰσαάκ, καὶ Ἰακώβ, καὶ Νῶε, καὶ Ἰῶβ, καὶ εἴ τινας ἄλλοι γεγόνاسι πρὸ τούτων ἢ μετὰ τούτους ὁμοίως δίκαιοι, —μέχρι τῆς Μωσέως τοῦ πιστοῦ θεράποντος μητρὸς, μηδὲν τούτων φυλάξαντας, εἴ δοκοῦσιν ὑμῖν σωθῆσθαι;

Καὶ ὁ Τρύφων ἀπεκρίνατο· Οὐ περιετέμνητο Ἀβραάμ καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτόν; Dial. cum Tryph. Oper. p. 205.

Such alone is the lame answer, which Trypho can give to his adversary. Neither here, nor elsewhere, does he venture to deny, that the *positive institution of the sabbath* originated from Moses, and that Abraham and the early patriarchs did *not* observe it.

institution of the sabbath formally and expressly recorded at the close of the Mosaic history of the creation. But the truth is, I suspect, Trypho had no inclination to contradict Justin. On *this* point, at least, the Jew and the Christian perfectly symbolised. Mr. Davison does not seem to be aware, that the matter, which *he* deems so indisputable as to make it unhesitatingly the very basis of his argument, was strenuously controverted by the earlier writers of the Hebrew nation.

Instead of asserting with Bishop Warburton that *the sabbath was divinely instituted in the beginning*, all the more ancient writers of that nation, if I mistake not, warmly contended, from tradition yet older than themselves, that *it was first instituted by their great lawgiver Moses**. There was, indeed, a small difference of opinion among them, as to the *precise time* of its earliest institution. For Salomon Jarchi, Moses Mai-

* To this remark, Philo the Jew may possibly be an exception. For, since he describes the seventh day, as being a festival, not peculiar to one city or country, but common to the whole world; it may be argued, that he held its primeval divine institution. Τὴν ἐπιούσαν ἡμέραν ἐβδόμην ἐσέμνυνεν ὁ Πατήρ, ἐπαινέσας καὶ ἁγίαν προσειπὼν· ἑορτὴ γὰρ οὐ μιᾶς πόλεως ἢ χώρας ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ παντός, ἣν κυρίως ἄξιον καὶ μόνον πάνδημον ὀνομάζειν, καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γενέσιον. Phil. de Mund. Opific. Oper. p. 20.

monides, Abraham Hispaniensis, Levi Ben-Gerson, Isaac Abarbinel, Jose Ben-Chilpetha, Jochanan, Iisa, and Jehuda Levita, with the Babylonian Gemara at their head, maintained, that Moses instituted the sabbath *at Marah*: while Issachar Ben-Nephthali, the author of the Shemoth Rabba, and other persons referred to by the writer of that work, pronounced, that, through the complaisant acquiescence of Pharaoh, and for the laudable purpose of affording some rest to the overwrought people, Moses certainly instituted it *in Egypt*. But still, that *the observance of the sabbath, as a divine institution, originated with Moses*, was a position, which, in the Hebrew Church, long bore the praise of strict and indisputable orthodoxy.

By the more adventurous moderns, however, the slumbering question has been keenly agitated. The chief opponent of the ancient opinion was Menasseh Ben-Israel, chief priest of Amsterdam in the seventeenth century. In his book on the creation, this writer vehemently argues, that the sabbath was observed long before the delivery of the Law by Moses, that Abraham and Jacob and Joseph all devoutly sabbatised, and that the patriarchs sanctified the seventh day by an unbroken tradition of the divine

institution of the sabbath from the very beginning*.

To this latter opinion I myself incline. Through the medium of what strikes upon my own mind as *fair and legitimate* INDUCTION, I gather, and I certainly believe, that *the sabbath was divinely instituted from the beginning*: but I am unable, with Bishop Warburton and Mr. Davison, to discover any EXPRESS RECORD of

* Seld. de Jur. Natur. et Gent. lib. iii. c. 9—13. p. 316—360. Selden himself, acting as a sort of umpire, pronounces the opinion of the older Rabbins to be the most consonant with truth. Dr. Spencer not only agrees with Selden in maintaining, that *the sabbath was first divinely instituted in the time of Moses*: but he also goes to the extreme length of asserting, that, *as the sabbath could not have been binding under the Patriarchal Dispensation, because as yet it had not been instituted; so neither is it any longer binding under the Christian Dispensation, save in the character of an useful ecclesiastical ordinance.* Spencer. de Leg. Heb. Rit. lib. i. c. 4. sect. 7—13. vol. i. p. 38—74. The same doctrine was held by Tertullian. *Qui contendit et sabbatum adhuc observandum,—doceat in præteritum justos sabbatizasse.* Tertull. adv. Jud. Oper. p. 121. The language of Justin Martyr seems also to import a somewhat similar speculation: for, while censuring the Jewish mode of keeping the sabbath, he intimates, that the new Law enjoined a *perpetual sabbath*; which obviously annuls all *obligatory sanctification* of any one day *in particular*. Σαββαρίζειν ἡμᾶς ὁ καὶνὸς νόμος διαπαντὸς ἐθέλει. Dial. cum Tryph. Oper. p. 177. Yet, in *practice*, Justin mentions and describes the Christian observance of Sunday or the Lord's day. See Justin. Apol. i. vulg. ii. Oper. 77. The truth, I take it, is well stated by Mr. Holden. Christianity abrogated the legal peculiarities of the Jewish sabbath, but not

its divine institution anterior to the time of Moses*.

the sabbath itself as originally instituted. See *Christian Sabbath*, chap. iii. sect. 2.

* Mr. Holden, in his *Work on the Christian Sabbath*, contends, that *The divine institution of a perpetually recurring sabbath may be read, in Gen. ii. 2, 3, under the form of an EXPRESS RECORD.*

I readily give his due meed of praise to this able and learned writer: but, with every aid which I can borrow from him (and the aid, assuredly, is not small), I am unable to discover what he professes to discern so clearly. Such, in fact, is the force of truth, that, after all, even he is compelled to acknowledge, that *the primitive divine institution of the sabbath* can be gathered, from Gen. ii. 2, 3, only by way of *INDUCTION or IMPLICATION.*

In the original institution, says he, *it is stated in general terms, that God blessed and sanctified the seventh day; which must undoubtedly IMPLY the sanctity of every seventh day.* *Christ. Sabb. p. 252.*

I should hesitate, even after accomplishing a full comparison of Scripture with Scripture, to use so very strong an expression as *undoubtedly*: for, in truth, the matter has been *much more than doubted* by many, both ancients and moderns, both Jews and Christians. Let my hesitation, however, be proper or improper, we seem to have, in the above-cited passage, an acknowledgment on the part of Mr. Holden, that, when we attempt to prove, from Gen. ii. 2, 3, *the primitive divine institution of a perpetually recurring sabbath*, we can reach no higher than *IMPLICATION*; implication, the justice of which is admitted indeed by some, but has been denied by others.

It may not be improper to remark, that this implicative evidence will be precisely of the same weight, whether we suppose the demiurgic week to comprehend only seven natural days, or whether we adopt the opinion that it contains seven periods of vast length, the last of which is even now evolving.

Should the first theory be preferred; each revolving

The value of the argument, from the alleged
EXPRESS RECORD of the primitive divine institution

week will be a copy of the demiurgic week : should the second theory be maintained ; each revolving week will still be a copy of the demiurgic week, with this only difference, that the copy will be made upon a reduced scale.

In either case, the passage, in Gen. ii. 2, 3, does nothing more, so far as verbal expression is concerned, than record the FACT : that *God rested on the seventh day of the demiurgic week*, whatever might be the precise length of that day ; and that *he sanctified or set apart from the other six days the identical seventh day, on which he rested from the work of creation.*

With respect to the sanctification itself, we are not told on whose account it was ordained. Hence, if we adopt the second theory, there is nothing, so far as I can see, to prevent our supposing, that the grand sabbatism of heaven and its blessed inhabitants is the sanctified rest to which the passage alludes : a sabbatism, whereof our earthly sabbath is a designed though imperfect imitation ; a sabbatism, into the enjoyment of which the people of God shall hereafter be admitted. See Heb. iv. 1—11. Ἀρα ἀπολείπεται ΣΑΒΒΑΤΙΣΜΟΣ τῷ λαῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ. Heb. iv. 9.

As the easiest mode of accounting for an universally acknowledged fact, and as the least objectionable method of solving a difficulty which that fact produces, I have elsewhere expressed an inclination to adopt the theory, that *the seven days of the demiurgic week are seven vast periods* : and I have stated the grounds on which that theory may be supported and defended. See my Treatise on the Patriarchal, the Levitical, and the Christian, Dispensations, book i. chap. 3.

On this point, it were absolute folly to play the dogmatist. My sole object was to shew, with how much ease the shafts of Infidelity might be repelled : and this object I fully attained, though, among some very well meaning Christians, my labour seems to have met with but small

of the sabbath, will, in future, I trust, be appreciated according to its intrinsic merit.

If neither the early Christian writers, nor yet the early Jewish writers, could discern any such EXPRESS RECORD in the Mosaic history of the creation, the supposed RECORD can scarcely have been worded with sufficient precision to form the basis of a legitimate argument against *the primeval divine institution of expiatory sacrifice*.

acceptation. It is quite possible, that my view of the matter may be altogether erroneous : but, certainly, in the way of fairly arguing the question, I have not as yet seen any thing which I can justly deem a confutation. Mistaken I may be : but my supposed mistake has not hitherto been demonstrated. With all my respect for Mr. Holden's powers (a respect considerably increased by my observing, that he does not think it necessary to sink the character of a gentleman in that of a controversialist), his attempt to overthrow the theory, which I have advocated, strikes upon my own apprehension as being a failure. Were this a proper time and place, I trust that I should find no great difficulty in answering him : and my task, if undertaken, would be rendered more easy by the circumstance, that he has occasionally misconceived both my own statement and the real merits of the question. I do not, however, think, that any further discussion of the subject can be either necessary or advantageous.

CHAPTER III.

Respecting the Objection founded upon the alleged Circumstance, that there is no express Mention of the atoning Virtue of Sacrifice under the Patriarchal Dispensation.

As a kind of buttress to the last objection, Mr. Davison additionally contends for the fact, that *There is NO EXPRESS MENTION of the atoning virtue of sacrifice under the Patriarchal Dispensation.*

“ Let the Scripture History,” says he, “ be explored. It will be found, that, in the primitive religion, we have actually no evidence extant, no one positive example, of any expiatory atoning virtue ascribed to the sacrifice. This is a material point, which I state. But I appeal to the Scripture History. That History, I believe, will fully sustain the statement made*.”

I. Lest, through a conscious weakness, any thing of importance might seem to have been designedly pretermitted, I have chosen, in its

* Inquiry, p. 29.

proper place, specifically to notice the present objection: but, in effect, it has *already* been incidentally answered in the course of an earlier discussion.

The answer to it is contained in my adduction of direct scriptural testimony, that *Cain was commanded or reminded of God to bring and devote* A SIN-OFFERING*.

An eucharistic sacrifice of vegetables the fratricide had *already* brought. But this was not sufficient. He was charged or reminded yet *additionally* to bring A SIN-OFFERING OF A PROFESSEDLY EXPIATORY SACRIFICE.

Now, in the very notion of AN EXPIATORY SACRIFICE, the doctrine of AN ATONEMENT is, by plain necessity, involved. For, if Cain were commanded to bring A SIN-OFFERING, he was commanded to bring a sacrifice, to which AN EXPIATORY ATONING VIRTUE is, even professedly, ascribed.

Therefore, through a diligent exploration of the Scripture History, it has been found, that, in the primitive religion, we have both evidence extant, and moreover a positive example, of AN EXPIATORY ATONING VIRTUE *being ascribed to animal sacrifice.*

* See above, sect. iii. chap. 1. part 2. See also the whole of sect. ii.

II. In the present advanced stage of the discussion, I perceive not what reply can be given to this statement, save a denial, that the Hebrew word *Chattath*, expressed in English by the term *sin-offering*, unavoidably involves the notion of AN ATONEMENT.

It may be said, that, although Cain was commanded to devote a *sin-offering*, we are not therefore bound to conclude that he was commanded to bring an EXPIATORY sacrifice: because, for any thing that we know to the contrary, the prescribed *sin-offering* might have been *homologetically* devoted, on the mere account of the acknowledged sin of the worshipper, without any specific reference to the idea of A VICARIOUS EXPIATION.

Lest this reply should peradventure be hazarded, I shall notice it by anticipation.

1. Its whole stress plainly lies in the sacrificial signification of the Hebrew word *Chattath*.

For the question is not, how we may please, with arbitrary variety, to employ the English term *sin-offering*: but the question is, what we must receive, as the STRICT and ONLY sense of the Hebrew word *Chattath*, when used to express an animal sacrifice.

Now, I will venture to say, that, if

the whole of the Hebrew Scriptures, whenever the word *Chattath* is used to express *an animal sacrifice*, it is INVARIABLY used to denote an EXPIATORY sacrifice, or a sacrifice offered up under the precise notion of EFFECTING AN ATONEMENT.

There is a passage, in which we have what may well be styled the *definition* of the present word: and, so far as I know, from this strict definition, the sacred Hebrew writers, in their sacrificial use of the word, NEVER depart.

Aaron shall make an atonement upon the horns of the altar, once in a year, with the blood of THE SIN-OFFERING OF ATONEMENTS: once in the year, shall he make atonement upon it throughout your generations: it is most holy unto the Lord.*

Here, the word *Chattath*, in its sacrificial use, is strictly defined to signify *such an offering as should be presented under the precise notion of MAKING AN ATONEMENT FOR SIN BY BLOOD*. If the word be ever sacrificially employed in any other sense; in the sense, for instance, of a mere homologetic oblation, from which the distinct notion of A VICARIOUS ATONEMENT BY BLOOD is altogether excluded; that passage has hitherto escaped my notice†.

* Exod. xxx. 10. See also Exod. xxix. 36.

† It is true indeed, that, in the devotement of the ex-

How, then, stands our positive scriptural example of AN EXPIATORY ATONING VIRTUE *being ascribed to animal sacrifice in the primitive patriarchal religion?* It stands, I apprehend, in manner following.

Cain is commanded to bring a *Chattath*; for let it not be forgotten, that *this* is the precise word selected, rather than any other sacrificial term, by the sacred historian: Cain, I say, is commanded to bring a *Chattath*. But the word *Chattath*, in its sacrificial use, INVARIABLY denotes a *sin-offering of ATONEMENT*. Therefore a *sin-offering of ATONEMENT* is the specific sacrifice which Cain is commanded to bring.

2. This statement is very materially strengthened, when we consider by whom the book of Genesis was written.

piatory sin-offering, confession of sins was enjoined to be made on the part of the worshipper: but, by such an ordinance, confession was only *superadded* to atonement; the practice did not *exclude* the original and proper notion of the sacrifice itself. See Levit. v. 5—13. xvi. 7—10, 20—22.

In strict accordance with the precept, confession of sin, as we learn from the Rabbins, was always *associated with sacrifice* for sin, insomuch that the latter was deemed inefficacious without the former. Still, however, in point of ideality, it was a mere *adjunct* to the real sacrifice for sin: it did not constitute its palmary notion and object.

Docuerunt laudatæ memoriæ sapientes, in codice Zebachim, omni sacrificio pro peccato culpæ admissæ confessionem necessario addi debuisse. Abraben. ad Levit xvi. See Outram. de Sacrif. lib. i. c. 15. § ix.

It was written by Moses: it was written by the identical person, through whom was revealed the whole system of the levitical sin-offerings: it was written by the precise individual, who, from the mouth of God himself, has given us an express definition of the word *Chattath* when employed sacrificially.

Now the very word, which he himself perpetually uses, and which he himself from the mouth of God has expressly defined: this very word is selected by him, as the most appropriate term under which he could describe the animal-offering enjoined upon Cain.

Of all living men, Moses could be the least ignorant of the force of the word. Had the offering, required of Cain, been, not an EXPIATORY *sin-offering*, but an *offering merely CONFESSIONAL of sin*: we may, I think, be morally certain, that Moses would never have employed, in a sense which it is incapable of bearing, the well-defined and perfectly-familiar word *Chattath*.

I consider myself to have fully established the position, that AN EXPIATORY ATONING VIRTUE is ascribed, by the voice of inspiration itself, to the first-recorded animal sacrifice under the Patriarchal Dispensation.

CHAPTER IV.

Respecting the moral Objection to the rendering, A Sin-offering coucheth at the Door.

THE history of the sacrifices of Cain and Abel so much constitutes a principal strong-hold of his opponents, that Mr. Davison very naturally exerts all his strength either to wrest it from them or at least to neutralise it.

In pursuance of this object, he has brought an argument of a moral nature against the version, *A sin-offering coucheth at the door.*

“ I argue,” says he, “ that there is a grave
“ objection to the whole notion of a sin-offering
“ in this place, in its want of harmony with
“ the spirit and general tenour of Scripture :
“ which is not used to address the wilful sinner,
“ when he is supposed to be doing or medi-
“ tating to do evil, with an invitation to *go and*
“ *sacrifice* ; but rather to admonish him of his
“ evil deeds and their plague of punishment :
“ as reciprocally, in the preceding clause ; *If*
“ *thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?*
“ After this antecedent enunciation, it is more

“ conformable to the doctrinal habit of Scripture,
“ as it is also more in connection with the
“ commencement of the passage, to expect some
“ threatening or severe rebuke to follow*.”

The present objective argument is plainly built, partly upon a gratuitous assumption, and partly upon a complete misconception of the general drift and purpose of the whole history.

I. Mr. Davison, palpably though tacitly, assumes, that Cain, *anterior* to the devotement of his vegetable sacrifice, had been a grievous moral offender: for, unless he be allowed to assume *this* position, his entire argument, which is clearly founded upon it, is altogether irrelevant and inconclusive.

But where did Mr. Davison learn the fact, which he has gratuitously assumed? From what part of Holy Writ has he discovered, that Cain, *anterior* to the devotement of his sacrifice, was a grievous moral offender? On what text does he build his objection, that, *according to the scriptural analogy of God's dealings with the wicked and the profligate, Cain ought to have been threatened with punishment, not to have been commanded to go and sacrifice?* The proof of Cain's previous immorality would properly, I think,

* Inquiry, p. 54.

have preceded an argument evidently constructed upon its implied *allegation*: but, instead of solid proof, I find nothing save gratuitous assumption. On the hypothesis, that *Cain, antecedently to his sacrifice, had been a grievous moral offender*; Mr. Davison's objection may, or may not, be weighty. But how does Mr. Davison know of a certainty, that Cain, antecedently to his sacrifice, *had been a grievous moral offender*? Mr. Davison, I fear, has come under the lash of his own scourge, by "leaving Scripture," as he expresses himself, "at a distance far behind; for the use, I suppose, of more modest inquirers*."

II. In truth, however, Mr. Davison has totally misconceived the general drift and purpose of the whole history.

God does not command Cain to bring a sin-offering, because he had been recently guilty of some gross overt act of sin; the only basis, on which Mr. Davison's objection can for a moment be supported: but he commands him to bring a sin-offering, because, while in the general constitution of his nature he was a sinner, he yet presumptuously disbelieved God's own revelation, and rejected that specific mode of sacrifice which rested upon the notion of an atonement. It is in opposition to Cain's *inward*

* Inquiry, p. 165.

principle, not by way of cheaply supplying the place of repentance for *some recently-committed notorious immorality*, that the necessity of devoting a sin-offering is so graciously and mercifully urged upon him. As the Apostle speaks, he WANTED the faith of Abel, when he brought his eucharistic oblation of vegetables. *By FAITH, Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain*: by WANT OF FAITH, Cain offered unto God a less excellent sacrifice than Abel. Cain's eucharistic oblation might, *abstractedly*, have been innocent or even laudable: but the *inward principle*, with which it was offered, and which the Apostle places in direct opposition to the praiseworthy faith of Abel, marred the whole sacrifice, and caused it to be an utter abomination to the Lord*. The faith, possessed by the one bro-

* This statement fully answers a not unpalatable minor objection propounded by Mr. Davison.

"With regard to the *acceptance* of Abel's offering or Noah's, though this acceptance has been employed to prove that the sacrifice must have been of an *expiatory* kind; it is by a circle of reasoning, which would only reduce us to infinite difficulties. It would go to prove, that *no other oblation could be capable of acceptance*: which is too large a notion, either for truth or for serious argument." Inquiry, p. 31.

Certainly, the *bare* acceptance of a sacrifice proves not its character: for, under proper circumstances, an eucharistic sacrifice may be accepted as well as an expiatory sacrifice. But this, I apprehend, is not quite a fair account of at least the offering of *Abel*. Any argument, drawn from its *par-*

ther and wanted by the other brother, was, as we learn from the apostolic definition, *faith in a divine revelation*. Here lay the sin of Cain: nor have we any other sin recorded of him, *anterior* to the murder of Abel. Hence, without endangerment of good morals; for which, in the exposition of Scripture, I would contend no less jealously than Mr. Davison himself: without any endangerment of good morals, the *ONLY* remedy, suitable to the particular sin of Cain, *his WANT OF FAITH*, was wisely and consistently prescribed to him.

Mr. Davison's moral objection is, I trust, sufficiently answered.

particular and *referential* acceptance, will not bring out the absurdity, that *no other oblation than an expiatory one could be capable of acceptance*: for this were that inconclusive mode of reasoning, which draws a *general* conclusion from *partial* premises. It would only go to shew, that, in the *particular* case of Cain, an eucharistic sacrifice was an offence to God: it would only go to shew, that, in his *particular* case, no other oblation than an expiatory one could be capable of acceptance. The *general* question would still be left so completely open, that, under *other* circumstances and with *another* frame of mind, Cain might have been well pleasing to the Lord, though he had simply devoted a mere eucharistic oblation. His sacrifice of vegetables, in short, was rejected, not *abstractedly*, but *concretely*. In itself, it *might* have been acceptable: as opposed to an enjoined placular sacrifice, it *was* abominable. In all this, I perceive not any notion, which (as Mr. Davison speaks) is too large, either for truth, or for serious argument.

CHAPTER V.

Respecting the Objection founded upon a supposed Retrogradation of the Levitical Dispensation, as viewed in reference to the Patriarchal Dispensation.

AGAINST the theological scheme, which maintains that *piacular sacrifice was instituted of God at the commencement of the Patriarchal Dispensation*, a very subtle and ingenious objection has been brought forward by Mr. Davison.

“ I offer it to be considered,” says he, “ that,
“ as the Scripture history does not furnish the
“ proof of atoning oblations in the first ages of
“ the world; so there is one internal reason,
“ which renders it highly improbable that an
“ institution of that kind then existed. For, I
“ ask, if sacrifices of expiation and atonement
“ were given at that early time, of what were
“ they expiatory? For what offences did they
“ ratify the atonement? For moral transgres-
“ sion, no doubt: for sin, estimated according
“ to the great Law of God. The ceremonial
“ Law did not exist: the moral only could
“ be the rule of duty to the primitive world.

“ It only, therefore, could receive the rite of
“ expiation. But, since expiation for moral sin
“ was not the privilege of the later Dispensa-
“ tion, that of Moses ; since atonement for all
“ the greater instances of transgression, and
“ even in the extent of man’s ordinary obliquity
“ of practice, was not included in the operation
“ of the Mosaic rites: had such an institute of
“ atonement been granted, in the first period of
“ things, to the primeval race ; the divine eco-
“ nomy would have been retrograde ; a sacra-
“ ment of grace and pardon would have been
“ withdrawn ; or, which is the same thing, it
“ would have reduced from greater purposes
“ to less : and all this is a change, in the re-
“ vealed ratification of the divine mercy and the
“ remedial provisions of the divine Law ; a
“ change, of disproportion in the appointment,
“ of loss and disfavour in the effect, which is
“ highly inconsistent with our best notions of
“ the progressive order of revealed religion, and
“ with the actual evidences of that order con-
“ tained in the general system of it. If the
“ worshipper *under* the Law sought in vain for
“ a sacrifice, to take away sin, and to absolve
“ his conscience from the burden of his moral
“ guilt ; we must be slow to believe, that the

“ penitent *before* the Law stood on better ground,
“ or had promises and appointments of greater
“ efficacy. David knew of no such sacrifice
“ ordained : and, therefore, Abel and Noah
“ scarcely could have had the privilege of it.

“ I submit this relative view of the state of
“ revealed religion, in the two periods of the
“ primitive and the Mosaic times, as amounting,
“ alone, almost to a decisive proof, in the
“ absence of other more explicit information,
“ that the first sacrifices could not be express
“ institutions of pardon and atonement. If we
“ suppose those sacrifices to have been the
“ known authentic medium of expiation, we
“ make them not merely to have been the same
“ as the Levitical in their *intent* ; in being a
“ seal of pardon and restoration to God’s favour,
“ which is itself a very questionable assumption :
“ but we make them go beyond the
“ Levitical in their *subject*, by their use to seal
“ that pardon in the very heart and substance
“ of the Law of moral duty ; which is still less
“ credible*.”

It appears to me, that the present objection, however ingenious and subtle, is built, partly

* Inquiry, p. 84—86.

upon misconception, and partly upon an inaccurate statement of facts.

I. In point of moral merit and efficacy, it is perfectly certain, that animal sacrifice cannot make atonement for sin.

This matter, once for all, has been fully and definitively settled by the great Apostle.

It is not possible, that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins.*

This same matter was felt and acknowledged by spiritual worshippers under the Law: and the same matter would doubtless be felt and acknowledged by spiritual worshippers under Patriarchism, if they were acquainted with the shadowy rite of piacular atonement. Hence, on the broad merits of the question, I see not how Mr. Davison's alleged retrogradation follows from the internal necessity of the system which I have adopted. Whether under Patriarchism or under the Law, piacular devotements were ALIKE *intrinsically* inefficacious. They possessed no *more* merit or power under the one than under the other. Whatever virtue, under EITHER Dispensation, they had, was purely *relative* and *shadowy*. They directed the offerers to some alone meritorious and potent sacrifice of atone-

* Heb. x. 4.

ment: they taught them, through the medium of a scenical representation, the nature of that vital principle of reconciliation with God, which, as Mr. Davison justly remarks, is *of the very essence of the Christian Faith**: and, thus far, *as significantly inculcating* A PRINCIPLE, they were most useful and most important. But here they stopped. The sinner learned from them the doctrine of an atonement, *viewed as an essential* PRINCIPLE: and, whenever he offered up a piacular sacrifice, he acknowledged, that, upon that PRINCIPLE *only*, to the systematic *exclusion* of every *other* principle, he rested his humble yet explicit hope of reconciliation. Still, in *themselves*, such sacrifices were defective and inefficacious. Defective, however, as they were, they pointed, by their recognition of A PRINCIPLE, to that, which they themselves were unable to accomplish. This, whether under Patriarchism or under the Law, was their prescribed office: and this office, by their inculcation and preservation of A PRINCIPLE, they effectually performed.

Now, according to this statement of which I perceive not the inaccuracy, where is the retrogradation censured by Mr. Davison?

Piacular sacrifice, under EACH of the two

* Inquiry, p. 160.

earlier Dispensations, was the same in dignity, the same in purpose. But where there is no *inequality*, there can be no *retrogradation*. Mr. Davison says, that the piacular sacrifices under the Law possessed no inherent efficacy of making a moral atonement for sin. I say the very same: and I extend precisely the same remark to the expiatory sacrifices under Patriarchism. For the latter, I claim not any moral dignity above the former. In rank and potency, I deem them perfectly equal. Where there is no *inequality*, there can be no *retrogradation*.

II. But Mr. Davison contends, that, if the patriarchal sacrifices made expiation for *any* thing, they made it for *moral* offences: while the legal sacrifices made no expiation for *moral* offences, but solely for such as were *ceremonial*. Hence he argues, that, as *morals* are confessedly superior to *ceremonies*, the Levitical Dispensation, according to the system which he opposes, *must*, in reference to the Patriarchal Dispensation, have plainly retrograded.

His argument would be conclusive, were it founded upon facts: but I much doubt the accuracy of his statement.

1. The grand *principle* of the alleged difference is, in truth, spontaneously and fairly relinquished by himself.

His objection is professedly built on the ground, that, under the Law, piacular sacrifices made atonement for *ceremonial* offences EXCLUSIVELY. Yet he confesses, that, in some specified cases of *moral* transgression, a sacrificial atonement was ordained*.

Here, therefore, Mr. Davison relinquishes his *principle*: for he owns, that, under the Law, atonement was *not* made EXCLUSIVELY for *ceremonial* offences.

2. Still it may be said, that legal atonement for *moral* transgression is narrow and limited: while, if we admit the existence of patriarchal atonement for *moral* transgression, we, in effect, stand pledged to view it as being wide and unlimited. Hence, even though Mr. Davison's grand *principle* be relinquished as untenable, we certainly have, nevertheless, a palpable retrogradation.

I readily allow such to be the case, according to the *present* statement: but I suspect this statement to be *notionally* incorrect.

Mr. Davison, so far as I can see, has confounded two matters together, which ought to have been carefully separated: *the making of*

* Inquiry, p. 90—93. It may not be useless to remark, that the specified cases themselves are of no trifling import. See Levit. vi. 1—7, where they are enumerated.

satisfaction in the court of heaven, and the making of satisfaction in a court of earthly judicature.

It was the peculiarity of the Israelitish polity, that it was a theocracy. Jehovah presided over his chosen people in the quality, not only of a *God*, but likewise of a *King*. Hence it would follow, that moral transgressions, which, under *one* aspect, might be atoned for by piacular sacrifice; under *another* aspect, would be incapable of admitting any atonement. And this obvious distinction, which resulted from the theocratic polity of Israel, is, in reality, founded upon the very necessity of things themselves.

If the murderer, by making a sacrificial atonement for his offence, could thereby escape the due punishment of the *civil* law: it is plain, that the whole frame of society would be unhinged. Hence, under the *civil* law of Israel, no such atonement could be accepted for the greater instances of moral transgression. Punishment followed, as a matter of course: nor could any piacular sacrifice exempt the offender from its operation.

But, though atonement could not be made in the earthly court of *the king* of Israel; we must not too hastily conclude, that *therefore* it could not be made in the heavenly court of *the God* of

Israel. *Here*, if I mistake not, the matter still continued on the same footing, as it stood during the period of the Patriarchal Dispensation. So far as mere *typical* piacular sacrifice could make atonement for sin in the court of heaven ; atonement was *thus* made, on behalf of the sinner, under the Levitical Dispensation, no less than under the Patriarchal. But, under *neither* Dispensation, nor yet (we may add) even under the Christian Dispensation, could *any* piacular sacrifice, even the blessed piacular sacrifice of our Lord himself, so atone for moral offences, as to exempt the offender from that punishment which the statute law of the land awarded to him in a *human* court of judicature. No doubt, in absolute strictness of speech, mere *typical* sacrifice can never make a *real* atonement for moral transgression. But this physically inherent defectiveness is no way *peculiar* to the typical sin-offerings of the Law : it *equally* belongs to the typical sin-offerings of Patriarchism.

3. Mr. Davison dwells much on the confession made by David and on the general doctrine of St. Paul, that man could not be justified from *moral* transgression by the piacular sacrifices of the Law of Moses : and this he would institute as a proof that the piacular sacrifices of the Law

were intended to apply *exclusively* to the case of ceremonial transgression *.

He strikes me as reasoning very inconclusively. Both David and Paul are speaking, not of the *typical intent*, but of the *physical inefficaciousness*, of expiatory animal sacrifices. Abel and Noah and Job, under the Patriarchal Dispensation, might, with exact propriety, have used precisely the same language: for, in truth, *their* sacrifices, so far as intrinsic value and efficacy are concerned, were no more available to the expiation of sin, than the sacrifices of David or of Solomon †.

* Inquiry, p. 86—90.

† I am much mistaken, if the present statement does not tend to throw additional light on the true *rationale* of the Law, in regard to its exclusively recorded temporal sanctions.

The true *rationale* of the temporal sanction of the Mosaic Law is this.

That Law was the statute Law of the theocratic kingdom of Israel. But, in the *principle* of its administration, a kingdom, of which God is the temporal sovereign, cannot differ from a kingdom whose temporal sovereign is a mere man. Now a kingdom of the latter description enforces its statute law by temporal sanctions *only*. Therefore a kingdom of the former description, inasmuch as the two kingdoms differ solely in the *persons* of their respective temporal sovereigns, must needs enforce *its* statute law also *exclusively* by temporal sanctions. See my Treatise on the Patriarchal, Levitical, and Christian, Dispensations, book ii. chap. 4.

Now, on this principle, the legal ordinance of expiatory sacrifice is engrafted. Temporally, it made atonement only for ceremonial offences: spiritually, as we learn expressly

This, I think, is the clear meaning of the language employed by David and St. Paul. It

from St. Paul, it made atonement, that is to say, it made typical atonement, for moral offences also. See Heb. vii. 25—28.

To the present solution of a well-known difficulty, which I find had been proposed by Michaelis, though until very lately I was not aware of the circumstance: to this solution it has been objected by Mr. Davison, that the Law comprehends both a *moral* code and a *civil* code, that it prescribes to *private* duty as well as to *public* duty, that it is a law of *religion* as well as a law of *government*: and the objection has been exemplified, in the commandment of the perfect love of God, in the tenth commandment of the decalogue, and in other precepts of a similar description; none of which can ever be reduced to the statutes of the land, to be administered and enforced on the rules of a civil government. See Davison's Discourses on Prophecy, p. 212, 213.

Such an objection may seem plausible: but it does not, I think, possess much cogency.

I. We are told, as if it were something *peculiar* to the Mosaic Law, that it comprehends both a *moral* code and a *civil* code, that it prescribes to *private* duty as well as to *public* duty, and that it is a law of *religion* as well as a law of *government*.

But this matter, so far from being *peculiar* to the Mosaic Law, is, in truth, more or less common to *every* code of statute law. Thus, when the statute law of England prohibits, under temporal sanctions, murder and theft and profane oaths and sabbath-breaking, it is, in so far forth, a *moral* code as well as a *civil* code: it, in so far forth, is a law of *religion* as well as a law of *government*. The circumstance, therefore, inaccurately alleged as something *peculiar* to the Mosaic Law, furnishes no real objection to what I still venture to deem the true *rationale* of its exclusively temporal sanctions.

II. But we are further told, by way of exemplification, that various commandments occur in the Mosaic Law, which can never be reduced to statutes of the land to be

was not, that they denied *the typical expiatory intent* of the legal sin-offerings in respect to

administered and enforced on the rules of a civil government: whence it is inferred, that the *rationale*, for which I contend, is of necessity inadmissible.

1. This objection rests upon the tacit, but fallacious, assumption, that a *temporal theocracy*, in the detail of its actual administration, is not more perfect than a *temporal human government*.

Here lies the fallacy: and, the moment that fallacy is exposed, the objection falls harmless to the ground.

A violation of the eighth commandment and a violation of the tenth commandment of the decalogue are equally a breach of the *moral Law*. Yet, in the statute law of England, a breach of the eighth is visited by a temporal penalty: while to a breach of the tenth *no* penalty is annexed. Of this and of other similar inequalities the reason is obvious. A mere human government can reach a breach of the eighth: but no mere human government can reach a breach of the tenth. On the other hand, a theocracy can, with equal ease and equal certainty, visit *every* offence: for a theocracy, in the detail of its administration, is *perfect*; while every human government, in the detail of its administration, is of necessity *imperfect*. But this *perfection* in a theocracy does not alter its *essential character*. It still equally remains a *temporal government*: and it differs only from any other *temporal government* in the accidental circumstance of its *perfection*. Various commandments, no doubt, occur in the Mosaic Law, which, in the case of mere human governments, can never be reduced to statutes of the land to be administered and enforced on the rules of a civil government. But this is solely owing to the necessary *imperfection* of such governments. In the case of the *perfect* Hebrew theocracy, this impossibility did not exist. On the contrary, *every* commandment was *there* reduced to the statute law of the land: and, in consequence, the breach of it was visited, on the strict principle of a *temporal government*, with *temporal* pains and penalties.

cases of moral transgression, but that they denied the *physical or inherent efficacy* of such sa-

2. It may be said, that the magistrates of Israel could no more visit with temporal punishment a breach of the tenth commandment, than the magistrates of England could do: because a Hebrew magistrate could no more *prove* against a man the crime of *coveting*, than an English magistrate.

Undoubtedly he could not: but here comes in that identical *perfection* of a theocracy, to which a mere *human* government can never attain. Though the temporal magistrates of Israel, like any other human temporal magistrates, could only *themselves* punish what could be satisfactorily proved against a person; yet *God*, as an absolute temporal king, could do what no other temporal king could do. *God* could temporally punish every breach of the Law of Moses, which might elude the vigilance of the subordinate *human* magistrates: and, accordingly, in matter of fact, temporal rewards and punishments regularly followed both public and private obedience and disobedience. This mode of administering temporal sanctions on the part of the temporal theocrat of Israel produced that singular state of things, which of course is unknown under any government save a theocracy: I mean an *extraordinary providence*. The *entire* Law of Moses was the statute law of Israel: and, as the temporal king of Israel was at once omniscient and omnipotent, various commandments, which could not be reduced to the statute law of any other nation differently circumstanced, were without any difficulty reduced to the statute law of Israel to be administered and enforced by *God* himself on the rules of a civil government; for offences, which his inferior magistrates could not reach, could always be penally visited by the supreme temporal head of the theocracy. *Exod. xxx. 19—21.*

Even the precept of a *perfect love to God*, when viewed theocratically, was part and parcel of the statute law of Israel. For, in truth, what is it more, when *God* is a *temporal* prince, than a real profession of the highest fealty and allegiance? *Every* human government requires the fealty

crifices. Under the one aspect, they were important: under the other aspect, they were worthless. The blood of bulls and of goats could not take away sin, either under the Levitical Dispensation or under the Patriarchal Dispensation: but, unless *atonement for MORAL guilt* had been the typical object of such sacrifices, I see not by what possible mechanism they can be constructed into types of *the alone MORALLY efficacious sacrifice of Christ*.

4. In drawing the necessary distinction for which I contend, I deem myself fully warranted, not only by the very nature of the question, but also by the direct testimony of the inspired writer to the Hebrews.

Mr. Davison maintains, that, with some trifling exceptions, the piacular sacrifices of the Law made atonement EXCLUSIVELY for *ceremonial* and allegiance of its subjects: but, from its *imperfection* each mere human government can enforce no more than the outward act of homage and obedience. A theocracy, on the other hand, being *perfect*, demands, not only the fealty of the overt act, but also the fealty of the heart and the affections. If this better homage was withdrawn, the offence, through the agency of an extraordinary providence, was followed by a temporal punishment. Nearly the whole of the seventy-eighth Psalm is employed in the exemplification of this principle.

I do not perceive, that I have any need either to change or even to modify my statement in consequence of Mr. Davison's objection.

transgressions: but the Apostle, if I rightly understand him, teaches a directly opposite doctrine.

Such an high-priest, says he, became us, who is holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners, and made higher than the heavens: who needeth not daily, as those high-priests, to offer up sacrifice, first for his own sins and then for the people's; for this he did once, when he offered up himself. For the Law maketh men high-priests, which have infirmity: but the word of the oath, which was since the Law, maketh the Son, who is consecrated for evermore.*

From this passage we learn, that the Levitical high-priests, under the Law, daily offered up sacrifice, both for their own sins, and for the sins of the people; a matter, which it was no way necessary for our Lord to do: because, in the first place, he himself knew no sin personally; and because, in the second place, his one devotement of himself for the sins of the world, being completely and truly efficacious, required not any repetition.

Such is the doctrine, which we learn from the passage: and it is too plain to be misapprehended. Both the necessary drift of the Apostle's

* Heb. vii. 26—28. See also Heb. v. 1—3.

entire argument, and the very management of his peculiar phraseology, compel us to believe, that the daily sin-offering, devoted by the Levitical priesthood, was designed to atone, not merely for *ceremonial* offences, but likewise for *moral* transgressions of whatsoever description.

In fact, the sole question is, Whether the *sins*, here spoken of, were *ceremonial* or *moral*.

Now the language of the Apostle imperiously precludes the idea, that they were *ceremonial*.

The levitical high-priests, says the inspired writer, *offered up sacrifice daily, first for their own sins, and then for the sins of the people. But THIS* thing Christ did once, when he offered up himself.*

THIS thing Christ did once. *What*, then, was it, that Christ once accomplished?

Christ did *really*, what the successive high-priests did only *typically*. In point of design and intent, each did the *SAME thing*; and that *SAME thing* was the *making of atonement for moral transgression*: but the levitical sacrifices were meritoriously inefficacious; the evangelical sacrifice was meritoriously efficacious. Still, in import and in design, the several sacrifices were *IDENTICAL*. The Apostle assures us, that *here*

there was no difference. *Under the Law, the high-priests offered up sacrifice daily for sin. But THIS thing Christ did once, when he offered up himself.* What the high-priests did, Christ did: what Christ did, the high-priests did. If Christ's devotement of himself were *a sacrifice for MORAL transgression*; the emphatic word *THIS* determines, that such also was the character of the daily levitical sacrifice.

5. It is not unworthy of note, as tending yet additionally to shew, how greatly Mr. Davison has misapprehended the language of David, that the Jews themselves, in exact agreement with the inspired author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, suppose and have long supposed, that the sacrifices under the Law were intended to expiate, not only *ceremonial*, but likewise *moral*, offences.

This is evident from the purport of the prayers, which they assert to have been used by the high-priest on the great annual day of expiation; when, as the Apostle teaches us, he offered blood for himself and for the errors of the people*.

Two of these prayers have been preserved

* Heb. ix. 7. If any one should contend, from the Apostle's use of the word *ἀγνοήματα* in this text, that involuntary breaches of the ceremonial Law were alone in-

in the Mishna : and I subjoin them, as shewing the doctrine of the ancient Hebrew Church relative to the nature and object of the levitical sin-offerings.

I beseech thee, O Lord, we have sinned, we have offended, we have rebelled in thy sight, I and my family. I beseech thee, O Lord, remit now the sins, the offences, and the rebellions, by which we have sinned and offended and rebelled, I and my family. As it is written in the Law of thy servant Moses : In this day, there shall be an expiation of you and a purification from all your sins ; before the Lord ye shall be purified.

I beseech thee, O Lord, we have sinned, we have offended, we have rebelled in thy sight, I and my family and the sons of Aaron thy holy people. I beseech thee, O Lord, remit now the sins, the offences, the rebellions, by which we have sinned and offended and rebelled in thy sight, I and my family, and the sons of Aaron thy holy people. As it is written in the Law of thy servant Moses : In this day, there shall be an expiation of you and a purification from all your sins ; before the Lord ye shall be purified.

tended, he would do well to read the learned Outram's remarks on the term. See Outram. de Sacrif. lib. i. c. 13. § VII. VIII.

Exactly similar, on behalf of the sins and rebellions of the whole people, was the prayer offered up over the scape-goat and his fellow.

Nor were these supplications confined to the greater and more important sin-offerings: they were individually put up, for his own special sins, by each person when he sacrificed. Laying his hands upon the head of the victim to intimate the transfer of his offences, the sinner, according to Maimonides, prayed in manner following.

I beseech thee, O Lord, I have sinned, I have offended, I have rebelled, I have done this and that. Now, therefore, I repent me: and let this victim be my expiation.

In the place of the formula, *I have done this and that*, the sacrificer specifically mentions the sin to be expiated by his victim: and, by the imposition of hands, the Jews understand the sacrificer to pray; *Let this victim be substituted in my place, so that upon the head of my victim may fall the evil which I have deserved**.

No person, I think, can imagine, that, in these prayers, the only offences intended were ceremonial offences. Evidently, they are con-

* See Outram, de Sacrif. lib. i. c. 15. § x. xi.

ceived and expressed in the exact spirit and form of the recorded prayer of Daniel*.

Thus, so far as I can judge, the very basis of Mr. Davison's objection fails: and thus the retrogradation, which *in principle* he rightly censures, is found *in point of fact* to have no existence.

CHAPTER VI.

Respecting the Objection founded on the Declaration, that the System of the Gospel is a Mystery, which was hidden of old Time, but which now is made manifest.

WE read in Holy Writ, that the Dispensation of the Gospel is *a mystery, which has been hidden from ages and from generations, but which now at length is made manifest to the saints of God*†.

On this passage, and on others of a similar purport, Mr. Davison has constructed yet another objection to the system, which would assign *the divine institution of peculiar sacrifice* to the Patriarchal Dispensation.

* See Dan. ix. 4—19.

† Coloss. i. 26. Compare Ephes. iii. 9.

“ The doctrine of *the atonement*,” says he,
“ is of the very essence of the Christian Faith :
“ it is the chief article of its characteristic
“ system: but it is also that one point of its
“ system, which is among the latest touched
“ upon in the predictions of prophecy; not
“ being directly introduced into a specific notice,
“ so far as I know, before the predictions
“ of the prophet Isaiah. For, although some
“ of the prophetic psalms foreshew the *sufferings*
“ of the Messiah, they do not exhibit the *vica-*
“ *rious* and *expiatory* import of those sufferings,
“ as the prophecy of Isaiah does. The un-
“ searchable nature, therefore, of this doctrine
“ of *the atonement*, and its late appearance in
“ the volume of prophecy, equally tend to dis-
“ countenance the belief, either that man had
“ explored, by means of sacrifice or by any
“ other prophetic sign, or that God had com-
“ municated, in the prime of the world, a know-
“ ledge of this the most transcendent part of his
“ counsel in the Evangelical Dispensation.

“ We are confirmed in this negative belief,
“ by some significant testimonies in the New
“ Testament. For *the system of the Gospel* is
“ described there, as *the mystery, which hath*
“ *been hid from ages and from generations, but now*

“ *is made manifest to his saints**: *as the mystery,*
 “ *which, from the beginning of the world, hath*
 “ *been hid in God*†. These passages do not
 “ import, that *no disclosure of the plan of the*
 “ *Gospel redemption* had been granted to the
 “ *foregone ages; but no disclosure sufficient to*
 “ *put men in possession of the perfect truth.*
 “ Prophecy had been a continual and advancing
 “ developement of it. The same Apostle, there-
 “ fore, describes the Gospel of God, as *that*
 “ *which he had promised afore by his Prophets*
 “ *in the Holy Scripture*‡; and as *the revelation*
 “ *of the Mystery, which was kept secret since*
 “ *the world began, but now is made manifest,*
 “ *and by the scriptures of the prophets*§; and as
 “ *being witnessed by the Law and the prophets.*

“ These are passages, which refer us to
 “ *no unwritten communications,* explanatory of
 “ this great secret of God; but to the authentic
 “ evidence of the Law and the prophets, con-
 “ tained *in the Scripture* ||.”

I. Such, in form, is Mr. Davison's objection.
 Its cogency I must confess myself unable to
 discover. In reality, it is effectively answered
 even by Mr. Davison himself.

* Coloss. i. 26.

† Ephes. iii. 9.

‡ Röm. i. 2.

§ Rom. xvi. 25.

|| Inquiry, p. 161, 162.

The substance of what the learned writer here maintains, is precisely what I myself also maintain. I contend only for the primitive knowledge of the doctrine of AN atonement, shadowed out by the significant rite of piacular sacrifice. With respect to the *degree* of that knowledge, different persons, according as they estimate the weight of the evidence which presents itself, will obviously entertain different opinions. But the *degree* of such knowledge is not the point in debate. Our discussion respects the *existence* of the doctrine, not the *circumstantial extent* to which the doctrine was revealed. On this *latter* question, there will be a considerable difference of opinion even among those, who strenuously hold the affirmative of the *former* question. With this *latter* question, therefore, in our present discussion, Mr. Davison and myself have no manner of concern. The *sole* point, to be determined, is: *Whether the texts, adduced by Mr. Davison, are hostile to the opinion, that the doctrine of AN atonement through the medium of piacular sacrifice was revealed at the very commencement of the Patriarchal Dispensation.* Let this point be determined by Mr. Davison himself.

“ These passages,” says he, “ do not import,

“ that *no disclosure* of the plan of the Gospel
“ redemption had been granted to the foregone
“ ages ; but *no disclosure sufficient to put men*
“ *in possession of the PERFECT truth.*”

I ask no more than the present concession. If our texts forbid not the *necessary* belief, that the doctrine of AN *atonement* was revealed under the Law : I see not, why they should forbid the *argued* belief, that the doctrine of AN *atonement* was revealed under Patriarchism. The *measure* of the knowledge, I repeat it, is not the question between us : the true question is, simply, the *existence* of the knowledge. Hence, if the texts deny not the *existence* of the knowledge to the Levitical Dispensation : I am at a loss to comprehend, why they *must* be interpreted, as denying the *existence* of the knowledge to the Patriarchal Dispensation.

II. Mr. Davison's statement of the present objection is marked by a certain indistinctness, which, after all, may possibly have led me to misapprehend his meaning.

The statement, as given above, divides itself into *three* parts. Throughout its *middle* part, Mr. Davison seems to understand the Apostle's word *Mystery* in the sense of *The system of the Gospel* or in the sense of *The general plan of*

Gospel Redemption. Yet, if we may judge both from its *earlier* part and from its *concluding* part, he would confine the import of the word *Mystery* to *The special doctrine of the Atonement*.

Now, so far as I can judge, Mr. Davison has no more right to confine the word *Mystery* to *The special doctrine of the atonement*, than Bishop Warburton had to confine it to *The special doctrine of a future retributory state*. Each limitation is alike arbitrary and erroneous. The *Mystery*, which from the beginning of the world had been hid with God, was not either this or that *particular* doctrine of Christianity: but, as Mr. Davison in the *middle* part of his statement well expresses its import, it was *The whole system of the Gospel* or *The entire plan of the Gospel Redemption*.

We may perhaps wonder, why so acute a man as Mr. Davison should gratuitously introduce such a measure of indistinctness into his present objection. The enigma is solved in the *concluding* part of his statement.

St. Paul had described the great *Mystery*, as having been promised by God's prophets in the *Holy Scripture*, and as having been gradually opened by the *scriptures* of the prophets before its final complete manifestation.

On such descriptions Mr. Davison remarks :
“ These are passages, which refer us to no
“ *unwritten* communications, explanatory of this
“ secret of God ; but to the authentic evidence
“ of the Law and the prophets, contained in
“ *the scripture.*”

He had contended, that we have no revelation of the doctrine of an atonement, until it was communicated through the medium of the *written* Law. Here, then, he is willing to exhibit St. Paul, as speaking the same language with himself. For, in regard to the doctrine of an atonement, that great secret of God which is characterised by the alleged lateness of its appearance, the Apostle, according to Mr. Davison, refers us to no *unwritten* communications, but to the authentic *written* evidence of the Law and the prophets.

With respect to the objection as *thus* exhibited, I should say, in the first place, that we have no right to confine the word *Mystery* to *The special doctrine of the atonement* ; and, in the second place, I should say, that the very necessity of the case demonstrates St. Paul to have been setting up no such opposition of *written* to *unwritten* communication, as is plainly ne-

cessary to the effectiveness of Mr. Davison's objection.

The *Mystery*, as I have already observed, is not *The special doctrine of an Atonement* in particular, but *The whole system of the Gospel* or *The entire plan of Gospel Redemption*; and, although this *Mystery* was doubtless in a state of gradual revelation by the *scriptures* of the prophets, we are surely not to conclude from the language of St. Paul, that *therefore* there was no revelation of it before the existence of the *written word*. If we adopt such a conclusion, we shall indeed make short work with the Patriarchal Dispensation: for, in that case, it would follow, that, since there was no *written word* under the Patriarchal Dispensation, there could have been no disclosure of *The system of the Gospel* or of *The plan of Gospel Redemption*; notwithstanding that the promise of the woman's seed, and the enunciation of a blessing upon all nations from a descendant of Abraham, and the express prediction of a Saviour to be born from the house of Judah, had all been delivered anterior to the existence, so far at least as we know, of any divinely-accredited *writings*.

The truth is, while for the gradual develop-

ment of the *Mystery*. St. Paul most accurately refers us to the *scriptures* of the prophets, he does not *therefore*, as Mr. Davison would imply, EXCLUDE those *unwritten* notices of *The system of the Gospel*, which we know to have existed during the patriarchal ages and anterior to any *written* communication. In other words St. Paul does not set up *written* communications in opposition to and in exclusion of *unwritten* communications: for, if he did, he would plainly shut out the patriarchal religionists from ALL knowledge of *the plan of Gospel Redemption*.

It may be said, that the once *unwritten* communications of Patriarchism were afterward by Moses committed to *writing*.

Undoubtedly it may be so said: but then, according to the evident tenor of Mr. Davison's objection (at least if I rightly understand that objection), this is no satisfactory replication to my answer.

During the space of more than two thousand five hundred years, those, who flourished under the Patriarchal Dispensation, had no *written* communications. Hence, if *written* communications be essential to any even the smallest knowledge of *the plan of Gospel Redemption*, the patriarchal religionists must, in every point,

have been totally ignorant of it: a monstrous position, which Mr. Davison himself contradicts; for he justly asserts, that, in the originally-unwritten divine promise that *the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head*, is comprehended the prospect of man's redemption*.

CHAPTER VII.

Respecting the Objection, that the Idea of an Animal couching at the Door of Cain is inconsistent with the recorded Profession of Cain.

As I have now disposed of Mr. Davison's more serious objections, I may be allowed to notice one, which he urges indeed, but which he confesses to be of less moment.

With respect to the proposed translation of the text in Genesis, *A sin-offering coucheth at the door*, "there is," says Mr. Davison, "some want of aptitude and felicity in it to Cain's manner of life; of whom it is said just before, that he was a tiller of the ground, not a keeper of sheep: and therefore the idea

* Inquiry, p. 167, 168.

“ of the *animal couching at the door* does not
“ come home, with its images, so naturally to
“ him*.”

I have hitherto, from pure civility and from a decent unwillingness to wrangle about uncertainties, obsequiously followed the common opinion, that the *door*, mentioned in the litigated passage, was the property of Cain. But, when Mr. Davison makes that *unproved* opinion the professed basis of an argument against the interpretation, which I have thought it expedient to adopt; it doubtless becomes necessary, that I should forthwith remonstrate against the admission of so very compendious a process.

Archbishop Magee, whom Mr. Davison is specially combating, understands, though quite incidentally, the *door*, spoken of in the present passage, to have been Cain's door†.

Of this circumstance Mr. Davison avails himself: for he forthwith builds upon it an objection, deduced from the fratricide's recorded manner of life.

Cain was *a tiller of the ground, not a keeper of sheep*. Hence it is incongruous and unnatural to suppose, that an *animal* victim should

* Inquiry, p. 53, 54.

† Discour. on Atonem. and Sacrif. vol. ii. p. 288.

be couching at the door of the *agriculturist* Cain*.

I. The stress of the objection mainly rests upon the appropriation of the *door*.

We can scarcely suppose, argues Mr. Davison, that an *animal* victim would be couching opportunely at *the door of Cain* the professed *agriculturist*. At *Abel's door*, it might have been couching: at *Cain's door*, we are somewhat surprised to note its appearance.

Thus, in form, runs the objection. But where did Mr. Davison learn, that the *door* spoken of was the door of Cain? In the history, not a syllable is said, which authorises any such appropriation.

Were I to assert, that the *door* in question was the door, not of Cain's tent, but of a tent or tabernacle, set apart by the primeval family, as a consecrated oratory or chapel, for the purposes of devotion: I should have quite as good ground for making this assertion, as Mr. Davison can have for assuming the *door* to be the door of Cain's own tent. In the abstract, the matter is left free for debate or conjecture: in the abstract, if Scripture does not say that the *door* was the door of an oratory, neither does it

* Compare Inquiry, p. 47 with p. 53.

say that the *door* was attached to the tent of Cain.

Thus stands the matter in the abstract: but, in point of regular debate, I think I could give some plausible reasons in favour of the hypothesis of the oratory: while I cannot imagine even so much as a single plausible reason which the ingenuity of Mr. Davison could give in favour of the other hypothesis. I will not alarm him, however, with the awful prospect of a copious dissertation upon the subject: I shall content myself with remarking, that, even independently of every other consideration, the very phraseology of the passage is plainly much more favourable to the former conjecture than to the latter. It is not said, *At thy door*; but, *At the door**. Now, if we suppose God to have spoken oracularly from the adytum, before which the sacrifices of the two brothers were offered: we shall at once perceive the reason and the propriety of the present phraseology. But, if, by the expression, we suppose the Lord to have meant *the door of Cain's dwelling-place*: we shall be left unavailingly to conjecture, why he should indefinitely have said *At the door*, rather than definitely *At thy door*.

* The original Hebrew, not being emphatic, simply runs לַפֶּתַח *At door*.

The eminently-learned Lightfoot, whom I cannot but think to have been reprobated far too disdainfully by Mr. Davison, has doubtless marred, by a sort of ill-advised anachronism, what would otherwise have been a reasonable and consistent explanation. I find it difficult, indeed, to believe, that Moses introduced the Lord, as speaking of a *sin-offering lying at the door*, in proleptic allusion to the circumstance, that, *under the Law, the victims for sacrifice were always brought to the door of the tabernacle* *: but I should greatly hesitate to censure the opinion, that *the victims for sacrifice, during the primitive ages, were brought to the door of the consecrated sacellum*, and that *the ordinance was thence DERIVED into the Levitical Dispensation* †.

The whole of this, it may be said, is a matter of pure speculation. Doubtless it is; but then I venture to think, that *the appropriation of the door to Cain* is a matter of pure speculation also. Hence, unless Mr. Davison can prove that *the door belonged to Cain*, he clearly, on the principles of sound

* Mos erat, cui ut notissimo Moses sermonem accommodavit, collocare sacrificia ad fores sanctuarii. Observat. in Gen. c. iv. § 7.

† Respecting the derivation of matters from the Patriarchal into the Levitical Dispensation, see my Hor. Mosaic. book ii. sect. i. chap. 1. § vii. 1. 2nd Edit.

reasoning, can have no right to make the mere *gratuitous assumption* of the fact the basis of an objective argument, however small (as he himself confesses) may be the moment of that argument. As for the *objection itself*, I think as lightly of it as Mr. Davison can do: but I must ever strenuously protest against the *principle* upon which it is founded; for when analysed, that principle is nothing better than *a complete begging of the question*.

II. Still it may be urged, that, whether the door was the door of an oratory or the door of Cain's tent (respecting which matter, we, in truth, know nothing certain); it were inept and infelicitous to expect that an *agriculturist* should be ready provided with an *animal* victim.

In such an expectation, I perceive neither the want of aptitude nor the want of felicity, which Mr. Davison alleges against it.

On the supposition, that God himself had ordained the rite of expiatory sacrifice (and let it be remembered, that the whole of Mr. Davison's objection is professedly directed against *this* supposition); the breeder and rearer of cattle must obviously, in the very nature of things, have been the *sole* provider of the appointed animal victims. Abel might freely give

his produce to his father and to his brother: or he might, in the way of barter, exchange it for *their* produce. This is immaterial to our solution of the difficulty; but it is quite certain, that, if Abel were the *only* keeper of sheep, ALL the animal victims, whether offered by himself or by his father or by his brother, must have been furnished from *his* stock EXCLUSIVELY; unless indeed we are to suppose, that Abel selfishly refused to accommodate his relatives, and that the stated sacrifice, at the end of days or at its regularly appointed time, might sometimes of plain necessity be deferred, until Adam and Cain had procured *their* victims by hunting. Abel, then, would severally provide a lamb both for Cain and for himself: and, to the lamb, thus provided by Abel for Cain, and thence couching ready for sacrifice at the door of the sacred tabernacle, the words of the Lord may well and aptly be thought to refer.

Under this aspect, I deem the passage *favourable*, rather than *unfavourable*, to the exposition which I have adopted.

Abel, according to custom, had brought a lamb for Cain. Cain, in the unholy pride of his high speculations, refused to devote it as an expiatory sacrifice. *If thou doest well*, said the

Herd to the daring unbeliever, *shalt thou not be accepted? And, if thou doest not well, a sign of reprobation toucheth at the door.* Again it may be said, that the whole of this is a matter of pure speculation. I readily admit such to be the case: but what then? Mr. Davison adduces an objection, which itself is altogether founded upon mere unauthorised conjecture: he cannot, therefore, reasonably complain, that one speculation should be rebutted by another. If a skilful Arcadian, secure in his acknowledged powers of scientific modulation, recreate himself with a *voluntary* upon his shepherd's reed: even a much less skilful brother of the art may be permitted responsively to solace his audience with a lay equally spontaneous.

CHAPTER VIII.

Respecting the Objection founded on the alleged Novelty of the Opinion, that Piacular Sacrifice was, from the first, divinely instituted under the Patriarchal Dispensation.

TERTULLIAN has bequeathed to the Church of Christ a canon, which I have ever been accustomed to deem peculiarly valuable.

Whatever is first, is true: whatever is of more recent origin, is spurious.*

This sound canon holds universally good, in regard to the vital and essential *doctrines* of Christianity: but I doubt, whether it be equally applicable to what I would contradistinctively call *opinions*. The reason of such a difference, between *doctrines* and *opinions*, is almost self-evident.

Whatever *doctrines* are essential to Christianity, those *doctrines* must have been taught and held from the very first predication of the Gospel: for, to assert the contrary, is, in effect, to assert a contradiction. Hence *novelty in doctrine* stands self-convicted of error. But *opinions*, though perfectly true, may very possibly be only of modern growth: for, in a considerable degree, they rest upon critical discussion; and, as an *opinion* may happen not to be discussed until a recent period, its late establishment is no necessary indication of its falsehood.

To the class of *opinions*, rather than to the class of *doctrines* strictly so called, I would refer the system, which maintains *the divine institution*

* Id esse verum, quodcunque primum: id esse adulterum, quodcunque posterius. Tertull. adv. Prax. § 2. Oper. p. 405.

of *piacular sacrifice at the commencement of the Patriarchal Dispensation*. That system involves, indeed, much, which *doctrinally* I esteem of the very highest importance : but *itself* I am willing to call *an opinion* rather than a *doctrine*. And, accordingly, since its final adoption or its final rejection depends altogether upon critical discussion and diligent examination, I do not apprehend, that the evidence in its favour can be either increased by its antiquity or diminished by its modernness.

An objection, however, is brought against it by Mr. Davison, on the professed score of its *novelty*.

“ Either there has been,” says he, “ some
“ essential mistake, or a singular misfortune,
“ in the several determinations of this question.
“ For the Fathers of the Christian Church,
“ in its first days, read the Old Testament, and
“ understood the doctrine of the New ; and
“ *they* thought, that Abel offered his sacrifice
“ of his own will, though they knew that no-
“ thing but the will of God could be found
“ in the sacrifice of Christ : and thus they held
“ an opinion of *the origin of sacrifice*, which
“ it has become the object of modern theology,
“ not merely to disprove, but to defame ; as
“ if it were incompatible with all reverence,

“ either for the Mosaic or the Christian religion.
“ This, at the best, is a cheerless and unsatisfactory state of the controversy. For,
“ although the Fathers of the Church are to
“ be reckoned, neither infallible, nor free from
“ serious error: yet it is a mortification to
“ our charity, in our communion with them, to
“ find, that any important opinion, which *they*
“ have taught, should be deemed to be at
“ variance with the foundations of *our* faith.
“ One would wish to think, there might be
“ piety and safety in their error: although, if
“ *we* have been blessed, in later times, with
“ some superior light, there can be no reason
“ for us, to retain their mistakes, but only to
“ spare their memory. But, when the primitive
“ Fathers took their impression, from the Scripture history, concerning *the first appointment*
“ *of sacrifice*; I believe that *they* derived it
“ by reading, in this instance, with a candour
“ and ingenuousness of mind which *we* should
“ do well to imitate”*.

This objection, here stated at large, is thought by Mr. Davison to be so important, that, exclusively of the passage which has just been cited, he either adduces it or refers to it no less

* Inquiry, p. 146, 147.

than *six several times* : and, in the course of these several adductions or references, he takes occasion to intimate, that the system, reprobated by him on the score of its palpable novelty, *FIRST* sprang up in the age of the Puritans ; that is to say, during the period (I suppose) of the seventeenth century*.

The last-alleged fact, I mean *the puritanical origin of the system*, he states in a manner, which leaves no ambiguity in regard to what he deems *the UNIVERSAL sentiments of the early ecclesiastical writers*.

“ To return,” says he, “ to the opinion of “ the Fathers respecting *the HUMAN institution of sacrifice* ; their *CONSENT*, in that opinion, “ was not left unnoticed by Hammond. He “ took his part with the *primitive*, against the “ *modern and puritan*, doctrine : and *the rise of sacrifice* was an exemplification of the more “ recent subject in dispute, concerning Will- “ worship. *Abel’s oblation*, which the Fathers “ generally observe not to have been by any pre- “ cept from God, was a precedent to him, both “ in the instance of the rite, and in the *primi- “ tive authority*” †.

* Inquiry, p. 2, 7, 34, 38, 190, 192.

† Inquiry, p. 192. Hammond’s Works, vol. i. p. 237.

From the present passage, combined with Mr. Davison's other statements, I conclude him to enounce, as setting forth undoubted matters of fact, the two following positions: that *The Fathers* UNIVERSALLY taught the mere HUMAN institution of primitive patriarchal sacrifice; and that *The notion of its* DIVINE institution originated, at a very late period, with some fantastical innovating speculatists among the modern Puritans.

These two positions I understand Mr. Davison to maintain: and each of these two positions I undertake to controvert.

I. As the vouchers for his opinion, relative to the CONSENT of the Fathers touching the HUMAN institution of primitive patriarchal sacrifice, Mr. Davison refers to Spencer and Outram*.

I have carefully followed him to both those eminent writers: but, certainly, I have experienced no small measure of surprise and disappointment.

Mr. Davison refers to them, as bringing full and complete evidence, that *The Fathers* UNIVERSALLY taught the mere HUMAN origin of primitive patriarchal sacrifice: and, upon the strength of

* Inquiry, p. 190, 191. Outram. de Sacrif. lib. i. c. 1. § vi. p. 7—11. Spencer. de Leg. Heb. Rit. lib. iii. dissert. 2. cap. 1. sect. 2. vol. ii. p. 123—125. Hag. Comit. 1686.

this full and complete evidence, he pronounces, that *The notion of its DIVINE origin is a mere MODERN figment, excogitated in the presumptuously speculative age of innovating Puritanism.*

But what is the evidence, which Spencer and Outram *really* adduce? In good sooth, they jointly bring forward no more than FOUR of the early ecclesiastical writers, who venture explicitly or implicatively to assert *the HUMAN origin of primitive patriarchal sacrifice.*

The FOUR early writers, thus produced by them, are, Justin Martyr; John Chrysostom; the ancient unknown author of *Questions and Answers to the Orthodox*, a production which is commonly printed with the works of Justin Martyr; and the writer of the work denominated *Apostolical Constitutions.*

Of the four early theologians, thus adduced by Spencer and Outram, the three last are positive and explicit in their assertion: while, of the first, Justin Martyr to wit, we gather the sentiments, rather by implication, than in consequence of any direct avowal. *As circumcision,* says he, *commenced from Abraham: so the sabbath, and SACRIFICES, and oblations, and festivals, commenced from Moses.* Thus speaks Justin: and, though he does not express himself with the

absolute precision of the others ; yet, since he intimates, that the observance of the sabbath and the rite of sacrifice originated, as matters of *religious obligation*, from the Hebrew legislator, I readily allow, that, by necessary implication, he makes *patriarchal* sacrifice to be of HUMAN origin.

Through the joint medium, therefore, of Outram and of Spencer, precisely four of the early ecclesiastical writers are adduced by Mr. Davison, for the purpose of establishing the large assertion, that *The Fathers UNANIMOUSLY maintained and taught the mere HUMAN origin of primitive patriarchal sacrifice.*

With respect to myself individually, as I claim not to have accomplished the mighty task of perusing the works of all the old ecclesiastical writers, I will certainly not venture to say, that *no more* than FOUR maintain such an opinion : but *this* I will say, that no more than FOUR have been mediately *adduced* by Mr. Davison in support of his very extensive asseveration.

1. The person, who turns to Spencer and Outram according to Mr. Davison's reference, will, perhaps, upon a rapid inspection of their pages, be surprised, that I should limit his witnesses to the number four : but, if that person

will take the trouble to consider the case somewhat more attentively, he will, I believe, find me perfectly correct.

Unless I labour under a complete misapprehension, the true state of the matter may be laid down in manner following.

Outram cites at large Chrysostom and the author of *Questions and Answers to the Orthodox*, as directly asserting, what doubtless they do directly assert, the HUMAN institution of primitive patriarchal sacrifice: while, to Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, Theodoret, and Cyril of Alexandria, he only refers, as intimating, that *God introduced the rite of sacrifice into the Law, because the people had been accustomed to such a mode of worship in Egypt* *.

Thus writes Outram: but Spencer's citations or references are all professedly made for the purpose of establishing, not the *former*, but the *latter*, of these two positions †. His object is to

* Outram. de Sacrif. lib. i. c. 1. § vi. p. 7, 8.

† In the *concluding* chapter, indeed, of his Dissertation on the Principle and Origin of Sacrifice, Dr. Spencer contends, though with some degree of prudent hesitation, that *The patriarchs offered sacrifice, only through the impulse of a SPONTANEOUS piety, and not in consequence of any DIVINE institution*: but the various passages from the Fathers, which he cites or refers to in the *first* chapter of his dissertation, and to which Mr. Davison remands us as his authority, are ad-

shew, that *The rite of sacrifice was adopted into the Law of Moses through condescension to the weakness of the people, who, having been familiarised to it in Egypt, would have been dissatisfied without it, and who, if not allowed to sacrifice to God, would have been tempted to sacrifice to the demon-gods of Paganism:* and, for this purpose, he cites at large Justin Martyr, Origen, Tertullian, Chrysostom, Theodoret, Cyril of Alexandria, and Epiphanius of Salamis; while he contents himself with referring to Irenæus, Jerome, Procopius, Eucherius, Anastasius, and the author of the *Apostolic Constitutions* whom he

duced only to shew, that *Sacrifice was made an ordinance of the Mosaic Law, because the people had been accustomed to it in Egypt, and because, if not permitted to sacrifice to God, they would be tempted to sacrifice to demons.*

When Dr. Spencer, in his *concluding* chapter, would establish the distinct position, that *Sacrifice was not a primitive DIVINE institution*; he then asserts, I allow, that *This position may be defended by the testimony of almost all the ancient Fathers.* Yet, in *proof* of his large assertion, though not quite so large as that of Mr. Davison, he actually *brings forward* no more than THREE witnesses: namely, John Chrysostom, the author of the *Apostolic Constitutions*, and the author of *Questions and Answers to the Orthodox* in the Works of Justin Martyr.

He *might* have added yet a FOURTH witness, Justin Martyr himself: but, in *this* chapter, he omits him, confiding the proof of his assertion to THREE witnesses *only*. Compare Spencer. de Leg. Heb. Rit. lib. iii. dissert. 2. cap. 1. sect. 2. with Ibid. cap. 4. sect 1.

elsewhere quotes in full *, and who (I readily admit) is direct to Mr. Davison's purpose †.

Now these writers certainly vouch for the opinion which Spencer wished to establish; and FOUR, out of the entire number cited by himself and Outram, *incidentally* maintain also the HUMAN origin of primitive patriarchal sacrifice: but, so far at least as I have had an opportunity of examining, with the exception of those FOUR, they say nothing in favour of the special opinion which Mr. Davison has undertaken to advocate. They are silent, as to the HUMAN origin of primitive patriarchal sacrifice: they merely say, whether truly or falsely, that *The rite of sacrifice was introduced into the Law of Moses through God's condescension to the Egyptianising weakness of the people.*

2. It may be urged, however, that, in saying this, they *virtually* at least deny the DIVINE origin of primitive patriarchal sacrifice, and thence that they *virtually* at least teach its mere HUMAN origin.

Such is the aspect, under which Dr. Outram

* Spencer. de Leg. Heb. Rit. lib. iii. dissert. 2. cap. 4. sect 1. vol. ii. p. 147.

† Ibid. lib. iii. dissert. 2. cap. 1. sect. 2. vol. ii. p. 123—125.

would view the question : and such, as I conclude from his reference, is the opinion also of Mr. Davison.

The Fathers, says Dr. Outram, would never have intimated, that the rite of sacrifice was introduced into the Law through God's condescension to the Egyptianism of the Israelites, had they believed that it was DIVINELY instituted from the very foundation of the world. For it could not have escaped their notice, that, if GOD had first enjoined the rite of sacrifice upon the parents of the human race, he might, without any reference to the practice of Egypt, have similarly enjoined it upon the Israelites at the epoch of their exodus*.

Of this estimate, I more than doubt the correctness. An assertion, be it right or be it wrong, that *Sacrifice was introduced into the Law through condescension to the Egyptianism of the people*, affords no legitimate proof, that the person, who hazarded the assertion, held the mere HUMAN origin of primitive patriarchal sacrifice. Such a person could not but have known, that the rite of sacrifice existed anterior to the rise of pagan idolatry. Hence his notion, that *The rite was condescensively adopted into the Law from the Paganism of Egypt*, leaves the question, as to

* See Outram. de Sacrif. lib. i. cap. 1. § vi. p. 8, 9.

the *primitive* origin of sacrifice, entirely open. Paganism, which is nothing else than corrupted Patriarchism, certainly *invented* not the rite. On the contrary, Paganism, whether in Egypt or elsewhere, merely *borrowed* the rite from pure Patriarchism, which *already* possessed it: and, unless a writer explicitly *declares* such to be his opinion, we are not warranted in concluding that he held the *HUMAN origin of primitive patriarchal sacrifice*, simply because he imagined sacrifice to have been *immediately* adopted into the Law from the practice of Paganism, through condescension to the superstitious weakness of the people.

In reality, some of those very Fathers, who are adduced as supposing that *sacrifice was adopted into the Law from the ritual of Egypt*, hold language, notwithstanding, which, if it does not absolutely demonstrate, certainly seems to import, that they believed its primitive *DIVINE* institution. Thus, according to Cyril of Alexandria, *God accepted the sacrifice of Abel and rejected the sacrifice of Cain, because it was fitting, that posterity should learn from those, with whom the ordinance commenced, HOW THEY MIGHT BLAMELESSLY OFFER UNTO GOD HIS MEET AND DUE HONOURS*: a sentiment, which does not seem very

consistent with the notion of the mere HUMAN origin of primitive sacrifice *. And thus, according to Epiphanius, ALL *preceding sacrifices*, those consequently under Patriarchism as well as those under the Law, *were ACCOMPLISHED and PERFECTED in the one sacrifice of Christ*: language, which could not possibly have been held, as Mr. Davison himself must allow, unless Epiphanius had maintained the typically prophetic character, and thence (by a necessary consequence) the DIVINE institution, of primitive sacrifice under the Patriarchal Dispensation †.

On this point, Dr. Spencer has judged more correctly than Dr. Outram. He adduces not *the alleged mutuation of sacrifice from the ritual of Egypt*, as affording any proof of *its primitive HUMAN origin*: and, accordingly, though the matter has been overlooked by Mr. Davison, he effectively intimates, that no such proof can be legitimately deduced from such alleged mutuation. His intimation is conveyed in manner following.

The custom of *sacrificial feasts* he would derive to the Israelites, *immediately* indeed from the

* Cyril. Alex. cont. Julian. lib. iii. p. 103. Lips. 1696.

† Epiph. cont. Hær. lib. i. hæ. 42. ex epist. i. ad Corinth. See Davison's Inquiry, pp. 3, 4.

Egyptians, but *ultimately* from the patriarchs and the institutes of our common parents *. Now, if this were the case with *sacrificial feasts*, it must also have been the case with *sacrifices themselves*; inasmuch as the *sacrifice* could not but have preceded the *sacrificial feast* upon the slaughtered victim: and, *then*, the question will still remain open, as to the true *origin* of primitive sacrifice.

Again, therefore, I am compelled to say, that Mr. Davison's large assertion rests exclusively upon FOUR adduced witnesses. Very possibly a greater number of witnesses may be *in existence*: but FOUR is the precise number actually adduced by Mr. Davison.

3. Though I boast not of any very extensive converse with the early Fathers of the Church; yet the peremptory boldness of Mr. Davison's asseveration, having stirred up my curiosity, prompted me to examine into the matter so far as my limited opportunities of examination would permit: and, certainly, truth requires me to state, that my investigation is in no wise favourable to the asseveration before us.

Exclusive of the four witnesses mediately ad-

* Spencer. de Leg. Heb. Rit. lib. iii. dissert. 1. cap. 7, vol. ii. p. 80.

duced by Mr. Davison from Outram and Spencer, I have scrutinised, according to the measure of my opportunities, some fifteen or sixteen of the early Christian Fathers.

Out of this number, about one half *enter not at all* upon the topic of sacrifice: and, as for the other half, though they doubtless *enter* upon it; yet, with the exception of three individuals, they are silent respecting *the character of its primeval origination*. So far as I have observed, their favourite line of discussion is *the worthlessness of carnal sacrifice, when placed in contradistinction to the spiritual sacrifice of praise and prayer and thanksgiving and holiness*. On *this* subject, they copiously expatiate: but, whether they thus expatiate, or whether incidentally they little more than simply *mention* sacrifice, still they say nothing as to *its primitive origination*. With the exception of the three individuals already hinted at, unless indeed Jerome be deemed a fourth exception, they leave the question agitated between Mr. Davison and myself, *entirely open* *.

* The statement of Jerome is so loosely worded, that it may well be thought a sort of debateable ground.

He tells us, that Abel, under the influence of that law, which is mentioned in Rom. ii. 14, 15, and which he describes as being common to all mankind, acceptably devoted his sacrifice to the Lord.

It seems, in truth, never once to have occurred to them: and, what is not a little remarkable, even the discussion of the first-recorded sacrifice does not tempt them to any greater degree of communicativeness. We have a singular instance of this somewhat provoking taciturnity in the writings of the later Cyril. Through well nigh seven ample folio pages, the Emperor Julian, and his posthumous antagonist the learned

Hence it might seem, that, in the opinion of Jerome, Abel sacrificed, not in pursuance of any *divine command*, but solely through the guidance of what is called *the law of nature*.

Yet, under the self-same law as that by which Abel sacrificed, he places all those who lived from Adam to Moses: among whom he specially enumerates Abel himself, and Enoch, and Noah, and Melchizedek, and Abraham, and Lot, and Isaac, and Jacob. Now these persons, as we learn from the scriptural history, did not live under any *unrevealed law of nature*: but, on the contrary, they had perpetual communications with God under that Dispensation, which we style *Patriarchal*; and, accordingly, they are declared by the Apostle to the Hebrews to have *all obtained a good report through faith* in divine revelation.

Hence, conversely, it might seem, that, in the opinion of Jerome, Abel sacrificed, not with any *officious spontaneity*, but under the dictate of that *divine unwritten law* which constituted the basis of ancient Patriarchism.

Where a writer expresses himself thus vaguely, it were idle to cite him on either side of the question. It is, however, not improbable, that Jerome thought with Mr. Davison. At all events, I freely tender the learned Father to his acceptance, if his cause may thence receive any accession of strength. See Hieron. ad Demetriad. de Virgin. epist. i. Oper. vol. ix. p. 2. Colon. Agrip. 1616.

Patriarch of Alexandria, strenuously dispute upon the sacrifice of Cain and Abel. Yet, extraordinary as it may appear to our restless and inquisitive age, neither the Emperor nor the Prelate touches upon the *origin* of the rite. As if by common consent, they leave it an entirely open question, *Whether that origin were HUMAN or DIVINE**.

I beg to repeat, that I speak only so far as my own personal examination has extended. Of the many early ecclesiastical writers, to whom I have had no access, and whom therefore I have not consulted, the whole may very possibly agree in opinion with Mr. Davison. Where I freely confess my involuntary ignorance, I can give no specific statement. Yet, at all events, by a sufficiently simple process, I have considerably diminished the largeness of his assertion. Mr. Davison gives us to understand, that *The early Fathers are UNANIMOUS in maintaining the HUMAN origin of primitive patriarchal sacrifice.* Now a *majority*, indeed, of the early Fathers, for any thing at least that I can assert to the contrary, may possibly maintain *the HUMAN origin of primitive sacrifice*: but, most assuredly, no

* Cyril. Alex. cont. Julian. lib. x. p. 343—350.

such opinion is **UNIVERSALLY** maintained by those venerable and interesting ecclesiastics.

II. As Mr. Davison's first position was, that *The Fathers UNANIMOUSLY maintained the HUMAN origin of primitive patriarchal sacrifice*: so his second position was, that *The notion of its DIVINE origin was NOT MORE ANCIENT than the age of Puritanism*. Hence, consistently, he styles the tenet of its **HUMAN** origin *the PRIMITIVE doctrine*: while he brands the tenet of its **DIVINE** origin with the somewhat disparaging appellation of *the MODERN and PURITAN doctrine**. The question, therefore, of the *antiquity* or the *novelty* of this latter tenet is plainly reduced to a *mere question of FACT*.

Now, if we *simply* view the question before us as a *question of FACT*, it will very soon be decided against Mr. Davison.

Abel, says Philo the Jew, who flourished in the first century of the Christian era: *Abel brought neither the same oblation as Cain, nor in the same manner: but, instead of things inanimate, he brought things animate; and, instead of later and secondary products, he brought the older and the first: For he offered up sacrifice*.

* Inquiry, p. 192.

from the firstlings of his flock and from their fat,
ACCORDING TO THE MOST HOLY COMMAND *.

This *most holy command*, Philo tells us, was that which was afterward enjoined upon the Israelites at the time of the exodus: but, since he pronounces that Abel sacrificed *according to it*, he thence distinctly intimates, that it had subsisted from the beginning, and that its occurrence in the Law is a mere repetition of the original precept †.

Thus speaks Philo in the first century: let Mr. Davison, however, have the advantage of being understood to intimate only, that the Puritans of the seventeenth century were the earliest among Christians who maintained the DIVINE institution of primitive patriarchal sacrifice. I am quite willing to meet him even upon this much lower ground. For, to determine the question now before us, I reserved the three exceptions to which I have recently alluded.

1. My first exception is the great Augustine of Hippo, one of the most eminent of the Latin

* " Ἀβελ δὲ ἤνεγκεν αὐτῷ οὔτε αὐτὰ, οὔτε τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ ἀντὶ ἀψύχων ἔμψυχα, ἀντὶ δὲ νεωτέρων καὶ δευτερείων πρεσβύτερα καὶ πρῶτα—Ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν πρωτοτόκων τῶν προβάτων αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν στεάτων αὐτῶν φησὶ τὴν θυσίαν ποιεῖσθαι KATA TO 'ΙΕΡΩΤΑΤΟΝ ΔΙΑΤΑΓΜΑ. Phil. Jud. de Sacrif. Abel. et Cain. Oper. p. 145.

† Ibid. p. 145. Exod. xiii. 11—13.

Fathers, and a special luminary of the fourth century.

Respecting sacrifices, says this mighty theologian, the Pagan can object nothing to me except what he may deem the inconsistency, that we censure sacrifices as conducted by those of his own religious principles, notwithstanding that we read in our ancient canonical books, how GOD COMMANDED SACRIFICES TO BE OFFERED TO HIMSELF. Here then, treating somewhat more largely concerning true sacrifice, I will endeavour to demonstrate, that it is not due except to the one true God.

This true sacrifice, the true priest, who is the mediator between God and man, offered unto God: of which sacrifice, it was needful, that the promissory figures should be celebrated in animal victims, on account of the commendation of his future flesh and blood. For, through that one victim, the remission of sins, contracted from flesh and blood which cannot possess the kingdom of God, was in due time to be effected: because the same substance of the body shall be changed into a celestial quality; a matter indicated by the use of fire in sacrifice, swallowing up (as it were) death in victory.

Now these things were rightly celebrated among

that people, whose kingdom and whose priesthood were a standing prophecy of the future King and Priest, to govern and to consecrate the faithful in all nations, and to introduce them into the kingdom of heaven and into the holy assembly of the angels for life eternal.

Of this true sacrifice, then, as the Hebrews celebrated the religious predictive intimations, so did the Pagans celebrate certain sacrilegious imitations: because, as the Apostle speaks, What the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons and not to God.

FOR THE PROPHETIC IMMOLATION OF BLOOD, TESTIFYING, FROM THE VERY COMMENCEMENT OF THE HUMAN RACE, THE FUTURE PASSION OF THE MEDIATOR, IS A MATTER OF DEEP ANTIQUITY: INASMUCH AS ABEL IS FOUND, IN HOLY SCRIPTURE, TO HAVE BEEN THE FIRST, WHO OFFERED UP THIS PROPHETIC IMMOLATION.

Hence it is no marvel, if the fallen angels, of whom the two special vices are pride and falsehood, flitting through the air, exacted from their worshippers, by whom they wished to be esteemed Gods, that service, which they knew was justly due to the true God alone.

Sacrifice, therefore, sufficiently shews to whom it is due, not only WHEN THE TRUE GOD JUSTLY COM-

MANDS IT, *but even when a false god proudly exacts it* *.

In his own proper words, I have suffered Augustine to state his own sentiments ; that so

* De sacrificiis vero, nihil aliud mihi Paganus objiceret, nisi cur apud eos illa reprehendamus, cum, in nostris veteribus libris, TALIA SIBI DEUS NOSTER JUSSISSE LEGERETUR OFFERRI. Hic ego, de vero sacrificio latius fortasse disserens, demonstrarem id non deberi nisi uni vero Deo, quod unus ei verus sacerdos obtulit, *mediator Dei et hominum*, cujus sacrificii promissivas figuras in victimis animalium celebrari oportebat, propter commendationem futuræ carnis et sanguinis: per quam unam victimam fieret remissio peccatorum de carne et sanguine contractorum, quæ regnum Dei non possidebunt: quia eadem substantia corporis in cœlestem commutabitur qualitatem; quod ignis in sacrificio significabat, velut absorbens mortem in victoriam.

In eo autem populo hæc rite celebrata sunt, cujus et regnum et sacerdotium prophetia erat venturi regis et sacerdotis, ad regendos et consecrandos fideles in omnibus gentibus, et introducendos in regnum cœlorum et sacrarium angelorum ad vitam æternam.

Hujus itaque veri sacrificii sicut religiosa prædicamenta Hebræi celebraverint, ita sacrilega imitamenta Pagani: *quoniam, quæ immolant gentes*, ait Apostolus, *dæmoniis immolant et non Deo*. ANTIQUA ENIM RES EST PRÆNUNCIATIVA IMMOLATIO SANGUINIS, FUTURAM PASSIONEM MEDIATORIS AB INITIO GENERIS HUMANI TESTIFICANS: HANC ENIM PRIMUS ABEL OBTULISSE IN SACRIS LITERIS INVENITUR. Non igitur mirum est, si prævaricatores angeli, quorum duo maxima vitia sunt superbia atque fallacia, per hunc aërem volitantes, quod uni vero Deo deberi noverant, hoc sibi a suis cultoribus exegerunt a quibus dii putari voluerunt.

Sacrificium ergo, non solum CUM JUSTE IMPERAT VERUS DEUS, sed etiam cum superbe exigit falsus Deus, satis ostendit cui debeatur. August. cont. Faust. Manich. lib. xxii. c. 17. Oper. vol. vi. p. 145. Colon. Agrip. 1616.

each person may freely and fairly judge, as to the opinion of that eminent Father. With respect to myself, I certainly understand the learned Bishop of Hippo to maintain, most clearly and most decidedly, the identical tenet which I have undertaken to defend against the speculations of Mr. Davison.

(1.) The alone true efficacious sacrifice, he remarks, is the sacrifice of Christ the Mediator, offered up to God by himself the great and eternal High Priest.

But, of this sacrifice, all the animal victims under the Law of Moses were promissory figures or predictive intimations.

Yet we are not rashly to imagine, that typical sacrificial prophecy *began* with the Levitical Dispensation: on the contrary, says Augustine, *The PROPHETIC immolation of blood, testifying, FROM THE VERY COMMENCEMENT OF THE HUMAN RACE, the future passion of the Mediator, is a matter of DEEP ANTIQUITY; inasmuch as Abel is found, in Holy Scripture, to have been the first, who offered up THIS PROPHETIC IMMOLATION.*

The sacrifice of Abel, therefore, in the judgment of Augustine, was precisely of the SAME class or character, as the typical or prophetic sin-offerings under the Law. Each, ALIKE, pre-

dicted and *attested* the future passion of the Mediator.

But, as Mr. Davison himself most justly remarks, it is, in the very nature of things, impossible, that primitive patriarchal sacrifice could have been a *PROPHETIC type*, unless it were of *DIVINE institution*. For, “ if its *DIVINE institution* be taken away, the rite thereby forfeits “ its *PROPHETIC character*: it becomes simply a “ branch of the primitive religion; in which re- “ duced idea of it, however it might express “ the *piety* of the worshipper, it cannot be “ reckoned among the *TYPICAL signatures* of “ Christianity*.”

Hence, as Augustine maintained the *PROPHETIC character* of Abel's sacrifice, precisely in the same manner as he maintained the *PROPHETIC character* of the levitical sin-offerings: he must clearly, on Mr. Davison's own very rational principle, have maintained also, by a necessary consequence, the *DIVINE institution* of primitive patriarchal sacrifice.

(2.) Accordingly, he does not leave us merely to *infer* that such was his opinion, however inevitable the inference would be: he tells us

* Inquiry, p. 3.

explicitly, that GOD COMMANDED SACRIFICES TO BE OFFERED TO HIMSELF.

Now the context forbids us to confine this declaration to the sacrifices under the Mosaic Law. Any attempt thus to cramp a declaration, which occurs (be it observed) both at the commencement and at the close of his argument, to the sacrifices under the Law: any attempt thus gratuitously to cramp it will make the entire passage manifestly inconsistent. For, if, in the judgment of Augustine, sacrifice were DIVINELY instituted, *for the first time*, under the Mosaic Law: it is clear, that, in his judgment also, the sacrifice of Abel could not have been a PROPHETIC immolation. And, again, if, in his judgment, PROPHETIC OR TYPICAL sacrifice were *first* DIVINELY instituted through the instrumentality of Moses: it is equally clear, that, in his judgment also, sacrifice, under this precise aspect of its PROPHETIC OR TYPICAL character, could not have been, what yet he declares it to be, a matter of such deep antiquity that it had existed from the very commencement of the human race.

Thus indisputable is it, that an opinion, the rise of which has been vituperatively ascribed to the mere modern age of Puritanism, was, in

truth, maintained by Augustine of Hippo not less early than the fourth century.

2. My second exception is the mighty Athanasius, one of the most eminent of the Greek Fathers, and another splendid luminary of the same fourth age fruitful as it was in learning and talent.

The saints, he remarks, those real heralds of the truth, agree with one another, and vary not among themselves. For, though they were born at different times ; yet, being the prophets of the one true God and the harmonious evangelists of the one same word, they mutually tend to one and the same purpose.

What Moses taught, those things his predecessor Abraham had preserved : and, what Abraham had preserved, with those things Noah and Enoch were well acquainted ; for THEY MADE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CLEAN AND THE UNCLEAN, and were acceptable to the Deity.

Thus also, in like manner, Abel bore testimony. For he knew what he had learned from Adam : and ADAM HIMSELF TAUGHT ONLY WHAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY LEARNED FROM THE LORD.

Accordingly, the same Lord, at the end of the ages, having come into the world for the abolition of sin, declared : I give you not a new command-

ment, but an ancient commandment which ye have heard from the beginning *.

In this passage, I readily allow, there is no precise mention of sacrifice itself: but, both the general drift of the argument, and the peculiarity of the language employed, compel us, I think, to admit, that Athanasius had specially in his eye the TYPICAL OR PROPHETIC rite of expiatory oblation.

(1.) According to this illustrious Father of the early Greek Church, the whole scheme of the Gospel, at least in its grand outline, was uniformly known, and traditionally inculcated, then the very beginning.

The saints, says he, those real heralds of the truth, agree with one another, and vary not among themselves. For, though they were born at differ-

* 'Οὗ δὲ ἵνα, καὶ τῷ ὄντι τῆς ἀληθείας κήρυκες, ἀλλήλοις ἐκ συμφωνίας, καὶ οὐ διαφέρονται πρὸς ἑαυτούς. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ λαοὶ καὶ χρόνοι ἕτεροι γεγονόσιν, ἀλλ' εἰς ταυτὸν ἀλλήλοις ἡνωμένοι εἰδὲ δεῖν τοῦ Θεοῦ προφηταί, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν συμβεβηκὸς ἐκκαλεῖσθαι λόγον. Ἀ' γοῦν Μωσὴς ἐδίδασκε, καὶ Ἰσραὴλ ἐφύλαττε· ἡ δὲ Ἀβραὰμ ἐφύλαττε, ταῦτα ἴδον καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ὑπομνήσαν, ΔΙΑΚΡΙΝΟΝΤΕΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΑ ΑἰΤΙΑ ΑἰΤΙΑ ΑἰΤΙΑ, καὶ εὐάρεστοι γινόμενοι τῷ Θεῷ. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ Ἰσὼς αὐτὸς ἐμαρτύρησεν· ἐπιστάμενος καὶ ὁ Θεὸς διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ Ἀδάμ, ΤΟΥΤΕ ΚΑΙ Αὐτοὶ ΔΙΑΚΡΙΝΟΝΤΕΣ ΑἰΤΙΑ ΚΥΡΙΟΥ. Ὃς καὶ, ἐπὶ συντάξει τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν εἰς ἀθέτησιν τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ἔλεγεν· Ἰσὼς ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμῶν δίδωμι ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' ἐντολὴν παλαιάν ἦν διὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἡμῶν. Athan. Synod. Nicen. cont. Hær. Athan. theol. orat. vol. i. p. 402. Commel. 1600.

ent times ; yet, being the prophets of the one true God and the harmonious evangelists of the one same word, they mutually tend to one and the same purpose.

Thus speaks Athanasius : but his assertion is untrue, if the very PRINCIPLE of the Gospel, “ the very ESSENCE of the Christian Faith,” (as Mr. Davison speaks *,) the all-important doctrine of *an atonement by expiatory sacrifice*, were *totally unknown* to the patriarchal saints who flourished anterior to the time of Moses. For, if the *patriarchal* saints were IGNORANT of the very first principle of the Gospel, I see not, how the saints *in all ages* can be said to have AGREED with one another, and not to have VARIED among themselves.

Certainly, in *that* case, since the *patriarchal* saints must have held and taught the doctrine of *a reconciliation with God* EXCLUSIVELY of the *hitherto unrevealed principle of an atonement*, and since the saints *in all ages since the time of Moses* have constantly held and taught the doctrine of *a reconciliation with God avowedly on the now revealed principle of an atonement* : the *patriarchal* saints, and the *succeeding* saints whether under the Law or under the Gospel, cannot have

* Inquiry, p. 160.

been (as Athanasius asserts them to have been) *harmonious evangelists of the one same word*, cannot have *mutually tended to one and the same purpose*.

(2.) Thus evidently does the general drift of the argument shew, that Athanasius, in holding *the PRIMITIVE EXISTENCE of the principle of an atonement*, held also *the DIVINE INSTITUTION of primeval expiatory sacrifice*. But the matter, I apprehend, is put out of all doubt by the peculiarity of the language which he has employed.

The circumstance, which he specially insists upon as handed down by the early patriarchs from the original teaching of Adam by the Lord himself, is *the distinction between the CLEAN and the UNCLEAN*.

Now the Greek words, here used by Athanasius to express *the CLEAN and the UNCLEAN*, are precisely the same as those which are used by the Seventy to describe *the sacrificially CLEAN and UNCLEAN animals preserved by Noah in the ark**: and, that he alluded both to this transac-

* Gen. vii. 2, 3, 8. The Greek words, used by Athanasius, are καθαρά and ἀκάθαρα: the Greek words, used by the Seventy, are καθαρά and μὴ καθαρά. Compare Acts x. 14, and Levit. xi. 4, 6, 7, in the Greek. Athanasius ascribes to Noah and Enoch and the early patriarchs, in a direct line from God's own original teaching, that identical

tion and to Noah's subsequent sacrifice of every CLEAN beast and of every CLEAN fowl, there can be no reasonable doubt ; for he says, that *a distinction between the CLEAN and the UNCLEAN was made by Noah and Enoch, agreeably to the previous testimony of Abel, and in accordance with the yet earlier lessons which Adam had received from the Lord himself* *.

Such being the case, Athanasius clearly ascribes, to the Lord's own institution, *the sacrificial distinction of animals into the two classes of the CLEAN and the UNCLEAN.*

Whence, by an inevitable consequence, he pronounces, that *the Lord himself ordained the rite of animal expiatory sacrifice from the very beginning.* For thus runs his statement.

Moses, if Athanasius be correct in his opinion, taught what Abraham had preserved : and Abraham taught *that sacrificial distinction between the CLEAN and the UNCLEAN*, which Moses afterward enforced, and which he himself through the channel of his patriarchal ancestors had traditionally learned from Noah and Enoch. But

distinction between the clean and the unclean, which was afterward made so prominent a feature in the Law. Compare the clause in Athanasius with Levit. xi. 47.

* Gen. viii. 20.

Noah and Enoch taught nothing *new*. To what *they* taught, Abel, in his primitive sacrificial devotement of a *CLEAN* animal, had borne *his* testimony: the knowledge of Abel, as to the fitness of such a distinction, was derived from Adam: THE KNOWLEDGE OF ADAM WAS DERIVED FROM THE LORD.

3. My third exception is Eusebius of Cesarèa, who still flourished in the same fourth century, and who was one of the most extensively learned of the Greek Fathers.

The Hebrew Scripture teaches us, says he, that the first race of men, in the very earliest constitution of social life, honoured the Deity with animal sacrifices. For it speaks in manner following.

Now it came to pass after certain days, that Cain brought of the fruit of the earth an offering to the Lord: and Abel also brought of the firstlings of his flock. And God had respect to Abel and to his gifts: but to Cain and to his offerings he had not respect.

Here you may learn, that he, who sacrificed animals, is declared to be more acceptable, than he who brought unto God an offering from the earth. Noah also immediately devoted, of all the clean beasts and of all the clean birds, burnt-offerings upon the altar: and the Lord smelled a savour of

- maintained, let the tenet be adopted; if it cannot be legitimately maintained, let the tenet be forthwith dismissed. Should I, at any future time, be compelled, by the force of solid and irresistible evidence, to relinquish my present opinion; I shall feel it no disgrace to have been vanquished in controversy by such an antagonist as Mr. Davison.

THE END.

DUTY, *by animal sacrifice, to offer unto the Lord a ransom, life for life, of their own life and proper nature.*

Thus also did those ANCIENT LOVERS OF GOD, having previously LEARNED THROUGH THE DIVINE SPIRIT, that a certain venerable and great victim, a victim really acceptable unto God, would at length come to men ; a victim, which should be the purifier of the whole world ; a victim, of which they, being prophets and typically exhibiting what was about to come to pass, rightly appointed animal victims to be symbols. But this was the Christ of God, whose advent among men, and whose sacrificial devotement like a sheep on behalf of the whole human race, were from old time predicted *.

* Τους γάρτοι πρώτους εὐθὺς γενομένους ἀνθρώπους, ἅμα τῇ πρώτῃ συστάσει τοῦ βίου, θυσίαις ταῖς ἀπὸ ζώων τιμῆσαι τὸ θεῖον ἱστορεῖ. Λέγει δ' οὖν· Καὶ ἐγενέτο μεθ' ἡμέρας ἤνεγκε Κάιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν τῆς γῆς θυσίαν τῷ Κυρίῳ· καὶ Ἀβελ ἤνεγκε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τῶν πρωτοτόκων τῶν προβάτων αὐτοῦ. Καὶ ἐπεῖδεν ὁ Θεὸς ἐπὶ Ἀβελ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς δώροις αὐτοῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ Κάιν καὶ ταῖς θυσίαις αὐτοῦ οὐ προσέσχεν. Ἐνθα δὴ ἐπιστήσεις, ὡς μᾶλλον ὁ ζωοθυτήσας ἀποδεκτος εἴρηται παρὰ τὸν ἀπὸ γῆς προσαγαγόντα τῷ Θεῷ τὴν θυσίαν. Καὶ Νῶε δὲ εὐθὺς ἀπὸ παντῶν τῶν κτηνῶν τῶν καθαρῶν, καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν πτηνῶν τῶν καθαρῶν, ἀννήγκεν ἰλοκαρπῶσεις ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον· καὶ ὠσφράνθη Κύριος ὀσμὴν εὐωδίας. Ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀβραὰμ θύσας ἀναγέγραπται. Ὡστε, κατὰ τὴν τῆς θείας γραφῆς μαρτυρίαν, πρώτην πάντων τὴν διὰ ζώων θυσίαν ἐπινενοήσθαι ΤΟΙΣ ΠΑΛΑΙ ΘΕΟΦΙΛΕΣΙ. Τοῦτου δὲ τὸν λογισμόν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι, οὐ ΤΟΝ ΤΥΧΟΝΤΑ οὐδ' ἈΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΩΣ ΚΕΚΙΝΗΜΕΝΟΝ, κατὰ ΘΕΙΑΝ δ' ΕΠΙΝΟΙΑΝ ὑποβεβλημένον. Ἐπειδὴ γάρ

It would be difficult to find a more distinct and precise doctrinal statement, than that which is exhibited in the present very remarkable passage.

Eusebius begins with those worshippers under the Patriarchal Dispensation, whom he calls *the ancient lovers of God*. These, from the very beginning, were accustomed to devote animal sacrifices, *not through accident, not as a matter of mere human invention*; but in consequence of a *certain divine contrivance*, which rendered the

ἐσθλόν, ἅτε τὸν τρόπον εὐσεβεῖς καὶ Θεῷ προσωκειωμένοι θεῶν τε Πνεύματι τὰς ψυχὰς πεφωτισμένοι, μεγάλης αὐτοῖς θεραπέας δὲν εἰς ἀποκάθαρσιν τῶν θνητῶν πλημμελημάτων, λύτρον τῆς αὐτῶν σωτηρίας τῷ καὶ ζωῆς καὶ ψυχῆς χορηγῶ προσοφείλεσθαι ἡγοῦντο. "Ἐπειτα μηδὲν κρεῖττον καὶ τιμιώτερον τῆς οἰκείας ψυχῆς καθιεροῦν ἔχοντες, ἀντὶ ταύτης τῶς τῇν διὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων προσήγον θυσίαν, τῆς σφῶν ψυχῆς ἀντίψυχα προσκομίζοντες—Τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ Μωσῆς λευκότερα που διασαφεῖ, λέγων· Ψυχὴ πάσης σαρκὸς αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἐστίν· καὶ ἐγὼ δέδωκα ὑμῖν τὸ αἷμα ἐπὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου, ἐξιλάσκεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ὑμῶν—Σαφῶς γὰρ ἀντὶ τῆς ἀνθρώπινης ψυχῆς τὸ τῶν σφαγιαζομένων ζώων αἷμα φησὶν ἐξιλάσκεσθαι—"Ἐως μὲν οὖν οὐδέπω τὸ κρεῖττον οὐδὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ τιμιον καὶ θεοπρεπὲς σφάγιον παρῆν ἀνθρώποις, ταῖς διὰ ζώων θυσίαις λύτρα τῆς ἑαυτῶν ζωῆς καὶ ἀντίψυχα τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως προσηκόντως ἀποδίδοναι ΧΡΗΝ τῷ Θεῷ, ὥς καὶ ἔπραττον· Οἱ ΠΑΛΑΙΟΘΕΟΦΙΛΕΙΣ, σεμνὸν τι καὶ θεοφιλὲς καὶ μέγα ἱερεῖον ἤξεῖν ποτὲ εἰς ἀνθρώπους Τῷ Θεῷ, ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙ ΠΡΟΕΙΛΗΦΟΤΕΣ, τὸ τοῦ παντός καθάριστον κόσμου, οὗ καὶ τὰ σύμβολα τέως ἐπιτελεῖν αὐτοὺς προφῆτας ὄντας καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι προτυπομένους—Οὗτος δ' ἦν ὁ Χριστὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἄνωθεν ἐκ παλαιῶν χρόνων ἤξεῖν εἰς ἀνθρώπους, καὶ προβάτου δίκην ὑπὲρ παντός τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους σφαγήσασθαι, προαγορευόμενος, Euseb. Cæsariens. Demonst. Evan. lib. i. c. 9. p. 24, 25. Latet. Rob. Stephan, 1545.

sacrificer of animals more acceptable to God than the sacrificer of vegetable productions. As for the notion with which they devoted their primitive animal sacrifices, it was precisely the same as that which afterward so eminently characterised the Law of Moses. Their sacrifices were strictly piacular: and it was *their duty*, their duty evidently, because a divine commandment had *made* it their duty; it was *their duty* to offer such sacrifices, until that better sacrifice, which all other sacrifices of an expiatory nature typically represented, should in the fulness of time come into the world. Whatever, in short, was done ideally under the Law in the matter of piacular sacrifice; thus also, according to Eusebius, did those *ancient lovers of God* under the Patriarchal Dispensation. For they had *previously learned through the divine Spirit*, that a really acceptable victim would hereafter be devoted: and, in consequence of this revealed knowledge, they, being prophets, rightly appointed animal victims to be types or symbols of that future efficacious and God-befitting victim, who, on behalf of the whole human race, should, make a full and sufficient and satisfactory atonement*.

* The present singularly strong passage is noticed by Dr.

Such are the sentiments of Eusebius of Cæsarea, relative to the origin and ideality of primitive animal sacrifice. In his bare opinion, he may be very right, as I think ; or he may be very wrong, as Mr. Davison thinks : but such, at all events, is his opinion : and it will be recollected, that I am now producing evidence, not to the truth of a tenet, but to its ecclesiastical antiquity. The rise of this tenet Mr. Davison

Outram : but he is unwilling to allow, that in it Eusebius indicates any persuasion that patriarchal expiatory sacrifice was of divine institution.

I regret the necessity of complaining, that this able writer has in no wise acted with perfect fairness.

Of the entire passage, which is much longer than even as I have given it, he quotes only a few lines, omitting what I deem some of its very strongest points : and, with respect to what he has quoted, he makes an assertion, for which it may be doubted whether the words of Eusebius give him any sufficient warrant.

The assertion is, that *The knowledge of THE DIVINE CONTRIVANCE, in consequence of which animal victims were peculiarly devoted by the early patriarchs, was not common to all, but was limited to those who were the best.* See Outram. de Sacrif. lib. i. c. 1. § VI. p. 10, 11.

This, so far as I can see, is a virtual acknowledgment, however cramped, that *Eusebius held the DIVINE institution of primitive sacrifice.*

Accordingly, in another part of his work, Dr. Outram confesses, that, in the judgment of Eusebius, the sacrifices of Abel and Noah and Abraham were, in their nature, all peculiar, and, in their import, all prophetically typical of the expiatory sacrifice of Christ. Outram. de Sacrif. lib. 1. c. 22. § II. p. 249, 250.

ascribes to the age of modern Puritanism; by which I understand him to mean, chronologically, the seventeenth century: yet, as a simple matter of fact, we find it advocated, in the fourth century, by three of the most eminent among both the Greek and the Latin Fathers.

On the whole, I think we may gather, that, so far as the question was agitated in the primitive Church, the same diversity of opinion prevailed as that which still prevails in our own days. The witnesses, produced by Mr. Davison, maintain *the human institution of patriarchal sacrifice*: the witnesses, produced by myself, maintain *its divine institution*: while a considerable body of the Fathers, whose writings I have been led to examine, preserve, at least so far as a direct *expression* of sentiment is concerned, *a complete neutrality* *. Under these circumstances, the authority of the Fathers must, I apprehend, be thrown out of the question: and the matter must be debated and settled upon its own intrinsic

* It will perhaps be recollected, that Epiphanius and Cyril of Alexandria employ language, which certainly *seems* to import that they held the divine institution of primitive sacrifice. I do not, however, directly adduce them in evidence, because I appear to gather their sentiments only in the way of induction. See above, sect. iv. chap. 8. § 1. 2.

merits. Had any one of those ancient writers left us a direct argumentative treatise on the subject, it would certainly have been a deeply interesting production: but no such treatise has come within the narrow limits of my own ecclesiastical reading. I will not, indeed, take upon myself to deny the *existence* of such a treatise: for the very insignificant fact of *my* not having met with it is doubtless no proof of its *non-existence*. Yet I cannot refrain from suspecting, that no such treatise *has* descended to us: for, *had* this been the case, it would, most probably, long ere now have been brought to light by the learning and the industry of a Lightfoot or an Outram, a Spencer or a Warburton, a Magee or a Kennicott.

III. In taking leave of my exemplary and able opponent, I beg to apologise for any unguarded expression which unwittingly may have hurt his feelings. For the simple statement either of *facts* or of *arguments*, which may have a tendency to establish *my own* opinion and to subvert that which *he* has been led to adopt, he himself, I am assured, would not *wish* me to apologise.

We have each alike been influenced by an honest love of truth, the search after which has

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